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ABSTRACT
THE BODY AS SYMBOL: BRINGING TOGETHER
THEORIES OF SEX/GENDER AND RACE
FOR THEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Patricia Lewis, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, May 2010

This dissertation focuses on race and sex/gender as critical theological topics that are
not being adequately addressed in most theological discourse. They are either deemed
irrelevant to mainstream theology and addressed in a theoretically unsophisticated manner, if
at all, or compartmentalized in theological specializations leaving them outside mainstream
theological discourse and separate from each other. Sex/gender and race are important topics
for several reasons. First, much suffering has resulted from the meanings human beings have
assigned to various articulations of sex/gender and race and the actions taken and institutions
established based on these meanings. Second, reflection on race and sex/gender leads to
conversation about the reality and meaning of the body, and the body is a crucial theological
topic. Third, the most central questions in theology lead us to the body and discussion of the
body leads us to the most fundamental questions of theology.
I argue that theology needs to create common approaches for reflection on the body
that consider the whole body. My project presents a tool to establish better theological
discourse about the body that takes these specificities into consideration and brings them
together in theological anthropology. I first explore theological discourses concerning race
and sex/gender in order to plot a landscape of and for these conversations. This landscape
exposes the complexity of these topics and reveals that within each conversation there is
great disparity about how to talk about race and sex/gender. This first step of the project can
help theologians articulate and map their own theories of sex/gender and race and promote
more sophisticated conversation about the body within the discipline of theology. This part
of the dissertation also illustrates the centrality of the questions of sex/gender and race for
theology. In the second part of this dissertation, I explore womanist theology to gain insights
for bringing race and sex/gender together in theological discourse. Building on these
insights, my proposal of the body as symbol argues that a full appreciation of the body in its
specificity and complexity must address the body as construction and the body as expression.
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1
The fact that theology also considers the body should not astonish or surprise anyone who is
aware of the mystery and reality of the Incarnation. Theology is that science whose subject
is divinity. Through the fact that the Word of God became flesh, the body entered theology
through the main door.
John Paul II, The Theology of the Body1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

I.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
James Cone asserts that people enter the liberation struggle, in the broadest sense,

from their own specific experience and perspective. This project arises from the questions of
my own life. I have been thinking about the body for a long time. I have had life-long
questions of how and why sex/gender differences affect family, society, and church. My
decision to live and work in a low-income community led me to question how class
differences keep some segregated and award others benefits. My experience in the inner city
as well as academia raised my awareness of how race differences seep through all class
structures. I witness how differences in the sexual orientation of my friends keep them
isolated and uncelebrated in society. These experiences have taught me the influence the
meanings we assign to body categories have on all aspects of life. These observations have
challenged me to think more deeply and critically about the body in its specificity. This
project brings my theological study to bear on the questions of my life and an important,
though often neglected, subject of study. This dissertation focuses on race and sex/gender as
critical theological topics that are not being adequately addressed in most theological
discourse.2

1

John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston: Pauline Books and Media,
1997), 88.
2
Of course, conversations about race and sex/gender are being had in some specialized fields of theology. I am
concerned here with “mainstream” theological discourse and the fact that one can more often than not take a

2
In my own study of theology, I have found two main reasons for this lack of adequate
consideration of race and sex/gender.3 First, sex/gender and race are often deemed irrelevant
to mainstream theological discourse. Most theologians whose work does not specialize or
focus on race and sex/gender relegate conversations about the concrete realities of the body
to those theologians who have problematic bodies. These same theologians seem content to
brush aside the realities of race and sex/gender and speak about a theoretically unraced and
unsexed/ungendered body. This unwillingness to engage in theological discourse about race
and sex/gender seems to be accompanied by a general inability to have these conversations.
There is much confusion about how body categories like race and sex/gender are used and
what is meant when they are invoked. Terms such as gender, sex, woman, man, and race are
conflictual and there is widespread disagreement about these terms. I approach the body not
simply as matter versus spirit or as that hypothetical material body that all humans have that
makes us human. Bodies are always part of the social, political, cultural, and economic
matrix in which we find them. Theology must discuss the body in all its concreteness and
difference. The body is always raced and sexed/gendered and this reality must be
incorporated into mainstream theological anthropology.

graduate level theological anthropology course or read a theological anthropology text and never come across
the words race or sex/gender.
3
In this chapter, I explain my reasons for this lack of adequate consideration of race and sex/gender. Other
reasons given by both theologians and theorists will be explored in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. In
Chapter 4, womanist scholars give their reasons why the intersection of race and sex/gender is not adequately
addressed even in theological specializations. For more discussion on race and sex/gender and theological
education and endeavor, see James H. Cone, “Theology’s Great Sin: Silence in the Face of White Supremacy,”
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 55, no. 3-4 (2001): 1-15; Dwight H. Hopkins, “Black Theology on
Theological Education,” in Black Faith and Public Talk: Critical Essays on James Cone’s Black Theology and
Black Power, ed. Dwight H. Hopkins (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 41-52; Robert J. Deotis, “And We
Are Not Saved: A Black Theologian Looks at Theological Education,” Religious Education 87 (Summer 1992):
353-69; Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, “Religion, Gender, and Society: Shaping the Discipline of
Religious/Theological Studies,” in The Relevance of Theology: Nathan Söderblom and the Development of an
Academic Discipline, ed. Carl Reinhold Bråkenhielm and Gunhild Winqvist Hollman (Uppsala, Sweden:
Uppsala University, 2002), 85-99; and Denise Lardner Carmody, “Integrating Feminist Perspectives with the
Religious Studies Curriculum: Setting the Question,” Horizons 16 (Fall 1989): 292-301.
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The second reason sex/gender and race are not adequately addressed in theological
discourse is that theologies that do take categories of materiality like race and sex/gender into
consideration have been compartmentalized, and often marginalized, into separate and
distinct specializations. This is problematic for two reasons. First, they are cordoned off
from mainstream theological discourse. This results in an ostracism of discussions of
sex/gender and race from mainstream theology and a ghettoization of this important
conversation. Second, because of specialization these discourses about race and sex/gender
become distinct and separate from each other.4 Race and sex/gender become separate
subjects in theology because they are based on such specifics as personal and community
experience. Both can and have been treated as essential to identity. Within the separate
theological conversations about race and sex/gender, one may now be required to note the
importance of the other bodily reality but not to explore it at any great depth. Theology
needs to explore how discourses about race and sex/gender can come together for theological
anthropology.
This dissertation is my response to these frustrations and challenges. My goal in this
project is twofold. First, I explore theological discourses concerning race and sex/gender in
order to plot a landscape of and for these conversations. This landscape exposes the
complexity of these topics and reveals that within each conversation there is great disparity
about how to talk about race and sex/gender. This first step of the project can help
theologians articulate and map their own theories of sex/gender and race and promote more
sophisticated conversation about the body within the discipline of theology. In addition, this
part of the dissertation illustrates the centrality of the questions of sex/gender and race for
4

This of course is not the case in womanist theology but this specialty, like most liberation theologies, claims to
be and is treated as a theology of, by and for a specific community resulting in only that community attending to
it, in this case African American women.
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theology and demonstrates how theories of the body and theology are intertwined. Although
this first step begins to connect sex/gender and race discourses around a central organizing
concept, it is in the second part of this dissertation that I propose a theological approach to
the body that brings discourses about race and sex/gender together for theological
anthropology.
This project is based on the presupposition that race and sex/gender are important
topics for theological discourse. They are important for several reasons. First, much
suffering has resulted from the meanings human beings have assigned to various articulations
of sex/gender and race and the actions taken and institutions established based on these
meanings. Definitions of sex/gender have resulted in the second-class citizenship of women
in society and church. The black/white racial divide in the United States has resulted in the
suffering of the black community. The essentialization of the meanings of woman and black
to mean white women and black men has resulted in a general ignorance of the plight of
black women. Meanings of the categories of race and sex/gender include various
assumptions about acceptable sexuality. Women, people of color, and people with
“alternative” sexual orientations all struggle with the meanings imposed upon their bodies.
They struggle because their bodies are read in society as abnormal, inferior, or scripted for
specific roles that they may not want. Their freedom in living these bodies is limited by the
scripts presumed imprinted on them by genitalia, color, or “perversion” based on the
assumed misuse of their bodies.
I understand oppression to include both the unjust limitation of persons,
opportunities, and lives as well as outright discrimination and violence.5 This unjust

5

I find helpful Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s use of Iris Marion Young’s criteria of oppression for social
groups, which include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and systemic
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limitation and discrimination is based on theories and theologies of the body. Religious
belief systems have undergirded the oppositional way we think about men and women and
have contributed to the way we understand different races. Theologians need to recognize
the contributions of Christianity to the dehumanization of certain bodies and its justification
of the violence and oppression of persons based on physical attributes.6 If Christian
theologians believe that reflection on sin and redemption is important theological work, then
consideration of sex/gender and race must be part of theological discourse. Some may argue
that race and sex/gender in themselves are neutral and that racism and sexism are the true
problems. I contend that racism and sexism are inherent in the racial categories of black and
white and the sex/gender categories of male/female and masculine/feminine because the
history and language embedded in these descriptions are racist and sexist. Any real
liberation from these impediments and attacks must include a better understanding of the
concepts and realities of race and sex/gender.
The second reason discourse about sex/gender and race is important for theological
study is that reflection on race and sex/gender leads to conversation about the reality and
meaning of the body, and the body is a crucial theological topic. The work of the theologians
I explore evidence the body’s centrality for theological study. Pope John Paul II understood
the body as central to all theology, both our anthropology, which is our understanding of
violence. Schüssler Fiorenza adds two criteria related to theology and religion, namely silencing, and
vilification and trivialization. See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Sharing Her Word: Feminist Biblical
Interpretation in Context (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 29-31. For Young’s use of these criteria, see Iris
Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression,” in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), 38-65.
6
From its inception, feminist theology has been concerned with uncovering and naming the patriarchy in the
Christian tradition. See Mary Daly, The Church and the Second Sex (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), and
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983)
as two seminal works in early feminist theology. Likewise, black theology has always called attention to the
racism in the Christian tradition, such as the biblical interpretation of white scholars and ministers that claimed
that the enslavement of black people was intended by God and recorded in scripture, thereby justifying slavery
in this country. See James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed, rev. ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997), and
Gregory Baum and John Coleman, eds., The Church and Racism (New York: Seabury Press, 1982).
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ourselves, and our theology, which is our understanding of God.7 James Cone also makes
this connection when he asserts that our search for identity is nothing less than our search for
God.8 Consideration of the body is crucial because human persons live as specific bodies.
We immediately notice the race and sex/gender of each person we meet. We use these
categories to provide clues to who a person is and we are uncomfortable if we cannot classify
the person within the categories we use. Michael Omi and Howard Winant are race theorists
who argue that without racial identity one is in danger of having no identity.9 I would extend
that argument to include sex/gender identity as well. Feminist, womanist, and black
theologians challenge the theological community to recognize that not all bodies are the
same. With the growth of these liberation theologies, there is a growing awareness of the
complexity of the body. Since the specificity of bodies matters so much in the living of life
and church, we must think theologically about specific bodies not just the body as flesh
opposed to the soul.
Consideration of the body is also crucial for theology because at the center of
Christian belief and life is the Body of Christ. This most important body is individual,
communal, and eucharistic. The study of this body is concerned with the life and
circumstances of a specific person, the community born out of this life, and the sacramental
reality that binds them together. Theological reflection on the Body of Christ affects and is
affected by how we theologize about our own bodies. To understand Jesus Christ as the
Incarnation means that Jesus was a body-person. God took on humanity and shared in its
condition. Therefore, we must understand that Jesus Christ lived specifically as all humans

7

John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 47.
James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 14.
9
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (New
York: Routledge, 1994), 59.
8
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do. Jesus of Nazareth was a first century, Jewish man who lived in an occupied country.
These were the constructions that formed his identity. But he also lived deliberately. His
personal expression of his body was to make his place with the oppressed and outcasts of his
society and religion and to share in their condition in his very humanity, which included his
materiality. This is why liberation theologians see the Incarnation as key to theological body
talk. God is present in our very humanity. The body is the instrument for divine presence.
Roman Catholic Christianity still professes Christ’s material presence in the Eucharist
and in the community formed by its belief in the Incarnation. The liturgy and presence of
Christ in it involve specific meanings of bodily categorization as the community decides who
represents and reflects Christ. The Body of Christ that is the Church is human and therefore
both forms and is formed by the categories of sex/gender and race. The following
investigation into race and sex/gender argues that who the Church is and how the Church
lives is deeply affected by the meanings assigned to race and sex/gender. Since the Church is
a body and bodies do not exist outside of these categories, the Church must reflect on what
meanings of race and sex/gender it embraces and which bodies it excludes.
My third reason why discourse about the body is crucial for theology is that the most
central questions in theology lead us to the body, and discussion of the body leads us to the
most fundamental questions of theology. Discourse about sex/gender and race can serve as
entry points to discussions of inequality and injustice, but also elicit and engage biblical
hermeneutics, ecclesiological practices and beliefs, as well as ontological considerations.
How one interprets biblical revelation informs their understanding of the body. The body is
central to reflection on Christian mysteries that occur during liturgical rites in word and
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action.10 Theological reflection on bodies in their specificity explores the significance of
history for human identity and the question of how persons come to be at all. The
theologians included in this dissertation argue, and I would agree, that the very topic of the
subject cannot be considered without addressing the concepts of sex/gender and race. These
considerations of personhood are in turn intimately connected to notions of ontology and
truth. Therefore, ideas about sex/gender and race and the body in its specificity enter the
debate about whether universals exist in human living. The meaning a theologian attributes
to the body also goes to the very heart of their method and reflects their goals and concerns.
All ideas have bodies. Patricia Hill Collins argues that ideas cannot be divorced from the
individuals who create and share them so the identity, and therefore bodily categories, of the
owner of any idea matters.11 Liberation theologians argue that how we think, what we think
about, and what we think is true is intimately related to our placement within intersecting
oppressions based on body differentiation. Our experience and our prejudice influence our
research and our scholarly claims.

II.

METHOD
My approach to discourse about the body is informed by both my study of liberation

theologies and contemporary gender and race theories. Liberation theology anchors this
project within the struggle to liberate body-persons from oppression associated with the
meanings assigned to bodily categories. The analysis of race and sex/gender found in this
10

At the heart of any Christian Eucharistic ritual are the words, “This is my body.” Other Catholic liturgical
observances that involve reflection on the body are Corpus Christi, the Assumption of Mary, and Easter. Karl
Rahner’s theology of the symbol, which includes his reflections on the body as symbol, originates in his
thoughts on devotion to the Sacred Heart. The statement of belief found in the Apostles’ Creed includes the
words “We believe in the resurrection of the body.”
11
Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment,
2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 265.
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dissertation is not just an intellectual exercise but a task that is part of the greater project to
liberate individuals from that which oppresses and limits them and to create more inclusive
communities. I focus on prominent theologians who investigate bodily meaning for theology
with emphasis on race and sex/gender and examine how these theologians read the body and
explore its specificity within a theological context. In addition to insights from liberation
theology, I utilize theological investigations of symbol and its application to bodies, both
individual and communal, and the Body of Christ in all its aspects to create a method for
discourse of the specific materiality of bodies.
My study of the body also utilizes insights from contemporary theory about race and
sex/gender. Contemporary race and gender theories are becoming more and more part of
theological discourse about the body.12 Theology cannot ignore the specificity of bodies, and
contemporary theory is a great aid in thinking about this specificity. Theorists explore how
meaning is assigned to bodies and how these meanings can be changed. It examines how
history and language are at the heart of bodily reality. Theology needs to consider theoretical
approaches to the body that critique the very body categories that theologians often assume.
I believe that these theoretical critiques can help liberation theologians achieve their goal of
freedom from oppression. My own felt need for theoretical help to analyze the body in its
specificity led me first to gender theory. Reading Judith Butler and her theoretical approach
to the very idea of the materiality of the body opened up to me the space to think about the
fluidity of bodily meaning and how it is determined within discourse. Race theory
challenged me to see the historical nature of bodily meaning and how the body is always both
12

Critical race theory began as a development in contemporary legal studies, but now can encompass an
intellectual movement in natural and scientific scholarship that critically analyzes and problematizes the
concept of race. Gender theory is a field of inquiry that questions any universal beliefs about women and men
and attempts to map the cultural, societal, and political roots of gender and sex. See the introductions of
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation for a more in-depth account of the focus of both gender and race theory.
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present and past. These contemporary theories recognize that bodies are difficult to capture
and define with any one, or once and for all, category. Race and gender theories reveal the
diversity of the very categories of race and sex/gender.
My project embraces this pluralism and sits comfortably within a postmodern
context.13 This context treats pluralism as the way we are, not something to be overcome.
Diversity in the meaning and reality of sex/gender and race is the realization that postmodern
consciousness opens up to us and for us. This consciousness does not demand a single
answer or smooth synthesis. In a postmodern context we need tools that allow us to better
live in the pluralism of the world today. It is not my intent to dismiss the theories of any of
the theologians and theorists I encounter in this dissertation, but to understand each approach
to race and sex/gender and create dialogue among them. The central problem for theology
that I am addressing is the lack of sophisticated dialogue about race and sex/gender. I am
proposing a tool for discussion. Knowledge about different theories allows us to think better
about sex/gender and race. By arranging these theories around a central organizing principle,
we can better understand where they are in agreement and where they diverge. By situating
these theories within a theological context, we better understand how sex/gender and race are
related to the core questions and values of any theological system.
I believe that bodies exist as diverse and complex realities that are not easily defined
and never fully captured in language. Every body-person is different and complex. People
authentically live sex/gender and race differently. Race and sex/gender exist as multi13

For more detailed accounts of the meanings of postmodernity as well as its intersection with theology, see
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985 (Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minnesota Press, 1993); Walter James Lowe, “Postmodern Theology,” in Oxford Handbook of Systematic
Theology, eds. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 61723; Graham Ward, ed., Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
2001); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); and A. K. M. Adam, ed., Handbook of Postmodern Biblical Interpretation (St. Louis:
Chalice Press, 2000).
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faceted, complex realities. Identity can never be captured with any one category or bodily
description. There is always difference and diversity. People are more than any category of
identity; but they are always these categories as well. Therefore, no one theoretical approach
to race or sex/gender is sufficient. Race and sex/gender overlap, intersect, influence each
other, and exist with other identifying realities like class and sexuality. Adequate discourse
about race and sex/gender must also recognize that the meanings of bodies change over time.
This project considers a complex and messy body.
How do we talk about the body then? Can we talk about the body or must we talk
about individual or specific bodies? I think there must be a balance. Theologies that
intentionally begin with specific experiences are very important for any theology of the body.
People do have something authentic to say about themselves and their identity. Theology
must leave room in theoretical discourse for life stories, both past and present, and personal
experiences. But too much reliance on experience for discourse about the body can be a
frustrating endeavor. Some use their own experience to cancel out another’s experience or
the other’s frustration with body categories. A counter argument is often formed around a
differing opinion one member of any group in question holds. Therefore, theology must
include theoretical approaches to the body in addition to the experiential witness of
individual bodies. I contend that all theologies include theories about sex/gender and race,
whether articulated or not, because all theological methods lead to certain theories of
sex/gender and race. An engagement with various theories of categorizing the body can help
theologians better appreciate the significance of these categories for their theological work
whether they personally think race and sex/gender are important or not.
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III.

ARGUMENT
To do this work of liberation of body-persons, theology must reflect on the body itself

because racism, white privilege, sexism, androgyny, heterosexism, and homophobia are body
issues. Bodies are sites of oppression and the meanings we give to them justifications for
this oppression. Theology needs to create common approaches for reflection on the body
that consider the whole body, attending to all of its specificities. My project presents a tool
to establish better theological discourse about the body that takes these specificities into
consideration and brings them together in theological anthropology for the whole body. This
tool addresses the two problems outlined above, namely, the reality that discourse about race
and sex/gender is often deemed irrelevant for mainstream theology and therefore addressed
in a theoretically unsophisticated manner, if at all, and that discourse that does occur about
race and sex/gender is ostracized into theological specializations usually ignored by most
theologians and often separated from each other.
The first problem is addressed through analyses of theories of sex/gender and race. I
use construction as an organizing concept for these analyses. The notion that sex/gender and
race are somehow constructed realities is present in both theological and theoretical
discourse.14 The idea that the body and the categories by which it is given meaning are

14

Even before the term construction was widely used in theology some theologians recognized that the
meanings of bodies are ambiguous and shifting. In their early work, theologians such as James Cone, Elisabeth
Schüssler Fiorenza, and Delores Williams took quite seriously the idea that the meanings we give to certain
bodies are socially, culturally, and religiously constructed by history, language, and power. All three
theologians are interested in some way in unmooring bodily categories from “natural” descriptions. The
ambiguity and shifting meaning of the body is now expressed in the notion that the meanings of bodies, even
bodies themselves, are constructed within and by the context in which they are located. The concept that bodies
are constructed is a result of the wider discourse of deconstruction, which is a term used to refer to a
contemporary intellectual movement in philosophy, literary theory, and criticism, although not restricted to
these, and best understood in terms of its association with the writings of French philosopher Jacques Derrida.
Deconstruction is a strategy to analyze texts and social reality in order to disclose their cultural and social
dynamics and unquestioned assumptions as well as unresolved tensions, conflicts and contradictions.
Resonating Derrida’s statement that “There is nothing outside the text,” deconstruction recognizes no essential
difference between language and the world. The critical analysis of deconstruction is not meant to obliterate or
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constructed means that body categories once understood to have ahistorical, scientific, or
ontological meanings can be understood to have political, contextual, ever-shifting, and
changeable meanings. We are now being challenged to deconstruct these body designations
to understand why they have the meanings they do. There is much debate about the very
notion of construction; this debate will be part of my examination of theories of sex/gender
and race.
Reflecting on the body as construction is a tool to systematize specialized liberation
theologies and as a bridge to connect them together in order to better theologize about the
body. Using construction as an organizing principle I map theories of race and sex/gender to
aid theologians in navigating these discourses. There is no one theory or meaning to
sex/gender or race and these maps help clarify the differences. Theologians can then plot
their own theories of race and sex/gender. Acknowledging and understanding one’s own
ideas about each of these categories is an important first step to doing justice to the
importance and relevance of body categories for theology. One must be clear about where
one stands in these dialogues to have relevant and sophisticated discourse and dialogue about

demolish that which is its object of analysis, but to open up space for rethinking or new thinking about it.
Nicholas Royle claims that deconstruction is, above all perhaps, a questioning of the “is,” a concern with what
remains to be thought, with what cannot be thought within the present. Derrida himself writes, “Destabilization
is required for ‘progress’…And the ‘de-’ of deconstruction signifies not the demolition of what is constructing
itself, but rather what remains to be thought beyond the constructivist or destructionist scheme.” Jacques
Derrida, “Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion,” in Limited, Inc., ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Samuel Weber
and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 147. He has described as “the least bad
definition” of “deconstruction,” namely “the experience of the impossible.” Jacques Derrida, “Afterw.rds: or, at
least, less than a letter about a letter less,” in Afterwords, ed. Nicholas Royle, trans. Geoffrey Bennington
(Tampere, Finland: Outside Books, 1992). For more on deconstruction and its place within theological
discourse, see Thomas J. J. Altizer et al, eds., Deconstruction and Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982); John
D. Caputo and Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1997); David W. Odell-Scott, “Deconstruction,” in Handbook of Postmodern
Biblical Interpretation, 55-61; Nicholas Royle, ed., Deconstruction: A User’s Guide (New York: Palgrave,
2000); and the work of Mark C. Taylor including Deconstructing Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1982),
Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), and “The End(s) of
Theology,” in Introduction to Christian Theology: Contemporary North American Perspectives, ed. Roger A.
Badham (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998).
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the body in theology today. This dialogue must consider the particularities of any body and
these particularities are specific to the context in which bodies are situated. The implications
of race for a body in the United States have been shaped by the experience of slavery and
legalized discrimination. The meanings of sex/gender for a body in the United States are part
of the inheritance of Western culture and religion. Exploring these body categories through
the lens of construction highlights the complexity of bodies and how we categorize them. It
calls attention to not only different understandings of race and sex/gender as body categories
but also various notions about materiality itself and the materialization of bodies. Theories
about the constructedness of the materiality of the body can and do include the understanding
that these categories are not constructed at all. In this way, theologians who do not adhere to
the concept of construction in either discourse of race or sex/gender can still be part of the
dialogue. I recognize that the concept of construction is problematic for scholars who equate
it with illusion. That is not how I am using the term in this dissertation.
Using construction to think about the concepts of sex/gender and race challenges
theologians to go beyond their personal opinion and experience. Everyone must learn the
history of these designations and understand how they affect who we are and how we think.
Just as we need to expand our understandings of racism and sexism beyond personal
prejudice to structural discrimination, so too we need to recognize that the meaning of the
body goes beyond the individual person and has meaning according to the discourse of the
context in which it lives. Recognizing the contextual meaning of the body is not the
equivalent of a structuralist view of personal identity.15 Persons are able to deconstruct the
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Structuralism began as a specialist method of inquiry used first in linguistics and then in anthropology, most
notably in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss. Structuralism focuses on the way that
human behavior is determined by various structures and often becomes rigid and ahistorical, losing sight of the
individual, their freedom, and their ability to act. For more on structuralism, see Terence Hawkes,
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body and can change the realities of sex/gender and race. If bodies are constructed through
human action and thought, then they can be reconstructed through these same means whether
one believes this entails a new understanding of the body or a return to a true understanding
of the body.16
Exploring various theories of sex/gender and race around the same organizing
concept of construction begins to bring these disparate conversations together. While I focus
on the level of the construction of the body in theories of sex/gender and the meaning of the
construction of the body in theories of race, consideration of both race and sex/gender
embrace how and to what extent bodily identities are constructed in time and place. Bringing
discourse about race and sex/gender together in and for theological anthropology is the focus
of the second part of this dissertation and addresses the problem of ghettoizing these
discourses in theological specializations. Liberation theologians challenge all theologians to
understand that body designations and the meaning given to them in social and ecclesial life
are not only relevant but crucial for theological study and discussion. Womanist theologians
in particular call on theologians to recognize that body classifications and the social and
ecclesial structures and teachings based on them intersect and influence each other. Only by

Structuralism and Semiotics (New York: Routledge, 2003); and John Sturrock, ed., Structuralism and Since:
From Lévi-Strauss to Derrida (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
16
This belief that bodies can be reconstructed by first understanding their categorization as constructed is a
central notion in white studies, an area of research now being embraced by theologians. The editors of
Disrupting White Supremacy From Within write that the possibilities raised by constructionist theories have
major implications. Once it is recognized that race is not a fixed or static fact of nature, but a contested and
changing social-political reality, it becomes possible to interrogate the meanings it has been
given…Constructionist theories enable more sufficient understanding of how racial oppression actually works.
Understanding how race functions in processes of white supremacy can lead to pragmatic thinking toward
resistance. Recognizing race as constructed makes visible the human agency involved in constructing it, one of
the most important insights to leverage in understanding racism as a white problem. Jennifer Harvey, Karin A.
Case, and Robin Hawley Gorsline, eds., Disrupting White Supremacy From Within: White People On What We
Need To Do (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2004), 100. Conversely, John Paul II in his theology of the body argues
that many contemporary approaches to sex/gender have “constructed” it as false and that the proper course of
action is to realign our understanding and living of sex/gender with the biblical and true meaning of it.
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addressing the whole body in all its particularity can theologians produce theology about and
for real life.
Womanist theology addresses both the helpfulness and the limitations of construction
as a tool for reflection on the body. Womanists balance the objectification and limitation of
bodily identity that can occur through the lens of construction with a consideration of the
expression and individuality of bodily reality. Christian theology cannot be concerned only
with the historical winners’ points of view since Christian faith is centered on a person who
was most concerned with the realities of the outcast and oppressed. Therefore, theological
consideration of sex/gender and race cannot be satisfied with an analysis of the construction
of the body as instituted by power. Theology must also attend to the communal selfdefinition of those historically oppressed by the meanings assigned to race and sex/gender.
Womanists show how reflecting on the identity of black women from the point of view of
power is very different from the same reflection from the point of view of black women
themselves. In order to understand any body, one must develop a familiarity with their
discourse not just discourse about them
Womanist scholarship teaches that careful attention to group identity reveals the
diversity in every group. In addition to race and sex/gender, identity markers such as class
and sexuality also influence and shape the identity of body-persons. Attending to individual
expressions of bodily identity deepens our reflection on human identity and bodies. If
Christians believe that God is concerned with each individual person in their uniqueness,
then theology must be able to reflect on the individuality of body-persons as well as what
creates community among us. Theological reflection on the body must include an ability to
read the texts of our materiality as well as an ability to listen to individual life stories. I want
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this dissertation to help us learn to face each other as individuals. We must learn how to
stand quietly with another and wait to be told and taught who that other is and wants to be.
People know something real and important about their experience and history. It is only in
the listening and accepting and being with the other that we can recognize we are all unique
bodies and at the same time one body. The combination of construction and expression sees
our commonality in history and language and our uniqueness as individual creations of God.
Approaching the body as symbol embraces the body as a construction and the body as
an expression. The body is given meaning, and therefore constructed, through categories
such as race and sex/gender. Each body-person expresses these constructions within their
own individuality. Symbol is a concept that brings these ideas together. It has a long history
in theological reflection and is a useful tool to think about the body and the much needed
consideration of its sex/gender and race. I draw on my study of symbol in sacramental
theology and Christology. In both a symbol is understood as a material reality that reveals
mystery. Symbols are always contextual as they must have relevant meaning for the current
community. The body is materiality that reveals the mystery of humanity and is always
situated in its history, language, and context. The body expresses both. The body is
individual and communal. Bodies are not static but changing and changeable. Within this
fluidity of materiality, new identities are possible. New symbols of humanity will appear and
reveal more of its mystery. The more we are open to the diversity of bodies the more diverse
they appear. As a multivalent concept, symbol allows room for diverse understandings of
sex/gender and race, as well as other identity markers.
I find this approach to race and sex/gender as construction and expression helpful and
freeing in my own life as well as my thinking about the body. It allows for conversation
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between people with varying views on bodily categories such as race and sex/gender that
does not just disintegrate into personal experience but still allows personal experience to be
part of the conversation. I believe we must understand how and why people are oppressed by
race and sex/gender. We must find ways to create change that alleviates the oppression we
discover. My investigation of these theories and theologies of race and sex/gender proposes
a way of thinking about the body that allows the unique image of God that is each person to
be fully realized and shared. There is no simple fix to the problem of oppression based on
body categorization. The change that is needed is always happening and never done.17 We
cannot simply transcend our understandings of race and sex/gender to a completely different
reality. We must first understand why we think the way we do about these categories before
we can make any changes. It is my hope that in the learning and appreciation of race and
sex/gender as constructions and expressions, we will speak and live them in a more liberating
way.

IV.

SOURCES
The body is not a new theological topic.18 Throughout the centuries, Christian

theologians have struggled with issues concerning the meaning of the body in general, its
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The notions of gradual change and the always illusive reality of complete liberation from oppression are
specifically noted in the work of many of the scholars I include in this dissertation. James Cone and Elisabeth
Schüssler Fiorenza both recognize the important strides taken toward liberation and the always present need for
more and relate it to the theological concept of the already and not yet reality of Christian redemption. The
kingdom of God broke into the world with Jesus Christ but it is never fully experienced here. Delores Williams
argues that because total liberation is a hope and goal, liberation theologies cannot and should not just
concentrate on total liberation but also find ways to help people survive in the midst of their oppression that
presents hope for new ways of living. Kelly Brown Douglas presents a proposal for change based on the
gradual change of discourse. This same idea of gradual shifts in meaning through discourse is also at the heart
of Judith Butler’s work. Her analysis of bodies as formed in discourse allows room for repetitions in and of this
discourse that bring about changes in the meanings of bodies.
18
See James F. Keenan, “Christian Perspectives on the Human Body,” Theological Studies 55 (June 1994):
330-46; and Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart, Introducing Body Theology (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1998), for historical surveys of Christian approaches to the human body. See Sarah Coakley, ed.,
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value, desires, and needs, as well as with issues concerned with specific bodies, such as the
value of women and people of color in society, church, and before God. The body’s
importance has been recognized in biblical studies, historical theology, Christian ethics, as
well as systematic loci such as Christology and ecclesiology. In fact, there is now a
theological specialization called body theology.19 Theology is being challenged to consider
the importance of the body and the ramifications of how we categorize people based on the
body. This challenge has grown stronger with the emergence of various liberation theologies
and questions arising in and from contemporary theory. This dissertation focuses on the
categories of race, specifically those defined as black and white, and sex/gender, recognizing
that there is work being done on other areas of bodily identity.20 Theories of sexuality also
arise in this project since they have been intricately woven into our understandings of race
and sex/gender.21 This project brings together various voices addressing these topics, with

Religion and the Body (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), for a wider perspective about the body’s
intersection with religion.
19
Lisa Isherwood and Elizabeth Stuart describe body theology as theology through the body not about the body.
The starting point of body theology is all the experiences of the body, including but certainly not limited to
sexuality and body image issues. Isherwood and Stuart contend that body theology argues for a radical
understanding of incarnation that places the divine solidly in the world and challenges any notions of dualism.
See Isherwood and Stuart, Introducing Body Theology; James Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); and Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, Controversies in Body
Theology (London: SCM Press, 2008).
20
For theological reflection on other ethnic identities, see the Journal of Hispanic/Latino Theology; Miguel A.
De La Torre and Gastón Espinosa, Rethinking Latino(a) Religion and Identity (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2006);
Andrés G. Guerrero, A Chicano Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987); Alma Rose Alvarez, Liberation
Theology in Chicana/o Literature: Manifestations of Feminist and Gay Identities (New York: Routledge, 2007);
Jonathan Y. Tan, Introducing Asian American Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2008); and Peter C.
Phan, Christianity with an Asian Face: Asian American Theology in the Making (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
2003). For theological reflection on how disability and disease affect identity and theology, see Denise
Ackermann, “Engaging Stigma: An Embodied Theological Response to HIV and AIDS,” Scriptura (2005):
385-95; Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids,
MI: Brazos Press, 2008); and Hans S. Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability,
Theological Anthropology, and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Press, 2008).
21
For theological reflection on sexuality and identity, see Marcella Althaus-Reid, Homosexualities (London:
SCM Press, 2008); Jeffrey S. Silker, ed., Homosexuality and Religion: An Encyclopedia (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2007); Grace M. Jantzen, “Off the Straight and Narrow: Toward a Lesbian Theology,”
Theology & Sexuality (September 1995): 58-76; and Richard Cleaver, Know My Name: A Gay Liberation
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Pr, 1995). For specific reflection on how race and sexuality
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special emphasis on liberation theologies. I incorporate their work and wisdom into a more
general theological approach to the body as symbol.
Liberation theologies in the United States and elsewhere have been especially
concerned with the body. Feminist, black, and womanist theologians have critiqued how we
think of some bodies as “different,” while white male bodies are gauged normative. These
theologians argue that how we value bodily attributes and therefore specific bodies
influences all aspects of ecclesial and theological life and thought. The way we have decided
to categorize bodies, and therefore people, has determined how we have lived and continue to
live as individuals and as community. Historically, some bodies have been valued more than
other bodies. Certain physical attributes have been conceived as more valuable and we have
created a hierarchy of bodies based on the theories we have imagined concerning
embodiment. Some physical attributes have been theorized to reflect reason and leadership
while others have come to mean brutishness and weakness. The meaning ascribed to
physical aspects of the body has been used to justify the oppression and limitation of certain
body types and the unearned privilege of others.
I concentrate closely on the work of liberation theologians because like them I am
concerned with bodily categorization because it is used as a tool of oppression. Difference
becomes a problem only when people are limited and oppressed by it. Oppression is often
defined in terms of “isms” that result from negative body evaluation, namely racism, sexism,
classism, and heterosexism. I include in the meaning of oppression based on body
categorization the limitation of the spirit of individuals by the circumvention of their identity
and therefore their lives by the meanings given to their bodies. I focus on liberation

intersect, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation and Anthony B. Pinn and Dwight N. Hopkins, eds., Loving the Body:
Black Religious Studies and the Erotic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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theologies because my ultimate goal of this theological discourse about the body is more
fulfilled living for individuals and communities. Liberation theologies do not simply engage
in theoretical debate about the body, but start with the reality of oppression and work toward
its alleviation. Oppression is the key concern of liberation theologians and what unites them
under the designation of liberation theology. The alleviation of oppression includes survival
while oppressed, a better quality of life while struggling against these oppressions, and the
destruction of the systems and prejudices that cause this oppression in the first place. The
ultimate goal of liberation theologies is to create new ways of being and thinking that
overcome the “isms” that result in oppression. My goal for creating better discourse about
the body is to liberate people to be the image of God they are. This includes the destruction
of these “isms” as well as encouraging positive self-affirmation. It is the goal of all
liberation theology to create space for each human being to be whole and fulfilled. I believe
that when we liberate individuals we liberate the Spirit to better dwell among us. This
project is a result of my learning from liberation theologies and an attempt to contribute
something to the discourse.
Stephanie Mitchem describes liberation theologies as reactions against prevalent
Western-focused traditional theology and its universals. She claims that the domination of
Christian theology by Western tradition has led to the development and establishment of
“correct” theological methods as well as the promotion of cultural domination by
Christianity. Liberation theologies present a challenge to the tendencies of traditional
theology to (1) make sharp distinctions between body and soul; (2) give preference to the
spiritual/mental over the physical; and (3) believe that a universal, one-size-fits-all theology
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is possible.22 Liberation theologies argue that there are different perspectives for doing
theology because people are different based on their social location, which is often based on
their bodily identity. This declaration is a direct questioning of the reality and possibilities of
universals for the experience of all people and the theology created for them. Liberation
theologians challenge all theologians to recognize and consider their own social location and
how it affects their theology. Luis G. Pedraja, a Hispanic theologian, writes that
“Marginalized groups and theologies carry qualifiers, such as ‘Hispanic’ theology, while
those who are in power simply see their theologies and experiences as universal and thus as
the normative or universal expression of theology.”23 This “normative” expression of
theology has been used to subjugate persons and communities. For example, James Cone
states that his black theology emerged from his awareness of the weaknesses of white
theology. In his study he found white theologians too indifferent to suffering and patient
with cruelty, especially concerning blacks. Cone observed a bankruptcy in white American
theology because it was and is too tied to oppressive structures and furthers their social,
political, and economic interests. White theology led to a wrong ethics that excused and
justified slavery and black suffering. This realization led Cone as a black man and black
theologian to conclude that the biblical God/Christ cannot be limited to the prejudiced
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Stephanie Y. Mitchem, Introducing Womanist Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 36. She
argues that these tendencies are a result of the influence of Greco-Roman philosophical traditions on Western
thinking in general and North Atlantic theologies in particular. For other introductions to liberation theology,
see Roger A. Badham, Introduction to Christian Theology: Contemporary North American Perspectives
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998); Miguel A. De La Torre, Handbook of U.S. Theologies of
Liberation (St Louis: Chalice Pr, 2004); and Alfred T. Hennelly, Liberation Theology: A Documentary History
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990).
23
Quoted in Mitchem, Introducing Womanist Theology, 38. Originally in Luis Pedraja, Jesus Is My Uncle:
Christology from a Hispanic Perspective (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999), 25.
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interpretations of white scholars. Black theology, Cone contends, must be liberated from
white theology for it does not and cannot speak to oppressed blacks.24
Since mainstream theology has been found wanting for oppressed peoples, and
thereby for all people, a main focus within liberation theologies is the recovery and
restatement of the subjugated strands of human meaning, particularly those of women and
people of color.25 Liberation theologies engage people’s lives, their histories, and their
current political realities. These theologies focus on specific “group” experiences, including
both the experience of oppression and the resources and strengths developed to counter this
oppression. The history, stories, wisdom, and everyday realities of the community are the
basis for the construction of theology. People who were formerly viewed and felt themselves
to be outsiders to the closed circles of Western thought began to have a voice and a theology
that speaks of and to their particular experience and culture. Theologies of liberation are
specific. They are written out of the concrete situations and experiences of particular groups.
Specificity about bodily life and experience is the main subject of this dissertation. I
am interested in the meanings ascribed to the specific body categories of race and sex/gender
and their affect on how we are and act. I explore feminist and black theologies that argue
that how we value bodily attributes, what meaning we give to them, affects not only
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Cone, God of the Oppressed, 43ff. Cone presents black theology as a more accurate and authentic Christian
theology because the black experience witnesses to the same God one finds in the Bible. White scholars are
ignorant of this context where God is at work now so they cannot accurately represent Christianity today. Cone
contends that the reason white theology misses the mark is because it is not centered on the truth of a liberator
God. Early on, Cone was criticized for relying too much on the very system he was criticizing. See Frederick
E. Sontag, “Coconut Theology: Is James Cone the ‘Uncle Tom’ of Black Theology,” Journal of Religious
Thought 36 (Fall-Winter 1979-1980): 5-12, as an example of a criticism of the foundations of Cone’s black
theology.
25
Feminist theologians have collected the words of Christian women throughout the church’s history. An
example of this recovery of the past is Amy Oden, ed., In Her Words: Women’s Writings in the History of
Christian Thought (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994). Black theologians have collected the stories and
religious thought of enslaved African persons and used them as central sources for their theology. See Dwight
N. Hopkins and George C. L. Cummings, eds., Cut Loose Your Stammering Tongue: Black Theology in the
Slave Narratives (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003).
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individual identity but the community and its theology. If we value male bodies, feminists
argue, we will live in a male-dominated, patriarchal society and church. If we value white
skin, black theologians contend, we will live in a white supremacist, racist society and
church. Feminist and black theologies have attempted to sharpen our focus on body-persons
and experiences that have been historically oppressed and often ignored in theology. They
have challenged theologians, mostly white men, to see that these female bodies and black
bodies matter; they make a difference in how one experiences life, reads texts, views history,
thinks about God; in short, does theology. Because of their focus on the experience of being
raced and sexed/gendered, I rely heavily on the work of feminist and black theologians to
explore these body categories.
It must be clear from the beginning that there is not one or a black or feminist
theology or even one way of doing either and I do not approach them as such. In fact, I
chose each voice for this dissertation to represent a different approach to race and sex/gender,
very consciously exposing the differences within each of these theological discourses.
However, all black theologies and likewise all feminist theologies have shared historical
roots. Black theology traces its history back to the faith and experiences of enslaved
Africans in this country. The major catalysts for the emergence and development of black
theology as a twentieth century Christian theology are the Civil Rights Movement and the
Black Power Movement.26 Likewise, feminist theology has its roots in the movements for
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The modern Civil Rights Movement began on December 1, 1955, with Rosa Parkss calculated refusal to give
up her seat and move to the back of the bus. This Christian nonviolent movement was led by the Reverend
Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. Many young black pastors and ministers were affected by this movement and
their theology was formed out in the streets struggling and fighting for justice. Following the example of King,
they took the Christian gospel of Jesus Christ and applied it to the black experience. The Black Power
Movement of the 1960s and 1970s arose out of the Civil Rights Movement and can be said to have begun with
Stokley Carmichael’s call for black power during a civil rights march in Greenwood, MS, on June 16, 1966.
The cry was for the power blacks deserved, not integration into the white world and white values. There was a
recognition that freedom and justice for the black community would have to be wrested from white oppressors.

25
women’s suffrage and later in the fight for Equal Rights for women.27 Both theological
movements began in the disenfranchisement of persons based on their bodily identity.
The question of how to approach race and sex/gender and what their meanings should
be has always elicited a wide variety of responses from theologians in both discourses. Some
feminists have continued to maintain that sex and gender are essentialist categories and that
“woman” is indeed a term that can be used without further description. Some of these
scholars have declared Christianity irredeemably sexist and have worked to develop

Members of the Black Power Movement were determined this would be achieved by and through whatever
means were necessary. Malcolm X preached the right of self-identity and self-determination. He called on all
blacks to love themselves and stop equating positive with white. For more on both of these movements and
their leaders, see James H. Cone, Martin and Malcolm and America: A Dream or a Nightmare (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 1991). A third catalyst for the emergence of black theology was the 1964 publication of and
subsequent reaction to Joseph Washington, Black Religion: The Negro and Christianity in the United States
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). In this work, Washington argues that although blacks have
a unique culture, their religion and theology are merely folk religion and folk theology because black churches
are not genuine Christian churches. Genuine Christianity is found only in white churches since they embody
the faith, tradition, and church structure handed down through the centuries in Western Europe. He maintained
that a religion of justice, even one based on the justice of Jesus, did not qualify as faith and therefore was not a
proper foundation for Christian theology. Since blacks had been excluded from the genuine Christianity of
white churches, the goal should be to rejoin them. Black theology arose partly to refute this charge. Black
clergy began to create a theology for black people fighting for liberation that stated quite clearly that
Christianity and the God it worshipped were centrally interested in justice. For more on the catalysts of black
theology, see Dwight N. Hopkins, Introducing Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books,
1999), 28-41; and Diana L. Hayes, And Still We Rise: An Introduction to Black Liberation Theology (New
York: Paulist Press, 1996), 53-78.
27
Both religious and secular feminism can be divided into three waves. The first wave began in the 1830s and
called for the legal and economic equality of women with men in the United States. U.S. women challenged the
inferior status of women as part of their participation in the pre-Civil War abolitionist movement. The Female
Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1833, connected the oppression of slaves with the subordination of women.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1902) brought attention to the ways the Bible contributed to the subordination of
women and to a biblical commentary by first wave feminists called The Woman’s Bible. First wave feminism
paved the way for the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920, which gave women the right to
vote. This achievement, however, virtually ended the feminist movement at that time. In the 1960s and 1970s a
second wave of feminism broadened its call for the political and economic equality of women with men. In
conjunction with the civil rights struggles of African Americans, feminists sought civil rights for women. This
second wave was launched by the publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique in 1963 and was
supported by the National Organization of Women, founded in 1966. Second wave feminist theology was
initiated by Euro-American women who pursued advanced degrees in theology for the first time and brought
attention to the shortcomings of the “maleness” of Christian theology. The third wave of feminism began in the
late 1970s and has drawn attention to the differences in race and social class of women. Women of color, such
as bell hooks, exposed the whiteness of second wave feminism and called on all women to recognize the
importance of social location for all people. This new development in feminism has expanded its goal from the
equality of women with men to a recreation of all humanity according to right relations. For more on the
historical roots of feminist theology, see Anne M. Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology (Maryknoll, NY:
2001), 9-28.
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theologies and language that are woman focused. Others have worked to revalue the place
and status of women within the Christian tradition. Some feminist theologians would agree
that the categorization of sex and gender is natural but argue not essential. These theologians
temporarily focus on this categorization in order to one day focus on our shared humanity
rather than bodily divisions. Still other feminist theologians recognize the problem of using
the term “woman” unreflectively; but still consider it an important political and theological
category. They recognize that those struggling for the end of racism do not agree that
patriarchy is the most foundational evil in our country or church.28
There are corresponding trends in black theology concerning the challenge to race as
a body category. Some have argued that being physically black has become essential to how
one lives in the world and therefore they have called for Black Nationalism and separatism.
Others understand the goal of black theology as a work of liberation and reconciliation so
that we focus our attention on our shared humanity rather than racial divisions.29 All black
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Anne Clifford argues that the different types of feminism are the result of different experiences of patriarchy
and androcentrism and lead to different ways of analyzing its causes and remedies. She relies on Maria Riley’s
mapping of the feminist terrain and applies these to the discipline of feminist theology. These differentiations
are most applicable to second wave feminism. Riley identifies four major types of feminism of the second
wave. First, liberal feminism emphasizes civil rights and seeks the full equality of women with men in all
facets of societal life. Second, cultural feminism, also called “romantic feminism” and “reform feminism,”
emphasizes the moral superiority of women and traditional feminine values and seeks the betterment of society
by stressing the contributions made by women. Third, radical feminism emphasizes the pervasiveness of male
domination and the importance of “women-centered culture” and seeks to eliminate patriarchy in order to
liberate women from male control in every facet of life. The fourth and final type is socialist feminism, which
emphasizes white male dominance in the economic class struggles of capitalist societies and seeks to end the
economic dependence of women on men and to achieve major social reforms that will end class divisions.
Clifford connects revolutionary feminist theology with radical feminism. These theologians can be described as
post-Christian since they believe Christianity is irredeemably patriarchal, even anti-woman. Carol Christ, Mary
Daly, and Christine Downing are revolutionary or radical feminists. Clifford associates reformist feminist
theology with cultural feminism. This form of feminist theology does not wish for a totally revolutionized
Christianity but rather a more egalitarian one that involves women more. I would classify Elizabeth Johnson as
a reformist feminist theologian. Clifford’s third category of feminist theology is reconstructionist. Although it
shares with reformist feminist theology a commitment to Christianity, it calls for a deeper transformation and
reconstruction of Christianity and its structures. Included in this category are Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza and
Rosemary Radford Ruether. See Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology, 32-38.
29
Dwight Hopkins divides black theology into first and second generations. The first generation is further
delineated into political and cultural theologians. He defines political theologians as those claiming a
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theologians continue to maintain race as a legitimate and currently important theme for
Christian theology and its work of liberation. Other voices have challenged black scholars to
move away from understanding race as central to identity. They argue that racial categories
are themselves becoming limiting and non-liberating for people who find they fit less and
less comfortably within the boxes of “black” and “white.”30
Both black theology and feminist theology came under criticism for their exclusive
focus on one aspect of bodily identity. Since black theology was done mostly by black men,
they were concerned with the problems race presented them since their sex was not
problematic. Feminist theology was done mostly by white women who did not have
problems with their race but focused on the problems their sex/gender caused them. What
neither saw was their own exclusive approach to theology. Black women challenged both
white women and black men to see that black female bodies experience a different
womanhood and blackness. Womanists have challenged the sexism and racism found in the
theological mandate for political activism for the full empowerment of black people. Included in this group is
James Cone who understands race as basic to how we live and think in this country and calls for a general
liberation from whiteness. Another political theologian is J. Deotis Roberts who understands blackness as a
symbolic reality in our society and believes there must be room for both a black and white Christ in
Christianity. However, he hopes Christians can go beyond color to worship a colorless Christ and achieve true
reconciliation between whites and blacks as equals. Hopkins also includes Albert Cleage in this division of
black theology. Cleage was the leader of the Black Christian Nationalism Movement who advocated black
separation from the white world and a development of an independent church. Hopkins’ second category of
first generation theology includes cultural theologians Gayraud Wilmore and Charles Long who called on black
theology to be in touch with the African American cultural context. Open to both secular and non-Christian
sources, cultural theologians uncover and create black religious thought and language based in the American
black community and its cultural ties with Africa. Blackness in the U.S. is a cultural construct that does not
exhaust African American identity but also cannot be ignored. Second generation black theologians extended
black theology’s scope to include the place of women and the role of class in the creation of black theology.
See Hopkins, Introducing Black Theology of Liberation, 49-124. For a classification and criticism of
methodological perspectives in the academic study, interpretation, and construction of black theology in the
United States, see Frederick L. Ware, Methodologies of Black Theology (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2002).
Ware classifies black theologies as belonging to a hermeneutical school, philosophical school, or human
sciences school. All avenues of black theology are involved in the on-going task of identity formation and the
challenge of defining blackness amid its positive and negative realities.
30
See Victor Anderson, Beyond Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural
Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1995); and Alistair Kee, The Rise and Demise of Black Theology
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), which question the usefulness of the category of race for theology. These
texts are part of my analysis of race in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
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black and feminist political movements. They argue that black male theologians do not
adequately interrogate the patriarchal moorings of traditional Christian language about God
and humanity. Womanist writers have also exposed the racism of both secular and
theological white feminism. Womanists criticize feminists for being too focused on sexism
as the sole oppression in society and church. Womanists argue that the experience of black
women is different from that of white women. They cannot stand exclusively with white
women against sexism because they must stand with black men against racism. They argue
that neither white women nor black men can speak for black women; they stand at the
intersection of racism and sexism. Womanist theologians are concerned with the unique
position of black women’s bodies. From this unique position, they challenge liberation
theologians to fight against oppression in all its forms. Their critique of both black and
feminist theologies has led to a more complex conversation about the body and theological
reflection that brings race and sex/gender together. The inclusion of all three of these
theological specializations in this project brings attention to the complexity and importance
of the body in life and religion.
My investigation of and attention to black, feminist, and womanist theologies helps
create better overall theological discourse about race and sex/gender, but there are limitations
to the use of these sources. First, race is not just about being black or white. Black theology
does not concern itself with race per se but with a specific race, namely African American
people. This focus on race as black and white may seem to be a limitation for my bigger
project of thinking about the body as symbol. I recognize that not all people identify as being
white or black, but in the United States racial categories began and have been deeply affected
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by the black/white divide.31 In addition, dealing with race in a theological context means
addressing a genre of theology that reflects on the experience of a particular community of
people for whom their particular race is a consciously important aspect of life. Each genre of
theology begins with this community’s experience of race not race in general. To talk about
race in theology in general terms would be to address multiple genres of theology, which
would make this project unwieldy. However, the ideas and conclusions from this project
translate to such a wider analysis of race, at least in theology. My method of addressing the
materiality of the body as symbol calls for inclusion of all the specifics of the body into
theological conversation, including the particularities of each person’s racial identity and
struggles. In this way theological analysis of race broadens to include those beyond the
black-white paradigm.
The specific focus of each liberation theology is both its strength and one of its
limitations. All of these theologies are based on the experience of those people who fit
within the bodily parameters of the theology’s focus: black theology was for and by black
people, supposedly both men and women; feminist theology was by and for women,
supposedly white women and women of color; and womanist theology was by and for black
women. Because these theologies begin and focus on the experiences of specifically defined
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Michael Omi contends that how we think about, engage, and politically mobilize around racial issues have
been fundamentally shaped by a prevailing “black-white” paradigm of race relations and that such biracial
theorizing misses the complex nature of race relations in post-Civil Rights Movement America. One of the
main challenges to this paradigm of race relations is that demographically the nation is becoming less white.
The massive influx of new immigrant groups has destabilized specific concepts of race, led to a proliferation of
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consequences of trying to get beyond the black-white paradigm. On the one hand, he does not wish to displace
or decenter the black experience, which continues to define the fundamental contours of race and racism in our
society. On the other hand, he suggests that the prevailing black-white model tends to marginalize, if not
ignore, the experiences, needs, and political claims of other racialized groups. He proposes that the challenge is
to frame an appropriate language and analysis to help us understand the shifting dynamic of race that all groups
are implicated in. See Michael A. Omi, “The Changing Meaning of Race,” in America Becoming: Racist
Trends and Their Consequences, vol. 1, eds. Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001), 245, 250.
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groups, there is not much room for overlap. Even though womanists have critiqued both
black and feminist theologians for too narrowly defining identity under the categories of race
and sex/gender, their primary concern is also on a specific and delineated group of persons,
namely black/African American women. There was and is the challenge among the
theologies to respect and respond to the reality of those whose bodily identities and lived
realities were and are different. But thinking about race and gender as problematic and/or
oppressive realities one must experience to understand creates a problem for men wanting to
talk about gender and whites wanting to deal with race. Discussion and debate has arisen on
how one talks about an oppression one has not experienced.32 Using experience as central
has become divisive even in attempts to unite people with the same body categories, such as
women or blacks.33 Narrowly focusing on these realities has also led to an isolation of these
discourses from mainstream theology. It is argued for example that black theology is strictly
for blacks and feminist theology is strictly for women even though both are advocating a
change in how theology is done in general. Not everyone thinks about the(ir) body as
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problematic. Pauli Murray has also argued that the particularization of these liberation
theologies can stifle self-criticism, lead to isolation and frustration, and can develop into
myopia.34
Another critique of these liberation theologies is that they also essentialize bodies.
Feminist and black theologians have been criticized for their own exclusionary, limited, and
limiting categorization of bodies. Womanist theologians have critiqued feminist theologies
that do not consider race as a divisive aspect within the feminist movement. These same
theologians have also critiqued black theologies for not recognizing the sexist aspects of
black theology and the black church. Some womanists in turn have been criticized by black
lesbian women who do not find sexual orientation to be a prominent part of womanist
discourse about oppressed bodies. All of these theologies are being challenged to find room
in their discussion of bodies for social location and class structures. Challenged to face their
own exclusionary beliefs and practices, these theologies are beginning to address new
questions and different approaches to bodily identity. Groups based on bodily categorization
are being challenged to face their own diverse reality. No one is ever just raced or
sexed/gendered but always both. In addition, our individual identity is defined by many
other identity markers as well. Focus on community can neglect the individual but an
exclusive focus on the individual can lose sight of how people are community.
Contemporary theory challenges liberation theologies to recognize that the very
categories of race and sex/gender, such as black and white and woman and man,
continuously fragment. The postmodern subject is a complex entity not easily defined with
simple categories. However, we cannot simply discard such categories for they do have
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meaning both historically and in the present struggle of people for liberation. Liberation
theologies must recognize that liberation today may mean not only liberation of the group
from oppression and discrimination in general but also the liberation of the individual from
the group. I contend that any theological approach to the body must address it in its
constructed group reality as well as in its individuality. I utilize additional sources to focus
on these two aspects of the body.
Contemporary social theory is reevaluating the very categories at the heart of
liberation theologies. Theorists outside of theology contend with how to categorize and
ascribe meaning to the body. These theorists challenge essentialist theories about the body
and use the tools of philosophy, sociology, law, and language to examine the complexity of
body categorization. Critical race theorists wrestle with the questions of what race is, how it
came to be meaningful for our identity, and what the current meanings of race are. As North
Americans, we must be attentive to how the experience of colonialism, the African slave
trade, as well as centuries of slavery and segregation have affected our notions of race. Race
theory in general challenged me to see the changing meaning of the body.35 Gender theory in
general challenged me to see the level to which the body can be thought of as a social
construction. Gender theorists struggle with the meaning and naturalness of gender and
sexual differences for identity and the organization of society.36
Some theologians hesitate to dialogue and/or incorporate these contemporary theories
into their theological discourse. Some theologians fear that many “postmodern” theories lead
35

David Theo Goldberg is one theorist who explores the historical development of the meaning of race. He
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to relativism and provide no basis for community or individual agency to exact change. They
also fear that the loss of categorizations such as “woman” or “black” will undermine their
progress toward the liberation of people who self-identify with these categories. Therefore,
they continue to use language about the body that maintains dualistic overtones such as
“man” and “woman” and “black” and “white.” It is a question whether this dualist language
will in the end prove more harmful to their causes of liberation than what contemporary
theories have to offer. I believe that critical liberation theologians are increasingly aware of
the complexity of categorizing the body for analysis or political action in society and church.
While studying the theologies of select liberation theologians, I recognized a shift occurring
in their thought from reflection on body categories as natural/ontological/ahistorical to a
greater appreciation of race, sex/gender, and sexuality as culturally, including religiously,
constructed realities. There is an increasing number of theologians who do address
contemporary theory about the body in their work.37 Many, like me, are recognizing that
contemporary theory has something important to offer theology and is not contradictory to its
goals of love and unity.
I incorporate contemporary theory to help me think more deeply about the
constructedness of the body; but this is not all there is to the body. In order to reflect on the
individuality of body-persons, I incorporate sources that reflect both on how various social
constructions come together to create unique identity within any group as well as how
individuals express uniqueness in their own person. I turn to the work of Karl Rahner to
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reflect on the individuality of each body-person from a theological perspective. Rahner’s
work began my own thinking about the body as symbol and I use his theological reflection to
flesh out this aspect of the body as expression. Starting with his theological reflections on
the Trinity to his Christological considerations, Rahner’s work explores how symbols express
uniqueness and individuality of being.38 His application of the concept of symbol to the
human body is illuminating but not the definitive way of theologizing about the body. No
one source is the key to a theological approach to the body that is concerned with the
complexity of bodily identity in terms of race and sex/gender. Discourses must be brought
together. Dialogue is beginning to happen with the growing awareness that all oppression is
interrelated and that the body categorizations it produces are intersecting and multilayered. I
bring the conversations about race and sex/gender together with theoretical and theological
approaches to the body to propose a theology of the body that incorporates many voices.
I approach each source as an approach to the body that flows from the thinker’s
method and corresponds to their goals for body-persons. I explore how they challenge or
defend traditional notions about the body in terms of race, sex/gender, and sexuality and what
tools they offer to expand how we have conversation about the body in theology. I propose
how these discourses can be brought together to create a Christian approach to the body that
respects individuality and communal connectedness. Specific voices are not being used to
represent all black, feminist and womanist theologies. Nor are they being explored in their
entirety. Each source is used as an example of a different approach to and theory about
sex/gender, race, and the body in general. I bring theory and theology together in an
approach to physical and personal identity that respects individuality, acknowledges
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constructs, calls for community, and invites all theology to know the wisdom of liberation
theology.
I consider this project a contribution to the conversation of liberation theologies as
well as theological anthropology in general. My basic premise is that an analysis of the
categories of sex/gender and race is crucial for both liberation theology and theological
anthropology. Bodily categorization is intimately connected to racism and sexism so we
must analyze race to combat racism and sex/gender to combat sexism. These conversations
in turn must be brought into mainstream, traditional theology since everyone is working with
a theory of race and sex/gender whether they know it or not and it affects their theology.
Only by exposing these theories can theologians have better discourse about human
materiality, identity, and community. My investigation of liberation theologies and their
theories of sex/gender and race leads to my proposal of the body as symbol, which respects
the specificity of the body in liberation theology and a more general Catholic appreciation of
human materiality.

V.

PROJECT OUTLINE
This chapter has laid out the problems that are addressed in this dissertation and how

I address them. Theology needs better tools in order to engage in more in-depth
conversations about sex/gender and race. These conversations cannot be isolated from each
other or mainstream theological thinking about anthropology. My goals are to map theories
of sex/gender and race for better discourse about these body categories using the concept of
construction to organize the theories and to bring these separate discourses together for
theological anthropology. It is my argument that thinking about the body as symbol creates
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more sophisticated discourse about race and sex/gender in theology and brings them together
for and in theological anthropology. Part I of this dissertation will analyze various theories
of sex/gender and race in theology. Part II will explain my proposal to bring them together
for theological anthropology.
Part I introduces the reader to gender and race theory before outlining various
theories of sex/gender and race found in theology. Using construction as an organizing
principle, I map various theories about race and sex/gender, analyzing key differences,
emphases, and how these theories intersect with other important theological concepts such as
ontology, truth, methodology, philosophy, historical perspective, rhetorical and political
goals, understandings of language, subjectivity, personhood, and community, as well as
theological themes such as Christology, ecclesiology, biblical interpretation, sin, and
redemption. The maps of sex/gender and race theories serve as tools for clarification of these
theories and a template on which theologians can plot their own theories. In mapping various
theories of the materiality of the body, they are shown to exist in multiple ways. These
theories are explored within an overall concern for the liberation of bodies from oppression
based on bodily categories and as building blocks for a theology of the body that keeps
sex/gender and race as central concerns.
Chapter 2 explores theories of sex/gender according to how each theory explains the
level of construction of bodily materiality in terms of sex and gender. Theologians and
theorists disagree about the level of constructedness of the body in terms of sex and gender
with opinions ranging from no construction to total construction. Theories are explored that
explain sex and gender as ontological and transcendent categories of identity, that understand
the dual sex of humanity as natural but how sex is gendered as constructed, that view
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sex/gender as constructed for rhetorical and political reasons, and that understand all aspects
of bodily identity as constructed in time and space. Sex and gender are exposed as
multivalent concepts with differing relationships between the two depending on the theory in
question. This chapter is an exploration of how theology can bring together very different
ideas about the meaning of sex and gender into one conversation. Central to this
conversation about sex/gender and resulting sexualities is the notion that the meaning of
bodies is based on language and power and a deeper understanding of one’s notions of
language and power explains much about one’s notions of bodily identity. How each
theologian and theorist understands the very idea of construction expounds their theory of
sex/gender more deeply. Each theory of sex/gender is also dependent on the theologian’s
methodological starting point as well as their theological goals. This chapter explores how
theories of sex/gender are central to theological discourse.
Chapter 3 continues to use construction as an organizing principle to explore theories
about bodily materiality, but shifts its focus from the level of bodily constructedness to the
meaning of materiality once it is accepted as a construction. Outside of white supremist
writing, race is rarely thought to be a biological or “natural” category of human persons. It is
understood to be a social construction invented in time and place. The meaning assigned to
this construction varies from an essential aspect of identity that needs to constantly be taken
into consideration to an illusion that must be jettisoned from descriptions of human identity.
I explore five different meanings of race. Race as essence presents race as central to our
sense of self and for our living. Approaching race as historical legacy considers the history
of the concept; how race has been thought of in the past and how these past interpretations
influence how we think about it today. Understanding race as culture or community
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considers race as the worldview we receive from the community that has shaped us. The
fourth consideration of race reflects on how economic systems influence the meanings we
assign to race. The approach to race as illusion contends that race is losing its meaning. This
approach shifts focus from the community to the individual and asserts that to beat racism we
must transcend race. This chapter highlights the fact that race does not mean one thing to
everyone even if we limit our conversation of race to black/African American and
white/Caucasian. Race is an amorphous concept. The body reveals itself as historical; its
meaning shifting over time. Its meaning reflects its time and context as well as the ideas
applied to it by its interpreter. The same body means different things to different people.
Part II of this project explores the problem of bringing the study of sex/gender and
race together in theological anthropology. It presents some of the challenges of bringing
them together in theology and a tool that addresses these challenges. Chapter 4 investigates
womanist theology as a discourse that brings together race and sex/gender. Womanist
scholarship calls attention to the fact all body-persons are both and always raced and
sexed/gendered, and the reality that these identities interact and change each other. The
specifics of these interactions and their outcomes are unique to different communities and to
different individuals. Any community’s identity fragments and diversifies with the influence
of additional factors such as class and sexuality, highlighting the uniqueness of individuals
within the community. Womanist theologians explore the body in terms of identity being a
complex phenomenon. They investigate African American female identity in terms of the
interaction of sex/gender, race, class, and sexuality, recognizing that identity is formed within
matrices of oppression. Because of the uniqueness of identity for both communities and
individuals, womanist scholars challenge theologians to attend to both communal and
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individual discourses that contribute to determining identity for body-persons. Communities
construct counter-discourses that self-define their members, usually in a positive way. The
literature and culture of the community are the loci in which these discourses are found.
Individual discourses include the unique manner in which body-persons express the concepts
of race and sex/gender as well as the uniqueness of each subject. These discourses are only
learned through attention to specific life stories. Womanist discourse has much to teach
theologians about bodily identity and the interaction of race and sex/gender; but its focus
remains on the experience of specific identity constructions, namely African American
women. Womanist discourse is concerned with particular bodies.
Chapter 5 presents my proposal for a theological approach to the body that keeps
sex/gender and race central. This tool is based on what I have learned from my investigation
of race and sex/gender in theology and theory. My approach to the body as symbol
incorporates both an analysis of bodily identity through the lens of construction and a
consideration of bodily identity as the expression of both communal and individual
discourses. The body as construction is a useful tool since it can organize and map theories
of sex/gender and race and disclose how and why they differ, but it is limited in that it looses
sight of the individual aspect of the body. The body as expression is a useful tool since it
recognizes there are always counter-discourses in the construction of the body and an
individuality to each body, but it is limited in that it looses sight of the social aspect of the
body. Any theological approach to the body must balance construction and expression. With
the theological concept of symbol, theology has a tool that enables such an approach to the
body-person.
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Chapter 5 begins with an investigation of the notion of symbol in general and how it
has been and can be applied to the body in order for theological anthropology to better
address the identity concepts of race and sex/gender. Symbol is a theological concept that
brings together ideas teased out in the previous chapters. Symbols are multivalent, allowing
for different understandings of what is being symbolized and how, and are contextual and
shifting. There is precedent for thinking about the body as symbol in theology and theory.
Karl Rahner’s theology of the symbol focuses on the uniqueness of each person and how the
body expresses this. His work is important for how it illustrates the importance of the body
as symbol for all of theology. His approach to the body is limited, however, as it does not
spend ample attention on the body as social. This aspect of the body is more fully explored
in philosophical, anthropological, and sociological approaches to the body as symbol. These
disciplines investigate how the body is a construction and central to how life is lived and
understood, but are limited in their lack of attention to the individuality of each body-person.
My tool of the body as symbol incorporates both aspects of the body as construction and as
expression. I argue that this tool can allow for better discourse about sex/gender and race in
mainstream theological anthropology. It highlights the varied realities and theories of race
and sex/gender and brings them together as central to discourse about the body. Although
my purpose in this project is to focus on the concepts of race and sex/gender for bodily
identity, the body as symbol is a tool that invites theologians to explore other identity
concepts as well.
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VI.

USE OF LANGUAGE
There are many ideas and concepts about bodily identity explored in this dissertation.

It is customary to give an explanation of how one is using terms at the beginning of such a
project. However, a major theme of this dissertation is that categories about the body cannot
be contained in one definition. They exist as varied realities and therefore have multiple
meanings. In general, when I use the term body I mean the materiality of human persons.39
The body includes and encompasses ideas about biology as well as group and individual
identity that forms its experience and reality. I use the term body-person to reflect the reality
that we are not, nor are we ever, able to refer to mere materiality when the body is invoked.
The body is always a person.40 Body-persons are categorized according to supposedly
physical attributes that are easy to recognize such as skin color and “biological” sexual
differences. Body categorization is the way we group people according to physical attributes
or categories of materiality. I use the group identity markers black and African American
interchangeably to reflect that race has more than one meaning.41
Since this dissertation takes up the topics of race and sex/gender because of
discriminatory practices based on them and the resulting suffering of some based on body
categorization, let me say a few words about the “isms” that follow from bodily identity. I
will not address racism and sexism directly but work toward their elimination with closer
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attention to the concepts of race and sex/gender. I enlist sociologist Graham Kinloch’s
definition of racism and expand it to cover sexism as well. He writes that racism is
“uncritical acceptance (through socialization) of a negative social definition of a group
identified as a race [or sex/gender] on perceived physical grounds along with the legitimacy
of the discriminatory treatment accompanying that definition.”42 This discriminatory
treatment includes both individual and structural practices. It is my project to help us avoid
such “uncritical acceptance” of these identifications through a more attentive approach to the
categories that create group identities.
Being attentive to the history and language of body categorizations means
recognizing that the concepts of race and sex/gender shift and change over time. For
example, sex has meant the anatomical difference [in reproductive systems] between females
and males and gender the set of social roles, symbolic functions, and so on, that are assigned
to this difference.43 This distinction is very much contested now. The ambiguity is evident
in scholarly discourse as well as everyday use. Gender and sex are often used
interchangeably, for example, when one asks the gender of a newly born child. Although I
use the terms masculine and feminine to refer to traditional notions of gender as the
tendencies of persons within specific sexes, some of the authors I use do not make such a
distinction and use masculine and feminine, man and woman, and male and female
interchangeably. I employ the term sex/gender to reflect that there is debate about the
meanings of sex and gender and their relationship to each other and the fact that they are
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always in relationship to each other so both must be considered in our analysis of body
categories. Sexuality is intimately related to both of these categories. I do not mean
sexuality when I use the term sex. Sexuality is how and with whom one has intimate/sexual
relationships and involves the concepts of heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and so
on. This is not a central focus of this dissertation but because it is very much connected to
race and sex/gender it will arise throughout the project.
I introduce the reader to not only theories of sex/gender and race in theology but also
gender theory and race theory. These introductions are meant to be just that. I have chosen
theorists who present main ideas and central questions for gender and race theory
recognizing that they are just one voice in these larger disciplines. I also present black
feminist theory as a basis for womanist theology, recognizing the debate between black
feminists and womanists concerning the best self-naming for black female scholars.44 Some
of these theorists embrace a more modern approach to the body while others self-identify as

44

Black women in some disciplines are more likely to designate themselves black feminists rather than
womanists because of a longer development in these disciplines. Black women scholars in ethics and theology,
however, are more likely to identify themselves as womanists. These lines of demarcation are not set and black
feminists and womanists share in the commitment to analyze and deconstruct at least race, gender, and class
constructions from the perspective of African American women. The term womanist originates in the work of
Alice Walker, most notably in In Search of Our Mothers’ Garden. Walker locates the term within the black
female community; uses it to describe such a black woman’s relationships with other women, men, her
community, and the world; describes a womanist’s loves; and situates womanism in relationship to feminism.
Those scholars who advocate for the term black feminism contend that black women’s thought and activism is
better connected to the global feminist agenda. It both broadens this agenda and disrupts feminism’s racism.
African American women scholars who embrace the term womanist contend that the feminist movement has
been a white movement and argue that the term womanist better respects their connection to the whole African
American community. Perhaps most importantly, womanists claim that this way of self-naming makes clear
that at the forefront of their thought is the concrete experience of black women. This distinguishes them from
both white feminists and black male scholars. Many womanist scholars adopt the name because it feels right to
them; it fits. See Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose (San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1983), xi-xii, for Walker’s definition of womanism; Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting Words:
Black Women and the Search for Justice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 63-68, for an
exploration of the debates between black feminists and womanists; “Christian Ethics and Theology in
Womanist Perspective,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 5 (Fall 1989): 83-112, for a roundtable
discussion about the adoption of the term womanist for theology; and Joy James, Shadowboxing:
Representations of Black Feminist Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), for a mapping of a range of
black feminisms.
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postmodern scholars. Postmodernism is another ambiguous term. As Colin Campbell
writes,
Postmodernism is an exceptionally difficult phenomenon to pin down…As Alex
Callinicos has suggested, the term is certainly something of a “floating signifier” and
consequently, in Tom Docherty’s words, “hovers uncertainly in most current writings
between a difficult philosophical concept and simplistic notion of a certain nihilistic
tendency in contemporary culture.” When first used, the term did have a largely accepted
and determinate meaning, but it has since become “an irredeemably contested concept.”45
A definitive definition of postmodernism is not necessary for this project, but my work
attends to what Campbell calls North American postmodernism, which includes movements
that aim to change some aspect of culture because the orthodoxy of “modernity” oppresses
their members in some way. These movements are usually named “identity politics” and
critique the universalism of human identity embraced by modern discourse.46
I need to address two final notes about language in this dissertation. I use the
pronoun “their” rather than “he or she” to refer back to “person” or “one.” This seeming lack
of agreement is my intention. It reflects the fact that the duality of sex has become
problematic and I do not want to use language that simply enforces this duality. I want the
reader to take note of the tension inherent in discourse about sex/gender. Finally, I will use
women’s full last names reflecting before and after marriage with before first whether
hyphenated or not. This use reflects the dissertation’s concern with self-naming within such
constructs as heterosexual marriage.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided an introduction to my project, its presuppositions,

argument, method, and sources. Given the obvious relevance and importance of the body in
its specificity of sex/gender and race for theological study, theologians need tools to help
those outside of specialized sex/gender and race discourses to incorporate an adequate
analysis of the body into their theology. I am proposing a tool that helps theologians think
about sex/gender and race in a way that embraces the complexity of these concepts and
realities and brings them together for theological anthropology. There are great thinkers out
there creating new ways of thinking about the body and I welcome and celebrate their work.
I try to embody some of that theory for I find it challenging and exciting, and I believe it
could be freeing to many others in their own struggles with identity. This project gives me
the opportunity to bring my theological learning to bear on the questions of my life and
contribute to a larger conversation intended to alleviate oppressions that body-persons
experience. This liberation allows all persons to more fully embody and experience the
Spirit of God within and among us.
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To claim that the materiality of sex is constructed through a ritualized repetition of norms is
hardly a self-evident claim. Indeed, our customary notions of “construction” seem to get in
the way of understanding such a claim. For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel
pain, pleasure; endure illness and violence; and these “facts,” one might skeptically proclaim,
cannot be dismissed as mere constructions. Surely there must be some kind of necessity that
accompanies these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there is. But their
irrefutability in no way implies what it might mean to affirm them and through what
discursive means. Moreover, why is it that what is constructed is understood as an artificial
and dispensable character?
Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter1

CHAPTER 2: SEX/GENDER AND THEOLOGY

I.

INTRODUCTION
The first step in my proposal of considering the body as symbol explores how the

body is constructed in and by its temporal and spatial location. The concept of construction
invites reflection on the degree to which the materiality of the body is established within and
by means of social discourse as well as the meaning and significance attributed to identity
markers such as sex/gender and race that categorize this materiality. This chapter
specifically focuses on the degree of bodily construction by exploring the extent to which the
identity categories sex and gender are constructed in different theories of sex/gender. Using
construction as an organizing principle illuminates the differences in the theories as well as
how each theory flows from and informs the theologian’s or theorist’s method and goals.
This investigation into different theories of sex/gender can help theologians better understand
their own, perhaps until now unacknowledged, theory of sex/gender and the relevance and
significance of a consideration of sex/gender for all theological investigation.
The starting point for any gender theory is the identity categories described as sex and
gender. Sex refers here to the materiality of the body usually defined in terms of biology,
1

Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), x-xi.
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which classifies persons as either female or male. Gender indicates how female and male
bodies do or should live this dyadic sexual differentiation. Descriptors such as feminine and
masculine fall under the domain of gender. Sex/gender written together invites consideration
of the relationship of the two and recognizes that both must be considered in any approach to
body-persons. A gender theory is an explanation of the meaning and significance of these
categories of identity. The work of philosopher Judith Butler is a helpful guide in
approaching theories of sex/gender.2 Butler maintains that although different discourses set
limits to the analysis of gender based on their presuppositions and basic tenets, there are
some basic questions that all theories of sex/gender should address.
Gender theories must attend to the very notion of the person and the relationship of
the person and their materiality. How does the subject come to be and what is the role of the
concepts of sex/gender in this process? Is the person someone embodied, creating a division
between the substance of the person and their material reality or is there no such distinction?
Is the subject a person who is the bearer of essential and nonessential attributes or do these
attributes constitute a subject? These initial questions about the relationship of the person
and their materiality lead to more specific questions regarding the relationship between the
identity categories of sex and gender. The central issue is whether there is or should be a
distinction between sex and gender.3 Is sex to nature as gender is to culture? Is there a
precultural, prediscursive “nature” to identity or is “nature” produced? Questions like this
disclose varied understandings of ontology underlying different gender theories.

2

I rely especially on Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York:
Routledge, 1990).
3
Butler herself makes no distinction between the two but discusses how Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist
anthropology with its nature/culture distinction was appropriated by some feminists to create a sex/gender
distinction. See Butler, Gender Trouble, 36-37.
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Gender theories begin in the reality that all people are assigned to one of two sexes,
and intend to explain whether and why this binary is problematic. This discussion includes
reflection on the normativity of heterosexuality, which the binary approach to human living
establishes and reinforces. Discussion of sexuality goes hand in hand with discussions of sex
and gender since any gender theory will critique sexual practices.4 Reflections on
heterosexuality and the binary categorization of sex force attention to the very meanings of
“female,” “woman,” “male,” and “man.” There is disagreement in gender theory about what
does and should constitute these categories. Do they establish an individual’s primary
identity or establish cross-cultural constituencies? Butler challenges gender theorists to
decide whether “unity” of subject or constituency is a presupposition, a goal, a provisional
status around action, or an impossibility. Gender theorists should contend with how other
identity markers, such as race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality, intersect with sex/gender. Such
an investigation is especially important for feminist liberation theologians because various
identity categories have been used to oppress groups of people throughout history. Theories
of sex/gender should explore if and how people have been limited by the meaning assigned
to their materiality, and if and how our understandings of the categories of sex and gender
can and should be changed in order to bring about a fuller life for all body-persons.
The theologians and theorist I include in this chapter have different answers to the
questions involved in proposing a gender theory. These differences emerge from their
various interpretations of the degree to which the identity categories of sex and gender are
socially constructed. The first theory claims that neither sex nor gender are socially
4

Butler cites Michel Foucault’s argument that the mode of sexuality in fact constructs the very category of sex.
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History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); and in the introduction to
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constructed but have ontological and transcendent meaning outside of any specific social
discourse. This first approach to sex/gender is articulated in Pope John Paul II’s theology of
the body.5 The second answer treats sex as an unconstructed biological fact but defines
gender as the socially constructed way of living our sexed reality. The second theory finds
voice in the ethical approach of Lisa Sowle Cahill. The third approach argues that both sex
and gender have been constructed to support a system of oppression; but that some form of
these constructions must be maintained in order to overcome this oppression. Biblical
theologian Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza explores this third theory. The final consideration of
sex/gender in this chapter defines the very materialization of sex and its corresponding
articulations of gender as socially constructed phenomena. Philosopher Judith Butler
presents this final approach. These authors have been chosen because their work articulates
examples of four general theories of sex/gender. The theories themselves are the focus of
this chapter, not the specific theologians or theorist chosen to articulate it. My presentation
of their work is not meant to be exhaustive nor intended to define their approach to
sex/gender once and for all.

5

John Paul II is the only theologian included in this chapter that is not a feminist scholar. There is much debate
about whether John Paul II’s pontificate took a pro- or anti-woman stance, and opinions differ depending on
whether one agrees with John Paul that there is some kind of fundamental difference between men and women
that does and should affect the living of life. Feminist theologians such as Rosemary Radford Ruether view
John Paul II’s pontificate as a time of reactionary backlash in matters having to do with the status of women in
the church. See “John Paul II and the Growing Alienation of Women from the Church,” in Church in Anguish:
Has the Vatican Betrayed Vatican II?, eds. Hans Küng and Leonard Swidler (San Francisco: Harper and Row,
1987), 279-83. Lisa Sowle Cahill, however, points out that John Paul II has defended the equality and rights of
women in the family and in society to an extent far exceeding the teaching of previous pontiffs. See “The
Feminist Pope,” in Does Christianity Teach Male Headship?: The Equal-Regard Marriage and Its Critics, eds.
David Blankenhorn, Don Browning, and Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 2004), 40-48. Other women scholars who also understand John Paul to be pro-women have
taken up his challenge to build a “new feminism” in Michele Schumacher, ed., Women in Christ: Toward a New
Feminism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004).
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II.

THEORIES OF SEX/GENDER

No Construction
This first theory of sex/gender claims that neither sex nor gender is constructed in or
by their social context. An example of this theory is found in The Theology of the Body:
Human Love in the Divine Plan by Pope John Paul II. The body is central in John Paul II’s
theology. 6 His exploration of the body does not simply discuss the body in general but
addresses its specificity in terms of sex/gender. In The Theology of the Body, John Paul II
argues that both sex and gender have transcendent and ontological meaning fashioned and
intended by God in the original creation for all times. Therefore, John Paul II’s method for
explaining the body in its sexed/gendered reality is exegesis and commentary on the stories
of Genesis.7 John Paul II argues that in these stories is revealed the absolute originality and
truth of what the male and female human being is. These primordial experiences are treated
as the root of every human experience. John Paul II’s method for reflection on the body

6

In a commentary on John Paul II’s theology of the body, Christopher West writes, “The length of this
catechesis [The Theology of the Body] and its place as the inaugural teaching project of John Paul II’s
pontificate points to its fundamental significance. In fact, the theological vision detailed in these addresses
informs all his subsequent papal teachings. We have not fully penetrated the teachings of John Paul II if we
have not penetrated his theology of the body.” See Christopher West, Theology of the Body Explained: A
Commentary on John Paul II’s “Gospel of the Body” (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2003), 5.
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questions about the indissolubility of marriage. In his answers, Jesus references “the beginning.” John Paul II
picks up on this reference and explains how that conversation about marriage has its roots in the creation stories
of Genesis. He further explores Genesis with reference to the Gospel story of Mt 5:27-28 and the topic of lust
and adultery. John Paul’s method is not considered critical biblical scholarship. Although he is in favor of
historical critical method, John Paul does not usually employ it because he is more interested in the divine
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reflection on Genesis is not based on a literal reading of these stories. He categorizes the accounts as mythical,
not in its meaning of fabulous, but rather as an archaic way of expressing a deeper content. For more on John
Paul II’s use of scripture, see Charles E. Curran, “John Paul II’s Use of Scripture in His Moral Teaching,”
Horizon 31 (Spring 2004): 118-34; Michael Waldstein, trans., Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology
of the Body, by John Paul II (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2006), 18-23; and William S. Kurz, “The
Scriptural Foundations of The Theology of the Body,” in Pope John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic,
Ecclesial: Festschrift Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., ed. John M. McDermott and John Gavin (Philadelphia: Saint
Joseph’s University Press, 2007), 27-46.
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represents his overall belief that there is something to be known about the body beyond
specific historical experiences of it.
John Paul II considers both creation accounts in his development of a theology of the
body and what I am calling his gender theory. He understands there to be no contradiction
between these accounts but explains them as two ways of exploring the reality and meaning
of humanity. The first account, Gn 1:1-2, 4, simply gives the objective facts about the
creation of humanity: created male and female; created in the image of God; created to be
fruitful and multiply (and fill, subdue, and have dominion over the earth); and seen by God as
good. The second account, Gn 2:5-25, has a subjective character and is concerned with
humanity’s self-knowledge. John Paul II maintains that the subjectivity of this second
account corresponds to the objective reality of the first account. Both are significant for his
theology of the body and his gender theory but he focuses much more on the second account.
As leader of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II’s approach to the body
was intended to support and defend the Church’s teaching on sexuality, marriage, and family
life.8 John Paul II’s gender theory, explicated from his overall theology of the body, includes
the teaching that heterosexuality within monogamous marriage with an openness to
reproduction is the only acceptable form of sexuality. According to John Paul II, these are
the divine intentions for human bodies found in the scriptures and revealed by the body
8
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Franciscan Herald Press, 1983).
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itself.9 The goal of his theology of the body and its gender theory is to explain the true
understanding of human life intended by God from the beginning so people can take steps to
live this meaning authentically in their lives according to church teachings.
John Paul II’s gender theory argues that a fundamental fact of human existence is that
at every stage of its history God “created them male and female.” He contends that God
always creates humanity in this way and that they are always such. For John Paul II, the fact
that humanity is divinely intended to be male and female is revealed in the Genesis account
of both humanity’s original solitude, ‘adam alone, and its original unity, the creation of male
and female. Humanity’s original solitude includes the events from the creation of the first
person to the creation of the woman as such (Gn 2:7-2:20). John Paul II starts his theology
of the body from a consideration of the human person alone before considering sex as a
human marker. He argues that the first human being, ‘adam, is not yet specifically
sexed/gendered but embodies both male and female humanity.10 Both male and female
participate in the original solitude so that all that is said about the person before the duality of
sex is affirmed in both the male and the female after the duality is established.
John Paul II assigns two meanings to original solitude, one about the general meaning
of personhood and the other about the necessity of male-female sexual differentiation for this
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John Paul II’s exegesis of Genesis, especially Gn 2:24, “Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and
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which men “Neither marry nor are given in marriage” (Mk 12:25). The same anthropology remains. The
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discovering in their solitude a form of communion. The reciprocal “for” of man and woman can also be at the
basis of continence “for” the kingdom of heaven. The person fully rediscovers self through a sincere gift of self
totally to Christ. See John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 262-303.
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personhood. By means of the body ‘adam moves out into the world in a search for identity.
In original solitude, the human being realizes through the body that they are different from
the other creatures and alone. The human being discovers their own superiority to the other
creatures in that the human is capable of “tilling” the earth and transforming it according to
their own needs. The human way of participating in the visible world, through their body,
leads them to the conclusion that they alone are created in the image of God. The experience
of the body teaches the human being that they are both beyond the visible world as the image
of God, but still of this world as a corporal being. In original solitude, the human being
searches for an identity that reflects both of these realities and finds it in the realization of
themselves as a person.
As a person, the original human being yearns for communion with another person.
John Paul II contends that right from the beginning the human person is moving toward
relationship and the overcoming of the frontier of solitude. As the image and likeness of
God, the original person represents all humanity and embodies the unity of the male and
female. The person recognizes their humanity as male and female and longs for communion
between the two with another person. John Paul II argues that humanity requires the dualism
of sex, which is fully achieved in the creation of the second person and the sexing and
gendering of the first, in order for humanity to overcome its original solitude.
John Paul II maintains that the sleep of the first person which precedes the creation of
humanity as male and female is a return to the moment preceding the creation, a return to
non-being.11 It is the creation of humanity as male and female which represents the
“definitive” creation of humanity as it gives life to that communio personarum that man and
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woman form.12 He makes special note that in the biblical text, upon awakening, the human
person expresses joy in the other person, in the second “self,” and the person recognizes their
shared humanity not their difference. This is the “helper fit for him.” John Paul II translates
this notion of help to have the meaning of exact correspondence in a way that supports his
definition of gender relation(ship)s as complementarity.13 In this original unity there is
absolute trust and recognition of completeness between the male and female. This original
unity affirms everything that constitutes the person in solitude; the communion can only be
formed on the basis of double solitude. The Fall interrupts the total trust that is represented
by original nakedness in the original unity. The male and female are then divided and
opposed to one another rather than united. They become estranged from the body, both their
own and the other’s. It is then that the male becomes “husband” and rules over the woman.
John Paul II explains that Genesis reveals that human beings are not meant for the
antagonism between the sexes that the Fall brings. Rather, persons are meant for communion
and intimacy. He argues that the body calls out for unity in original solitude and in original
unity because human beings realize their essence by existing with and for someone. This is
the nuptial meaning of the body, which is John Paul II’s central understanding of materiality
and the basis of his gender theory. He explains the relationship between man and woman as
the quintessential example of this. The original person had to reawaken as two, male and
female, to attain this relationship because no animalia offered man the possibility to exist in a
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relationship of mutual giving.14 The man and woman gift their masculinity and femininity to
each other and in this way come to know their essence. The woman was given by the creator
to the man and accepted by the man as a gift the way the Creator wished her to be “for her
own sake.” In her continued giving of herself woman rediscovers herself. In receiving the
woman as a gift in the full truth of her person and femininity, the man enriches her. Man
gives himself in response to woman and is thereby also enriched through the gift of self in his
masculinity, which the woman also receives and welcomes, and the mutual relationship is
now established.15 John Paul II writes that this giving and this accepting of the gift
interpenetrate, so that the giving itself becomes accepting and the acceptance is transformed
into giving. One finds oneself in giving oneself and this “possession of self” becomes the
source of a new giving of oneself. It is only in and through the body that this giving and
receiving can occur because it is through the body that the human person expresses
themselves.
In both original solitude and original unity, human beings are the duality of male and
female. In original solitude the person embodies both the male and female as the full image
and likeness of God and as the basis for the communion of persons for which the person
longs. In original unity the male and female live out their mutuality for each other and reflect
the complementary duality at the heart of human being. John Paul II’s analysis of Genesis
argues that the two creation stories do not contradict each other but rather give both the
objective and subjective meaning of creation. Physical sex, that humanity was created male
and female in the beginning, is understood by John Paul II to be both objective and
subjective and includes within itself both sex and gender. He reads the creation accounts as
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revealing that it is the Creator’s decision that the human being should always and only exist
as a woman or a man. The reality of two sexes is an objective fact of creation as evidenced
in the first creation account. He contends that sex is a constituent part of a person and not
merely an attribute as evidenced in the second account. The person is deeply constituted by
the body as “he” or “she.”16
The nuptial meaning of the body includes not just sex but also what some would call
gender. John Paul II does not separate sex from gender since each biological sex has a
corresponding and appropriate gender. He writes that sex decides not only the somatic
individuality of man, but defines at the same time his personal identity and concreteness.17
We live our unique and unrepeatable self within the specificity of our sex/gender. In
addition, we are for and with each other in this same specificity. John Paul II contends that
femininity finds itself in the presence of masculinity and masculinity is confirmed through
femininity.18 Human life is dependent on what she will be for him and he for her.
Sex/gender in John Paul II’s gender theory is the foundation on which human life is
built and understood. Sex/gender has been given its meaning by God not human beings. We
express ourselves in and through our sex/gender but we do not create or construct the
meaning of sex/gender as such. John Paul II’s theology of the body is not concerned with
specific historical articulations of sex/gender but with their true meaning revealed in the
mystery of creation. This true meaning is ontological and transcendent of time and place.
The true meaning of the body is beyond any specific articulation of it yet this meaning is
present in all articulations. John Paul II recognizes that the sinfulness of historical humanity
16

John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 49. He writes that the constitution of the woman is different as
compared to the man and that we know today that it is different even in the deepest bio-physiological
determinants. John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 81.
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can distort our understandings of sex/gender but that does not negate that they have true
meanings, which is understood in light of scripture and the Church’s interpretation of it.19
The body expresses the divine intention for humanity. The body reveals the unique being
willed for their own sake and enables this being to participate in the communio personarum
willed by the Creator for them, and to live out the nuptial meaning of the body.

Gender Constructed
A second theory of sex/gender states that sex is not a social construction but gender
is. Lisa Sowle Cahill’s work, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, represents this approach to
sex/gender.20 Like John Paul II, Sowle Cahill approaches the body in its specificity of
sex/gender as a crucial theological topic. Sex and gender are treated as foundational
questions for Sowle Cahill’s Christian ethics and considered central to any ethical discourse
and a base on which to build this discourse. Sowle Cahill presents the materiality of the body
as a cross-cultural point of contact because she understands the differentiation of the human
body into the male and female sexes which cooperate for reproduction as a cross-cultural
phenomenon that is invariant over time. The sexual differentiation of men and women is
given form by cultural institutions such as family and marriage. Gender is this cultural
translation of sex, and as such, a socially constructed phenomenon. This approach to
sex/gender argues that although people cannot change the reality of sex, they can debate and
judge different interpretations of gender and the institutions that give form to them.
19

John Paul II writes that systematic theology discerns two antithetical situations or two different states of
human nature before and after the transgression of Genesis. The former is the state of integral nature and the
latter the state of sin in which historical humanity always finds itself. He contends, however, that the reality of
historical humanity has its roots in and always references the state of original innocence. There remains
continuity between the two because although we are closed to original innocence we are open to the mystery of
redemption. John Paul II, The Theology of the Body, 31.
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Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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Sowle Cahill employs a theological method she calls critical realism. She presents it
as a response to postmodern critique, which she argues cannot make objective moral
assessments because it gives equal validity to a plurality of moral foundations and agendas.21
Sowle Cahill maintains that ethicists must rediscover or reinvent some account of
knowledge, truth, and the “universals” of human experience that is reasonably objective in
order to make moral judgments. Her method proposes a modified objectivity that recognizes
that culturally relative assumptions are not timeless absolutes and all judgments are
potentially revisable. However, normative proposals for human living can be made based on
reasonable reflection on human experience within historical existence. She traces her
approach to the ethical tradition found in Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle. Such a method
requires generalizations about human life in order to condemn some moral and cultural
practices and promote others. Sowle Cahill proposes the sexed and gendered body as a
foundation for these generalizations. Because she describes the human body as such and in
its physiology as relatively invariant over time, she can use it as a common point of contact
for all people. Two examples of this invariance according to Sowle Cahill are the
differentiation of the human race into two sexes and the male-female sexual union to produce
children.22
The goal of Sowle Cahill’s ethical project is to promote human flourishing across
cultures. Human flourishing, according to Sowle Cahill, requires equality and compassion,
including equality between the sexes. She argues that how sex is socialized into gender can
create impediments or possibilities for human flourishing. Therefore, Christian theology
21

Sowle Cahill describes the postmodern sensibility as marked by randomness, fragmentation, distrust of all
“meta-narratives,” self-irony and irreverence, and countercultural politics. She argues that postmodern thought
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objectivity and universality. Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 14, 18.
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must give careful attention to these socializations. While she acknowledges that modernity
played a large part in teaching people to recognize and prize freedom and the equality of
persons, she proposes that Christianity can help people mold these values with compassion
and solidarity. She admits that the Christian tradition has not gone far enough in
implementing and supporting the range of ecclesial, familial, and social changes that
women’s equality requires. However, she still maintains that Christianity has much to add to
the discussion and realization of this equality. What it has to add is the kingdom preaching
of Jesus that invites people to transform their personal relationships into relationships based
on compassion and inclusiveness. Sowle Cahill reads New Testament instructions about sex
and gender as a challenge to hierarchy within and outside the family. Early Christians were
resocialized from the patriarchal family of society and the state to the new family of brothers
and sisters in Christ.23
Sowle Cahill proposes that the equality between the sexes that human flourishing
requires does not call for disregarding or contesting differences between men and women.
She understands these differences as not only an opportunity to bring about equality and
mutuality between the sexes but their recognition a necessity for this equality. Therefore, her
project is not to deconstruct sex but to critique the institutionalization of sexual
differentiation. She proposes a feminist ethical critique of social institutions that construct
gender in ways that create unequal relations between men and women, including marriage
and family forms. The question becomes how to socialize the body in order to promote
equality and compassion.

23

Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 150. She reads the gospel stories and actions as responding
to and challenging the highly stratified social relationships of their time, including that of the Greco-Roman
family.
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Sowle Cahill posits that in order for widespread ethical dialogue about human
flourishing to exist, people must recognize their commonality. She fears that the current
focus on diversity is becoming so extreme that there is not ample attention to connections
and shared reality between people, even that of bodily reality. Her project uses the body not
as something that isolates us through radical individualization, but what unites us in our
humanity. She writes that it is in and through the most basic and widespread forms of our
materiality that human beings have “common sense” access to the experience of other human
individuals.24 Sowle Cahill proposes that human commonality can be found in the fact that
each human person experiences a naturally occurring sex that is then gendered by common
social institutions. This is the foundation of her gender theory.
For Sowle Cahill sex originates in and comes back to the reproductive organs. The
sexual differentiation of the body is naturally occurring and shared by all people. Although
she does not dismiss individuality, she does not view the body as infinitely malleable or in
some way unique to each individual. She recognizes that to speak of sex, or the basic
materiality of the body, as a fundamental reality is considered an interpretation of it; so part
of her project is to re-establish the body’s stability. Although she would allow that sexuality
may extend itself in pluriform and diffuse ways, she maintains that to suggest that “there is
no such thing as ‘sex,’ or that sex in humans has no intrinsic connection to reproductive
physiology, is more rhetorical than factual. Such a claim could only be maintained on the
basis of an abrupt break between humanity and other mammalian species.”25 For Sowle
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Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, 76.
Ibid., 111. Sowle Cahill is writing in response to what she defines as the radical claims of such thinkers as
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler who would contest the foundationalism of a shared, two-sexed material
reality. She notes that Foucault “even suggests in a few more extravagant passages that the human body itself
is not a cultural constant.” Ibid., 22.
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Cahill, sex is a basic experience of embodied individuals. Sex is not socially constructed but
something on which culture operates.
Sowle Cahill contends that there are innate differences between the sexes that always
and everywhere inform identity. She holds that a feminist ethics should recognize that
women’s sexual and reproductive experience sets them apart from men as well as binds
women together historically. The question then focuses on the consequences of the different
embodiment of men and women. Sowle Cahill contends that although bodily difference does
affect our sense of self and how we live, it does not necessarily establish social roles or imply
a hierarchy of the sexes.26 She does not want to be labeled as a biological determinist. She
recognizes that an ethics that considers “natural” tendencies must integrate the reality of
biological urges with the equally human capacity for love, commitment, fidelity, and
compassion.
Sowle Cahill acknowledges that selfhood includes not only sex but the socialization
of sex that all humans experience. The sexed body is always socialized in cultural
institutions which channel its expression. On the one hand, this socialization is culturally
various leading to a diversity in how bodily realities are experienced. On the other hand, the
process of this socialization itself produces parallel institutions among cultures, such as the
family and clan, which, though distinct, are familiar to all. The experience of these common
institutions presents another junction for cross-cultural discourse. Although Sowle Cahill
here differentiates gender from sex, she maintains that they are always related. Gender is
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based on the biological tendencies, capacities, and differences of sex and the social ties that
sex creates.27
Lisa Sowle Cahill’s gender theory incorporates the idea of construction. Although
sexual differentiation is not socially constructed, gender is. This construction is not ex nihilo,
as she reads postmodern critique, but based on the differences between the sexes. For Sowle
Cahill basic facts of biology must be central to discourse about sex and gender. Her work
approaches the body as a symbol of both naturally occurring sexual differentiation and of the
social order in which it is found.28 This makes the body both invariant and changing. Sexual
differentiation is a constant of bodily reality. It expresses the commonality all people share
with each other. But the body also expresses its local context and its historical placement
because customs of gender are many and varied. How cultural communities socialize sexual
differentiation will constantly shift because no historical understanding of gender
encompasses the final way men and women should live their bodies. However, on Sowle
Cahill’s account the process of socialization is also a point of contact between people of
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different cultures. The body, then, serves as an anchor for cross-cultural ethical dialogue in
both its sex and gender.
Sowle Cahill’s Christian ethical project critiques how we gender sexually
differentiated bodies in order to promote equality between men and women. If a process of
gendering does not produce bodies that express equality and compassion, it must be
challenged and changed. Although she recognizes that for women the institutions of family
and marriage can be limiting and sometimes dangerous arenas, she does not believe that
bodies need to be liberated from all social control.29 What people need to do is live social
institutions differently. Sowle Cahill calls on contemporary Christians to emulate the witness
to social challenge of their early biblical counterparts. These initial Christian communities
recognized that how they lived family life could transform larger social patterns and
expectations. They embraced a communal vision of the body as well as alternatives to
hierarchy and domination in the family and society. Christians in today’s world must find
ways to bring about social transformation based on fundamental Christian values of
compassion and solidarity. This transformation does not require the denial or deconstruction
of sexual differentiation, but it does require the rejection of patriarchy that survives in and
through the social mediation of biological reproduction. According to Sowle Cahill,
Christians can upset exploitative, oppressive, and dehumanizing relationships in any culture
and the institutions that support them by living the institutions of family and marriage which
gender sexed bodies in a more reciprocal and compassionate way.30 The question for Sowle
29

Sowle Cahill writes, “In relation to sex and gender, an insistence on pragmatic self-determination which is
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30
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(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000).
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Cahill is not whether the body is gendered in different ways, therefore representing different
social systems, but rather what sort of society the body represents and what value judgment
we can bring to bear concerning ways of being bodies. This second theory of sex/gender
calls for engagement with the variety of gender socialization, but for acceptance of the
constancy of dyadic sexual differentiation.

Sex/Gender System Constructed
The next theory of sex/gender posits that the meaning and significance of both
biological sex and its cultural articulation as gender are social constructions. Advocates of
this approach to sex/gender retain the term and reality of women as a political rallying point
against the oppression that the constructed sex/gender system creates and supports. This
recognition of a reality of woman is meant to appreciate the continuing influence of the
sex/gender system on our lives and identity even though the hope is to shift our intellectual
focus away from sex/gender identity to frameworks that focus on alleviating oppression in all
its forms. Such an approach to sex/gender is outlined in the theology of Elisabeth Schüssler
Fiorenza.31 Schüssler Fiorenza argues that theologians must address the construction of
sex/gender because it contributes and supports systems of oppression. In the name of
liberation from this oppression, she advocates for the deconstruction of the Western
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sex/gender system in order to understand how it oppresses as well as the discovery of
avenues for changing how we think about body-persons.32
Schüssler Fiorenza defends the importance of thinking about body categorization for
biblical studies and theology. She argues that the meaning and significance given to different
bodies is an integral aspect of the meaning of ancient texts and their past and current
interpretations. The rhetorical and political goals of authors and interpreters are to construct
bodies to fit the social and ecclesial structures these agents support. The history bequeathed
to us by these texts and their interpretations encode certain ideas onto bodies and create
commonsense and “natural” understandings about which bodies rule and which bodies are
oppressed. She advocates an approach to reading ancient texts as well as the bodies they
construct that undermines interpretations that lead to oppression and supports liberation from
this oppression. She claims that this can be done because all texts, including bodies, are
ambiguous and allow for reading against the grain.
Schüssler Fiorenza names her theological method a Critical Feminist Liberation
Theology.33 This method challenges any reading of biblical texts and the theology based on
it that oppresses women or other traditional “nonpersons.” Schüssler Fiorenza has a critical
approach to history, biblical texts, and bodies. She defines all three as sites of struggle for
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authority and meaning. History for Schüssler Fiorenza is never the objective reporting of
“facts.” The texts that are our history are consciously constructed narratives that reflect the
interests and social location of the author as well as the historians and exegetes who interpret
them. They are stories about power relations, with “winners” ensuring how the “facts” are
reported and remembered. The language of those in power becomes commonsense and
forms our reality. In her theology, even biblical texts are treated as rhetorical structures with
philosophical and political objectives. Thus, Schüssler Fiorenza applies the same method of
investigation to bodies as she does to texts. She maintains that bodies, like texts, are
historical and political realities that have been constructed and reconstructed throughout
history.
Schüssler Fiorenza argues that because texts are sites of struggle, they evidence both
oppressive and liberating movements and feminist theologians must recognize both.34 She
contends that we have inherited a kyriarchal reality from ancient texts and their traditional
interpretations, but also models that oppose kyriarchy. Schüssler Fiorenza defines kyriarchy
as a multifaceted matrix of relationships between masters and oppressed people.35 It reflects
a more complex understanding of oppression than patriarchy, but patriarchy is part of the
matrix of kyriarchy. Our historical texts are androcentric because they were written within
patriarchal contexts. Their authors often wrote them for the purpose of maintaining this
balance of power. Exegetes throughout history continued to interpret them for this same
purpose. As a biblical scholar, Schüssler Fiorenza analyzes not only ancient texts themselves
but the linguistic theories by which they are translated. She contends that the historical
34
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development of masculine-exclusive language within the English language has led to the fact
that although the masculine gendered pronouns are supposed to be understood as standing for
all humanity they are not often read this way. Therefore our reading of ancient texts can
ignore or exclude the presence of women in the ancient world. Schüssler Fiorenza assumes
their presence.36 This assumption shifts the possible interpretation of many texts. Her
approach perceives ambiguity in texts rather than just one meaning. By extension, she
recognizes the ambiguity in the construction and meaning of bodies, which are based on
these texts.
Schüssler Fiorenza understands her approach to texts and bodies as a shift in feminist
theology away from identity questions per se to well-being questions. She contends that
feminist theology must focus on those suffering from oppression and uncover what keeps
kyriarchy and its language alive. A focus on kyriarchy keeps her theology attentive to the
experience of those who struggle against oppression especially the poorest of the poor who
remain women and children dependent on women. With this focus, she maintains her
feminist concern for women’s experience but expands her reflection to include more complex
and differentiated ways people are oppressed.37 Schüssler Fiorenza contends that a first step
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in this process of alleviating the distress and denigration of oppressed women is the
deconstruction and eventual destruction of the Western sex/gender system.
Any true elimination of oppression must present a way to include the former outcast
into decision-making structures. Schüssler Fiorenza argues that although Christianity was
and is not always and everywhere liberating for women and other nonpersons, reflection on
the Jesus movement and the house ekklēsia does offer liberating models for community. She
interprets the model of ekklēsia based on her understanding of the Greek word as the
assembly of full citizens that promotes the well-being of all.38 As the model of the Jesus
movement and the early Christian Church, she reads the ancient texts as advocating that
everyone can and should be part of the deciding of their own spiritual-political affairs as well
as being part of the determination of what well-being means. Schüssler Fiorenza reads the
Jesus movement and the early Christian Church as advocating radical democracy, which is a
way of living inclusive of the nonpersons and outcasts of kyriarchal structures, as the best
way to realize God’s basileia on earth. This approach to living includes both individual
liberation for self-actualization and the establishment of community that includes all in
responsible decision-making.39
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Schüssler Fiorenza argues that although the Jesus movement provided the model of
ekklēsia to guide Christian efforts to live God’s basileia of liberation for each person and
inclusion of all into God’s community, Christian communities have not always lived ekklēsia
and often find themselves accepting and creating kyriarchal patterns of oppression and
exclusion. The Christian acceptance of the Western sex/gender system into its exegesis,
historical interpretation and ecclesial structures reflects such kyriarchal living. Therefore,
deconstructing and recreating the meaning of bodies is a crucial step to move Christian
communities away from kyriarchal living to a way of being together that better reflects the
ekklēsia of the Christian gospel. Interpretation of the body forms a critical tool in evaluating
whether Christian communities are living up to the call of Jesus and the example he set for
them.
This tension between the models of liberation and the reality of kyriarchy is central to
Schüssler Fiorenza’s work and her gender theory. This tension is inherent in the theological
notion that Jesus Christ’s presence in the world announced the inbreaking of God’s basileia
into human living, but because it is an eschatological concept and reality it is never
completely realized in earthly life. The “already” and “not yet” aspect of the basileia of God
brought into the world through Jesus Christ means that the total liberation it promises is
always a goal but never fully realized. Schüssler Fiorenza uses this central Christian belief
about God’s basileia as a guiding principle for her feminist theology. Since her sociopolitical and theological goals are based on the eschatological concept of God’s basileia,

forces within the Christian community that wished to bring Christian life into conformity with patriarchal and
kyriarchal norms. Schüssler Fiorenza has come to understand the struggle for radical democracy to be
intricately related to women’s religious-theological authority. In her studies of Christian beginnings, Schüssler
Fiorenza draws a connection between religious antidemocratic arguments (lack of freedom for all) and the
debate concerning women’s place (lack of freedom based on body categorization). See Schüssler Fiorenza,
Sharing Her Word, 115-18; and Jesus: Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet, 8-9.
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which she understands as reflected in ekklēsia, this change will be gradual and incomplete.
For this reason, her gender theory seeks to balance the hope of changing intellectual
frameworks, such as the Western sex/gender system, that perpetuate kyriarchal structures
with the realization that this sex/gender system still informs and constructs our lives.
Schüssler Fiorenza’s approach to the sex/gender of bodies is the same as her strategy
for reading texts.40 Her analysis has two main steps. First, she seeks to understand how the
sex/gender system oppresses by deconstructing how bodies are formed in and by this system.
Second, she proposes ways this oppressive system can be changed and bodies reconstructed
through the creation of more liberating practices and relations. Deconstructing the Western
sex/gender system means deconstructing the body since it is the manifestation of this system.
The first step in this deconstruction is locating any body within their socio-political and
religious context and the social networks of power that exist within these contexts. This first
step differentiates the social experiences of masters from that of the oppressed. Her second
move is to uncover the forces that create ways of thinking and therefore being that lead to the
suffering of oppressed persons, including ideas that support sexism, racism, classism,
colonialism, and Eurocentrism. These ways of thinking and being are created and
continually influenced by the biases of the texts we read, the interpretations we have been
taught, and the privileges of the system in which we live. Schüssler Fiorenza’s approach to
bodies recognizes that our past and current philosophical, political, economic, and religious
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systems produce and assign identity to us.41 Kyriarchal arguments and theories for inequality
have become encoded in the body, and affect how we live and think about bodies. We must,
therefore, interrogate the philosophical, political and religious subtexts of even our most
commonsense understandings of the body.
After these strategies for deconstructing bodies, Schüssler Fiorenza turns her attention
to the task of reconstruction for she believes that bodies can be changed through a change in
how we read them. She contends that if we approach language as not deterministic, then
texts and the reality they produce in our bodies are ambiguous and open to different
interpretations. In addition, inviting the voices of people of varying socio-political
experiences to join the interpretation of texts disrupts traditional readings. Different
perspectives reveal the ambiguity and complexity of texts and bodies and allow for a
proliferation of interpretations.42 Schüssler Fiorenza admits that her translation of texts and
bodies serves her political goals, but maintains that all interpretations are motivated by
rhetorical aims. She argues that kyriocentric interpretations merely try to hide this
“constructedness” of reality in order to naturalize the structures and prejudices of kyriarchal
41
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systems. She claims she is simply more upfront and honest about her own rhetorical aims of
creating a counter-discourse for liberation.
Schüssler Fiorenza argues that since texts are inherently ambiguous and open to
multiple interpretations they contain contradictions and fissures that allow us to read against
the grain. Reading against the grain allows us to open up historical memory to what has been
suppressed by those in power. For example, Schüssler Fiorenza assumes that history
involved and involves both women and men and that both were historical actors who shaped
Christianity so both should be subjects of intellectual inquiry. She reads grammatical gender
as inclusive rather than an instrument of language to keep people marginalized and oppressed
by making them invisible in biblical translation and interpretation and therefore insignificant
for contemporary life as well. Having established that texts and bodies can and do have
ambiguous and plural readings, Schüssler Fiorenza encourages Christians to choose readings
that move the community toward the goal of liberation as articulated in the radical
democracy of ekklēsia inaugurated by the inbreaking of God’s basileia in Jesus Christ. Our
readings of texts and bodies should move us to personal transformation and liberating action.
Creative rereading should fashion subjects dedicated to radical democratic praxis and the
construction of a different realty that no longer supports kyriarchal structures, including the
Western sex/gender system.
Schüssler Fiorenza advocates changing the ways people are differentiated away from
the current emphasis on the sex/gender system to an approach to persons that recognizes if
they are being included or excluded from democratic agency. This approach to identity still
recognizes the important influence of the Western sex/gender system in how we understand
ourselves and others. Schüssler Fiorenza advocates the use of the term wo/men to reflect the
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tension of working toward liberation from kyriarchal oppression while still living within it.
Wo/men includes both oppressed women and men and those who stand with them. It is a
challenge to how we think about sex/gender categories since it recognizes that identity is
about our place in kyriarchal structures not any kind of neutral biological designation. It is
also an invitation to change the frameworks that create these designations in the first place.
Her use of the category of wo/men shifts focus from men and women to oppressors and
oppressed, suggesting a means of differentiating persons otherwise than the phallus.43 This
shift in the meaning of the body is a move from materiality as biological specimen to the
body as a text that is written for political purposes.
Schüssler Fiorenza’s gender theory understands bodies as constructed for rhetorical
and political purposes in just the way texts are. By thinking of the body as text, she shows
how bodies are expressions of philosophical and religious arguments that support specific
political goals. These arguments become encoded in the body and become the guidelines for
how we understand our materiality. Bodies are constructed by the “winners” of history,
those with power interested in keeping it. The very language of and about bodies reinforces
power relations, which includes how we live our sexed/gendered bodies. This language
includes not only contemporary ideas about the body but our history as well. The context of
the authors of our history, the interpreters of this history, as well as our own context construct
the meaning of our bodies.
On the other hand, Schüssler Fiorenza argues that texts and bodies are ambiguous
because they extend beyond their specific moment. People are not completely programmed
by their history or the context in which they find themselves. Our bodies do express the
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kyriarchy we have inherited, including our ideas of sex/gender, but they can be reread in a
more democratic way. Just like texts, bodies can be deconstructed to understand why we
understand them the way we do and reconstructed to express something else. Schüssler
Fiorenza’s goal is for bodies to express ekklēsia so that all people are freed from oppression
and all people participate in the decision-making for the well-being of themselves and others.
Although we may never attain this reality, it should be the goal of Christian feminist
theology. As theological justification for this type of reading, Schüssler Fiorenza argues that
the gospel stories invite us to engage in a rereading and rewriting of history in light of Jesus
Christ that leads to a rereading and rewriting of ourselves as his followers.

Total Construction
For this final approach to sex/gender, I return to the work of Judith Butler. Although
Butler is not a theologian, her work is engaged and used in theological reflection on the
body.44 Like John Paul II, Butler establishes no distinction between sex and gender and
describes both as foundational to our way of being in the world. She does not, however,
understand this to mean they are absolute, transcendent, or ahistorical. Her approach to
sex/gender differs fundamentally from that of Lisa Sowle Cahill, which argues for an a prior
sex on which is stamped the cultural construction of gender. Butler posits that both sex and
gender are constructions of power through which a subject comes to be at all, a position she
shares with Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza. She has a different understanding of power,
however, and so her theory takes exception to Schüssler Fiorenza’s argument that some idea
of women must be maintained for political purposes. Butler calls on feminist politics to shift
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its focus from the so-called interests of the set of ready-made subjects under the heading of
“women,” to a questioning of the very terms through which identity is articulated.45 In this
section I consider two of Butler’s works—Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” In the first, she outlines
a geneaology of gender and concludes that gender is performative of regulatory norms; in the
second, she furthers her investigation of how bodies are constructed and concludes that
power relations also work in the very formation of “sex” and its “materiality.”
Butler applies Michel Foucault’s notions of power and Jacques Derrida’s theory of
iterability to theorize how bodies become sexed/gendered and how the materialization of
bodies can be shifted to positively include more articulations of the subject beyond the
heterosexual binary of male/masculine and female/feminine. When Butler claims that the
materiality of the body is the effect of power, she is employing Foucault’s understanding of
power. Power here is not something someone has or yields nor an external force or subject
operating on bodies. Rather, Foucault defines power as a web of relations that
interpenetrates society and produces its subjects. Power is the regulatory norms that form
identity and the very process by which anyone is.46 This process of identity formation
produces intelligible subjects that fit the contextual norms as well as those entities that do not
fit the criteria of a subject. Butler names those that do not fit power’s discourse the abject.
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Butler’s gender theory and her strategy for changing the regulatory norms that
produce the materiality of the body rely on Derrida’s theory of language.47 Derrida claims
that at the heart of all language, that which makes language possible, is the notion of
iterability. In order for language to be possible it must be able to be repeated and used in
different contexts. Its iteration in a different context than its original citation creates a
rupture in the language that can result in a breakdown of meaning or the occurrence of new
meanings. For Butler, the language and discourses that produce the materiality of bodies are
phallogocentrism, which is identity based on male-ness, and compulsory heterosexuality.
These discourses provide the regulatory norms that determine what is meaningful about the
body and therefore how the body should be lived. Butler concludes that sex/gender is an
effect of these discourses not their cause, and posits that we experience the body as gendered
masculine and feminine because we live the body as dyadic.48 Her goal is to decenter these
discourses so that more and different bodies can materialize as acceptable and meaningful
subjects. Thus, Butler’s methodology yields a theory of sex/gender that claims that power
forms bodies in and as discourse, which in its necessary repetition can be rearticulated.
Butler argues against theories of sex/gender that separate the two and establish sex as
prediscursive on which gender operates. Such a theory of materiality is inadequate for Butler
because it cannot contest the discourse of compulsory heterosexuality which cast some
bodies as meaningful and others as not mattering at all. She claims that reference to a pure
body or a prediscursive sexed body is actually part of the discourses of phallogocentrism and
compulsory heterosexuality, which establish sex/gender as timeless structures. Butler argues
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that any reference to the body is at the same time a formation of the body.49 For her, there is
no subject who stands before the construction of sex in any spatial or temporal sense. All
subjects emerge within and as the matrix of gender relations. Butler gives as an example the
process through which an embryo becomes a person or a subject. She writes that through the
interpellation of sex/gender an “it” shifts to “she” and is “girled” and brought into the domain
of language and kinship. Declaring the embryo or child “she” demarcates the body as female
rather than male and as acceptable rather than unlivable.50 The body of the child becomes
culturally intelligible only by being sexed/gendered. Butler argues that the power of “sex” at
its most effective is that it constitutes a field of intelligibility, a taken-for-granted ontology.
Butler’s gender theory maintains that the regulatory norms of phallogocentrism and
compulsory heterosexuality materialize the body’s sex and produce male and female
subjects. Thus, the production of materiality does not mean that power creates materiality
but rather that it marks and delineates what portion of the materiality of the body is relevant
and foundational for the living of our lives. Butler contends that within our context being
male/masculine and female/feminine matters and so we are materialized and live as such. In
other words, power operates in the production of the binary frame of thinking about
sex/gender. Butler wants to recast the matter of bodies not as a site of surface but as a
process of materialization that is the effect of the dynamic of power. Regulatory norms
govern the materialization of any body.51
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According to Butler’s theory, the construction of bodies is not a singular act, but a
process of repetition. Subjects are materialized through the reiteration of the regulatory
norms that govern them. To name a person a female or male is the repeated inculcation of a
norm, and the power of regulatory norms stems from the persistence of their repetition.
Therefore, the phenomenon of sex is formed within and by discourse. The regulatory norms
of the controlling discourses produce by marking and constraining bodies to fit the ideals of
their discourse. Butler argues, however, that bodies can never fully comply with these ideals
because they are constructions themselves. “True” gender identity and the “law of sex” are
such because we mirror gender ideals in our living and cite sex as a law of nature. She
contends that norms only exist and have power to the extent that they are repeated or cited as
a norm. This repetition or citation occurs in our process of approximating or “identifying
with” such norms.52 Although the norms of sex/gender compel citations and approximations,
which we call female/feminine and male/masculine, there is no true or perfect sex/gender
identity.
After establishing her theory that bodily materiality is the repetition of the norms of
governing discourses and therefore have no “true” reality, Butler lays out how change in our
very materiality is possible. First, she claims that the concepts of sex and gender have
complex histories, which reveal them as historically revisable regulatory schemes. This
revision happens, and can only happen, within the discursive practices one wishes to contest.
Within and as part of the construction of sex/gender is the possibility for and agency to
change them.53 Butler argues that the materiality of the body is the effect of social discourse,
which maintains its status as foundational through the continual repetition of its regulatory
52
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norms. By applying Derrida’s insights about language and iterability to the discourses that
produce sex/gender, Butler treats identity as unstable and incorporating the possibility and
necessity of its own rearticulation and disruption. If sex/gender are regulatory norms that
require repetition then they have the same quality as language that needs to be repeated in
different contexts than the one for which it was originally intended. The regulatory norms’
ability to be repeated in different contexts means that their meaning is divided past and
future. There always exists the possibility for different articulations or reiterations of the
body by individuals. Gaps and fissures to the current construction of sex/gender open up and
allow shifts in the norms of sex/gender. Change happens when one lives sex/gender as
something different in a world that presupposes and requires that sex remain dyadic. Butler
argues that moral agency is in the gap of who I find myself to be and who I can be. Persons
can repeat these norms in other ways that allow for alternative identity formations. The task
is then not whether to repeat, but how to repeat the regulatory norms of sex/gender.
The first step in this change is to recognize that there are already bodies that exist in
what Butler calls “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” zones of social life. She claims that these
bodies fail to materialize as subjects within the discourses of phallogocentrism and
compulsory heterosexuality; but if we have the eyes to see them they represent the possibility
for change through the contestation of the regulatory norms of sex/gender. By including
their articulation of materiality, we can rearticulate “the symbolic horizon in which bodies
come to matter at all.”54 These alternative articulations of materiality question the
fundamental naturalness of sex/gender, contest its very binarism, and present new
possibilities for its articulation. Butler contends that a proliferation of sex/gender
configurations can become a reality if we redescribe what is currently defined as culturally
54
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unintelligible as acceptable articulations of materialization. This proliferation then has the
potential to deprive sex/gender configurations based on compulsory heterosexuality of their
natural status. Butler asks, “What would it mean to ‘cite’ the law to produce it differently, to
‘cite’ the law in order to reiterate and co-opt its power, to expose the heterosexual matrix and
to displace the effect of its necessity.”55 Her answer is that it would change the regulatory
norms that bring about the sexed/gendered subject. We would have the space and means to
rethink and rearticulate what it means to be sexed/gendered. In this process exist the
possibilities of rematerialization. For Butler, shifts in materialization are not change simply
for change’s sake. They are an attempt to include more persons in the realm of who matters
in social discourse. She wants to expand the meaning of what counts as a valued and
valuable body in the world, of what qualifies as bodies that matter, of what ways of living
count as “life,” and of what lives are worth protecting, saving, and grieving.56

III.

DISCUSSION
This chapter demonstrates how using construction as an organizing principle can

serve as a tool for theology to explore different theories of sex/gender through reflection on
the degree to which bodily materiality is constructed. Analysis of each theory centers on
how it answers the question to what degree are the sex and/or gender of the body constructed
in and by its social discourse. The varied responses to this question reveal that sex/gender as
concepts and realities exist broadly and diversely in theological discourse and life.
Sex/gender cannot be approached as one thing in and for theology; it must be handled as a
55
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discussion. Theologians must clarify their own theory of sex/gender, and equally important
know where it fits within the spectrum of views on sex/gender. This clarification invites
theologians to delve deeply into the relevance and place of the body in theology by
considering how reflection on the sex/gender of bodies calls attention to theological method,
truth claims, views on subjectivity and personhood, judgment of binary sexuality, and the
body’s relationship with language.
Conversation organized around construction begins with discussion about the very
meaning of the idea of construction, the process by which sex and gender are established,
who or what is responsible for this process, and if there is any opportunity for the
sexed/gendered person to change the meaning of sex and/or gender. For some theologians
such as John Paul II, construction of bodily reality would negate the belief that there is a
divine plan to and for our bodies and their living. If sex/gender are ontological realities that
reflect the divine plan, then sex/gender are not constructed but rather created. God is the
creating agent and humanity cannot change the ultimate meaning of sex/gender; it is revealed
to them. Any change in a person’s understanding and living of these categories should
reflect an acceptance of their original and ultimate meaning. Other theologians such as Lisa
Sowle Cahill understand construction to mean ex nihilio so using it to describe sex would
ignore the biology of humans as a mammalian species. If sex is a given in human reality,
then only gender can be addressed as constructed. Any meanings and institutionalizations of
gender that do not create equality and promote compassion in partnership should be changed.
Most who do use the idea of construction in their explanation of sex/gender do not mean it
“creates” materiality. Rather, the construction of sex/gender is understood as the assignment
of meaning to it, the demarcation of the importance of it, and therefore the production of it.
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Judith Butler adamantly argues that to state that sex/gender is constructed does not mean it is
illusory or artificial, or that it is constructed once and for all.57 Even theories that accept the
construction of sex/gender for rhetorical and political purposes might disagree on who or
what constructs them. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza describes the constructing agent as other
human beings, the winners of history who have control and want to maintain it. Judith Butler
has different notions of power and understands it as a web of relations rather than something
someone yields. Both, however, maintain that change is possible and in the hands of
constructed individuals either as a rebellion against the constructing agent or a decentering of
the constructing power from within.
The answers to the central question of this chapter must be read as crucial to and
flowing from the overall method and goals of the author’s theology or philosophy. A
theological method that demands the possibility of timeless realities to support unchanging
teaching describes the meaning of sex/gender as ahistorical and transcendent of time and
place. If a theological method is searching for universal foundations or generalizations to
anchor cross-cultural ethical dialogue, then sex and the process of being gendered is
described as invariant. Bodies will look different according to methods and goals that aim
for the alleviation of oppression that is based on the very categorization of bodies as sexed
and gendered. Both the meaning and reality of sex and gender are considered in terms of
how they move toward the goal of equality or hinder its achievement. When sex and gender
are understood as the result of power relations, they must be able to be changed if new
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political realities are to be achieved. This change happens through the deconstruction of the
history of sex/gender and a shift in how we think about sex/gender identity and live it.
These different approaches to sex/gender reveal different understandings of truth.
John Paul II professes a belief in ahistorical, transcendent truth we can know through
revelation. Sowle Cahill proposes a modified objectivity, which considers truth as something
we come to together. There are, however, foundations to human being that can be considered
universals. Schüssler Fiorenza maintains that we usually define truth according to the
commonsense established by the winners of history and the masters in the kyriarchal
structure. She claims it is better to think about truth as that which brings us closer to living
God’s basileia, which on earth is approximated in radical democracy. Butler approaches
truth as something constructed as such within and according to the discourses of any social
context.
These considerations of ontology and truth within the discourse about sex/gender
disclose each theorist’s notion of personhood and subjectivity, another central theological
question. Gender theories must address the relationship of selfhood and the sex/gender of the
body. Is there a subject beyond their sex/gender or does the subject come to be and exist
only as sexed/gendered? Is true selfhood a goal that can only be achieved once the person is
liberated from oppressive sex/gender articulations or are they what define the person as a self
or subject? Inherent to these beliefs about the human subject is each theory’s idea of the
purpose of human life. Should sex/gender be understood as complementary, based on
equality and mutuality, undermined altogether, or expanded in order for persons to most fully
live human subjectivity? Each view of subjectivity comes to a different conclusion about the
unity of each sex as a group.
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John Paul argues for the necessity of male-female differentiation for personhood.
Each human being knows their essence and the self in and through their own sex/gender. In
the giving and receiving of the sexed/gendered self, each person realizes themselves as a
person created by God for this purpose. It is only in and through the body that a human
being knows themselves as a person created uniquely from other creatures and for
communion with other persons. The ultimate communion is the union of the male and
female. Because he understands sex/gender as our primary identity, the unity of males and
females as individual groups is a presupposition to John Paul II’s thought. Sowle Cahill
concurs with John Paul II that being a sexed and gendered person informs our sense of self
and through this reality we are able to connect with others. The body as sexed and gendered
is what makes us human. Sex and gender are essential aspects of being a human person,
although the hierarchy based on them is not. Sowle Cahill considers the unity of women a
goal to be maintained for it recognizes the uniqueness of women’s sexuality and reproductive
capacities and allows cross-cultural dialogue. For Schüssler Fiorenza, the person is formed
according to the sex/gender system of their history and context, but it does not and should not
be the essential way we think about human beings. She advocates other ways of categorizing
identity that would define people differently. Schüssler Fiorenza shifts identity designation
to wo/men in recognition that the unity of this group is a provisional status around action for
alleviation of oppression. Judith Butler describes the sex/gender matrix as a power discourse
that materializes bodies and causes subjects to be. These attributes of the body are both
essential and nonessential for personhood. Butler treats the unity of women as a phantasm
and an impossibility.
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Delving into the relationship of the subject to their materiality in terms of sex/gender
brings to light different understandings of the relationship of sex to gender as well as how
each relate to social life. While Lisa Sowle Cahill separates sex and gender in her analysis,
John Paul II, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, and Judith Butler treat them as inseparable
aspects of bodily reality. These three differ, however, on the relationship of sex/gender to
social life. John Paul II understands sex/gender as the foundational principle for social life;
its cause not its effect. Schüssler Fiorenza regards the sex/gender system as a foundational
principle of kyriarchy and established for its purposes. Butler argues that sex/gender is the
foundation of being in our social context and is produced and restrained by the normalizing
institutions of phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality. Sowle Cahill tries to
balance the idea that the sex of the body is prior to social life, but the gender of it formed
only within and by social institutions.
Various approaches to the relationship of sex and gender reveal diverse opinions
about whether the binary of sex and gender is problematic. The more problematic this
binary, the more sex and gender are viewed as constructed in social discourse and
changeable. Because John Paul II argues that God always creates human beings as male and
female, dyadic sexual differentiation is not problematic and heterosexuality is the only
acceptable form of sexuality. Sex/gender is not oppressive; the estrangement of the sexes
caused by the Fall is what creates tension between men and women. Lisa Sowle Cahill also
does not understand binary sexual difference as problematic, but rather as the foundation for
childbearing and rearing. It is the basis for necessary social order, although its gendering can
be established in oppressive ways. Schüssler Fiorenza and Butler both find the binary
problematic and oppressive. Schüssler Fiorenza contests it because it is part of the
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oppression of kyriarchy, creating relationships based on masters and oppressed. Butler
argues that the binary is unacceptable because it does not allow some bodies to materialize
and therefore matter in society.
These theories of sex/gender approach narratives and language as central to any
understanding of the body. Scripture is approached as both revealing a true and proper
understanding of our bodily reality and as rhetorical and political narratives that encode
bodies for inequality. Even so, all Christian theologians argue that the Christian narratives
can still expand our understandings of sex/gender to make them more about equality than
oppression. Theorists in other disciplines challenge theologians to recognize the importance
of social discourses in the creation and understanding of sex/gender that may extend beyond
and exist distinctly from Christian narratives but still affect how we know ourselves. These
narratives include our social and cultural history. There are and have been different
historical articulations of sex/gender. Theories define some of these articulations as the
result of sinful humanity or the interests of the powerful to keep some ruled while they rule.
Either way, one’s knowledge and interpretation of the history of sex and gender are
important aspects of any gender theory. This includes contending with past and current
scientific explanations of sex/gender. The science of the body changes in different contexts.
Sowle Cahill is the only theologian to base her argument for sex on science, although John
Paul II briefly employs science to support some of his claims. Judith Butler uses science to
support her opposing claim, contending that whether science argues for or against a dual sex
system is not obvious. Butler challenges theorists to delve more deeply into the supposed
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naturalness of sex by critiquing scientific discourses which establish its facticity, enquiring
into its history, and questioning its very meaning.58
The debate and discussion extracted through dialogue about sex/gender based on the
concept of construction leads to questions about bodily expression. Different theories about
sex/gender articulate different understandings of what the body expresses in its materiality.
The body can be understood as revealing God’s plan for creation or its social context that
may or may not be based on oppressive discourses. John Paul’s theory claims that each
person expresses the self in and through their body. Sowle Cahill treats the body as a crosscultural connection that creates discourse with others. Schüssler Fiorenza approaches bodies
as texts expressing the rhetorical and political goals of their authors. Butler contends that
they are the materialization of the norms of controlling discourses. One must determine if
the body’s expression as sex/gender is an appropriate and live-giving expression or one that
should be changed. These reflections also challenge theologians to think about how the body
expresses not only its constructing discourses but also the individual who the body is. To
what degree are individuals determined by the discourses that form them? If Christianity
believes that each person is a unique being willed for their own sake by God, then gender
theories must explore individual identity as opposed to and in relationship with communal
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identity.59 Reflecting on bodily construction and how it leads to questions about bodily
expression starts the process of thinking about the body as symbol.

IV.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the significance of the body has been investigated through the lens of

sex/gender. The importance of the body in its specificity of sex/gender for theology has been
demonstrated in each approach to sex/gender outlined in this chapter. Sex/gender was shown
to be relevant and significant to theological anthropology and what it means to be and live as
the image and likeness of God. It was argued that the body is the foundation of ethical
dialogue and our understandings of sex/gender the difference between human flourishing and
oppression. The meaning and significance we assign to sex/gender is also an integral aspect
of our scriptural texts and their exegesis. Although not a theologian, Judith Butler challenges
theology to investigate how sex/gender is part of our very understanding of the subject and
its possibility.
Theorists concerned with sex/gender have often been criticized for too narrow a view
of identity. Just as John Paul II establishes sex/gender as primary identity, feminist theorists
have been criticized for not recognizing that race is also a fundamental aspect of identity in
this country as well as around the world. There is now a general recognition that other social
divisions affect how sex/gender is lived in different communities and that race is a crucial
tool of oppressive structures and institutions. Theology must recognize, however, that race is
not just another aspect of identity, but that race and sex/gender together interpenetrate and
influence the meaning of each other. Sexual difference is not prior to racial difference.
59

This approach to the person as a unique being is not limited to Christian theology. Judith Butler understands
the individual as a unique utterance of the norms that form them. Therefore, each individual has the capacity to
shift the constructions of sex/gender through a different iteration of their materialization.
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Judith Butler honestly addresses race when she writes, “There are other regimes of regulatory
production that contour the materiality of bodies. Race emerges not simply as another, fully
separable, domain of power from sexual difference or sexuality, but that its ‘addition’
subverts the monolithic workings of the heterosexual imperative as I have described it so
far.”60 I agree with Butler’s assessment of the relationship of sex/gender and race in human
identity and the meaning of materiality and I will explore the intersection of sex/gender and
race in Part II of this dissertation. For now, I will move on to a specific consideration of
theories that give meaning to the construction of the materiality of the body commonly
known as race.

60

Butler, Bodies That Matter, 18.
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A person without a past is a person without an identity. And the absence of an identity is
very serious, because without self-knowledge others can make you become what they desire.
James Cone, My Soul Looks Back1

CHAPTER 3: RACE IN THEOLOGY

I.

INTRODUCTION
This chapter shifts focus from theories of sex/gender to theories of race but continues

to use construction as its organizing principle. The concept of construction is again
employed to invite reflection on how the materiality of the body is established within and by
means of social discourse as well as the meaning and significance attributed to identity
markers such as race and sex/gender that categorize this materiality. The previous chapter
outlined theories that debated the level of construction of sex and gender. In discussions
about race there is general agreement that race is socially constructed, meaning it has no
biological basis nor is it an ontological category with transcendent or ahistorical meaning.
However, agreement about race as a social construction does not mean agreement about what
race is. There remains debate about the meaning and significance of the construction of race
for human living. This chapter focuses on this discussion.
Declaring race a social construction does not relegate it to the status of illusion, which
is just one theory of race. Treating race as a social construction calls attention to the fact that
race as an identity category has been invented in time and space and so racial meaning
depends on its context and the history of its context. Race is an ever-changing, continuously
shifting concept.2 We must always ask the question of what is meant when the term “race” is

1

James H. Cone, My Soul Looks Back (Nashville: Abingdon, 1982), 28.
For a deeper investigation of the history of the term and concept of race, see E. Nathaniel Gates, ed., The
Concept of “Race” in Natural and Social Science (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997); Thomas F.
Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America (New York: Schocken Books, 1965); and Winthrop D.
2
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invoked. Race, like sex/gender, never exists as one thing but is subject to various
interpretations. Theories overlap and influence each other as well as contradict and oppose
one another. Exploring various theories of race helps theologians have better discussion
about race and how it intersects with theological discourse.
In order to frame my presentation of race in theology, I turn to the work of
sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant.3 Omi and Winant argue that the primary task
of racial theory is not to problematize a seemingly “natural” concept of race but to focus
attention on the continuing significance and changing meaning of race.4 They emphasize
three main points that are at the heart of race theory in general and this chapter in particular.
First, the importance and centrality of race in shaping identities and institutions in the United
States cannot and should not be understated. Omi and Winant argue that the United States is
a “color-conscious” not color-blind society; one marked by racism, not equality. 5 Race has
been and continues to be an important organizing concept at both the individual and
institutional level. Our socialization involves learning some version of racial categories and

Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1968).
3
I rely on the following texts: Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States: From
the 1960s to the 1990s; “Racial Formation,” in Race, Class, and Gender in the United States: An Integrated
Study, ed. Paula S. Rothenberg (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); “On the Theoretical Status of the Concept
of Race,” in Asian American Studies: A Reader, ed. Jean Yu-wen Shen Wu and Min Song (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 2000); and Michael A. Omi, “The Changing Meaning of Race.”
4
Omi and Winant, “On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race,” 200. Emphasis theirs. They write that
although most theorists reject race as a “natural” or biological concept there are still attempts to discern the
scientific meaning of race today in such areas as genetics and educational psychology. These attempts seek to
remove the concept of race from fundamental social, political, or economic determination and see the truth of
race to lie in the terrain of innate characteristics. Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation,” 14.
5
Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 10. Emphasis theirs. Omi and Winant describe the
U.S. social structure as a racial state, meaning a state that is inherently racial. They write that the state
intervenes in the racial order and is intervened by it; structures it and is structured by it. From its very inception
the state has been concerned with politics of race whether that concerns repression, exclusion, the categorization
of groups for situation in the racial order by such means as the census, or the political action and demands of
groups to the state. See their model of the racial state in Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States, 83-84. For more on the racial state, see David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 2002). For Omi and Winant’s discussion of racism, see Omi and Winant, Racial
Formation in the United States, 69-76.
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meaning systems and our common sense knowledge includes racial thinking. Our concepts
of race are infused with and supported by social, economic, political and religious forces and
beliefs. To ignore race means to ignore central issues of our society.
Omi and Winant’s second main point is that although race is central to life in the
United States, there is a general unwillingness to discuss it. Underlying this unwillingness is
the fact that race is a difficult concept even if it is often treated as a common sense, simple
reality. It is difficult to define race since it is fluid and subject to multiple determinations.
As one delves deeper into the study of race, one must contend with many areas of human
thinking. It is a topic that brings us back to the difficult and painful racial legacies of the
past, especially slavery, legalized discrimination, and violence against racial minorities,
which continue to haunt and shape American society. In addition, the important
investigation of whiteness that must be part of race theory is made problematic by the fact
that most whites do not see or recognize their whiteness most of the time.6 Because of these
difficulties the discussion of race is usually avoided, often by means of treating it as a mere
manifestation of some other supposedly more important social relationship or by advocating
color-blindness and the transcendence of race.
A third contention of Omi and Winant is that because of the importance we place on
race, we as a society, and just as importantly as individual scholars, cannot ignore these
realities or simply jettison our widely held racial beliefs. They advocate that we must notice,
not ignore, the concept of race in all its subtlety to effectively analyze issues that involve race

6

See Martha R. Mahoney, “The Social Construction of Whiteness,” in Critical White Studies: Looking Behind
the Mirror, eds. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 330-33.
She writes that whites usually discuss whiteness only when they perceive their well-being threatened by racebased initiatives or their privilege undermined by attacks on whiteness. These perceptions are often discussed
in terms of racism against whites. Making whites feel white is usually thought of as racism.
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and to make strides to oppose racism.7 Omi and Winant treat race as an element of social
structure not an irregularity in it and as a dimension of human representation not an illusion.8
In addition, race must be situated within its historical and social context. Races do not
emerge full-blown but are the results of historical practices as well as the contestation of
these practices and the beliefs behind them. Racial meanings vary over time and between
different societies.9 Race has a dynamic reality.
The five approaches to race that follow begin with the assumption that race is a social
construction. I name these theories race as essence, race as historical legacy, race as culture,
race as class, and race as illusion. Each section explores how race can be discussed in
theology. Theologians debate and investigate if and how race can be used to think about our
ultimate concern, to discern the significance of history for identity, to reflect on different
cultures and worldviews, to serve as an entry point to a discussion of economic inequality
and injustice, and to distract theologians from truly understanding contemporary living.
Included in all of these discussions is an assessment of racism and suggestions for liberation
from it. Each section is titled “race as…” not “race is…” because race is being treated as a
construction and therefore open to multiple interpretations. Theologians and theorists were
chosen to illustrate these positions although I recognize that no neat categorization can

7

Omi argues that it is crucial to relate racial categories and meanings to concepts of racism. See Omi, “The
Changing Meaning of Race,” 254.
8
Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 55.
9
Omi and Winant’s approach to race is explicitly historicist. They propose the emergence of racial time, which
is the interpretation of history itself through the lens of race. For example, instead of understanding modernity
in terms of the rise of capitalism and the bourgeoisie like enlightenment-based social theory, they point to the
immense historical rupture represented by the rise of Europe, the onset of African enslavement, the conquista,
and the subjugation of much of Asia, all of which were influenced by and further influenced ideas of race. They
argue, “that modern (and post-modern) history can be thought of as the process by which the slow inscription of
phenotypical signification took place upon the human body, in and through conquest and enslavement to be
sure, but also as an enormous act of expression, of narration.” “Western” or colonial time can be explained as a
huge project of demarcating “difference.” Omi and Winant, “On the Theoretical Status of the Concept of
Race,” 206. Since race and by extension race theory is contextual, race is understood differently in different
countries and societies. See Omi and Winant, “Racial Formation,” 15-16, 21.
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capture any one thinker’s understanding of race. Theories of race often overlap and intersect
in theology, theory, and life.

II.

THEORIES OF RACE

Race as Essence
This first approach to race treats race as essential to human identity. Such an
explanation of race is found in the work of James Cone, who reflects on Christian faith in
light of the black experience in the United States.10 Cone’s theory of race is based on the
claim that U.S. society essentializes race; we are “raced” first and everything else after that.11
Race is the meaning and significance we give to skin color; and its essentialization attempts
to explain who we are and how we should live based on the color of our skin. Theologizing
within this context, Cone asks who we should be as Christians and how we might live this
identity in a society that essentializes race. This reflection leads to a new way of thinking
about race as essence. Race for Cone is still about who we are and how we should live, but it
is now understood from a Christian perspective about identity. Cone concludes that
Christians are meant to live as the image of God, which today means we must be black. His
theological proposal challenges how we think about ourselves as well as God by reflecting on
theological anthropology through the lens of race, which Cone argues is necessary if
theology is to be relevant for Christians living in the United States.

10

James Cone is known as the father of black theology. His first book, Black Theology and Black Power (New
York: Seabury Press, 1969), was the first book on liberation theology. It was published two years before
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s Teología de la liberación. I rely on James H. Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989); A Black Theology of Liberation; God of the Oppressed; My Soul Looks Back;
and For My People: Black Theology and the Black Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984). For an
overview of Cone’s work, including continuities and changes in his thought, see Rufus Burrow, Jr., James H.
Cone and Black Liberation Theology (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1994).
11
See Cone, God of the Oppressed, xi; and For My People, 46.
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Cone’s discussion about identity begins with the Christian belief that all persons are
created as the image of God and we are called to live this identity in our specific context. In
order to be the image of God we must know who and how God is. This knowledge of God
comes from revelation, which Cone defines as God’s self-disclosure in personal relationship
with humankind. He claims that this revelation is found in the biblical witness as well as the
black experience since God’s relationship with humankind continues today.12 There is
continuity between the biblical stories of God, especially those of Jesus Christ as the
Incarnation of God in the first century, and the experience of the risen Christ today.
According to Cone, both means of God’s self-disclosure reveal a liberator God who is in
solidarity with victims of injustice. For Cone, the Bible speaks of how God is not just
interested in spiritual liberation but also bodily freedom as evidenced in the many stories
about cure from disease, escape from abuse, and the destruction of structures and realities
that oppress the poor and marginalized.13 The gospels specifically reveal how Jesus Christ as
God incarnate was with the oppressed and took on their condition as his own in his own
humanity.
The image of God was perfectly lived by Jesus Christ. If human beings are to be the
image of God as revealed and lived by Jesus Christ, each person must live as one with the
oppressed and take on their condition as their own. What this specifically means for a
person’s identity depends on their context. God will always be with the oppressed but to
meet God in one’s living one must look at concrete reality and where the factual inequalities
12

For Cone’s discussion on revelation, see “The Meaning of Revelation,” chap. 3 in A Black Theology of
Liberation.
13
Like much of black theology Cone bases his understanding of God as a liberator on the Exodus story and
Jesus’ proclamation in Lk 4:18-19. He interprets Jesus’ healing of the sick, feeding the hungry, and giving sight
to the blind to mean that Jesus did not regard salvation as an abstract, spiritual idea or a feeling in the heart.
Instead, salvation is the granting of physical wholeness in the concreteness of pain and suffering. See Cone,
God of the Oppressed, 140.
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exist in one’s specific time. Cone posits that in contemporary U.S. society living as the
image of God is only properly understood in racial terms. He argues that in a racist society
such as the United States no one can be, or should be, colorless, least of all God/Christ.14
Black theology teaches that in the black experience we find oppressed persons and therefore
we find God/Christ. For Cone, God/Christ is not just a theological concept but a liberating
presence he has experienced and to which the black experience testifies.
Cone understands God’s presence with oppressed black people as a continuation of
the work of God in the Bible. He argues that this continuity between God’s liberating work
of the past and God’s presence in the struggle for black liberation is based on the Christian
belief in the resurrected Christ. As the risen one, Jesus Christ continues to be as he was in
his humanly existence. Who Christ is today is who Christ was in the first century. In the
first century he was a Jew in an occupied country, one of the oppressed himself. But more
than just a situation into which he was born, he chose to make his place with the oppressed
and outcasts of his society and religion. As the Incarnate One, the one who took on humanity
and shared its condition, his human, bodily existence was and is inextricably tied to others.
Jesus Christ shared in the condition of the outcast and oppressed in his very humanity, which
included his materiality. As the resurrected one, Christ continues to be as he was in his
humanly existence, that is, one with the oppressed sharing in their condition. Cone argues
that Christ is alive in our midst continuing his work of liberation. Therefore, we find Jesus
today with the suffering and outcasts of our society and religious communities.

14

Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 63. The image of God/Christ as black has deep roots in black
theology in general and Cone’s theology in particular. For an analysis of the black God/Christ in black
theology, see Kelly Brown Douglas, The Black Christ (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994). For more on
God/Christ and blackness, see James H. Cone, “God is the Color of Suffering,” in Changing Face of God, ed.
Frederick W. Schmidt (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Pub., 2000), 51-63; and Warren McWilliams, “Theodicy
According to James Cone,” Journal of Religious Thought 36, no. 2 (1980): 45-54.
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Cone posits that we know and make sense of God/Christ in our present context only
in relation to the human condition as we know it. He argues that in the contemporary U.S.
God/Christ is found with the black community because they are the outcasts of our society.
Because black people are oppressed because of their blackness, God has taken on this
oppression as God’s own, and therefore God is black. Christ must also be understood as
black because he takes on the suffering of the oppressed as his own, in his very body. Only
in being black can Christ be today who Christ was. If a person finds their being in God and
wishes to live as the image of God, they must also completely identify with the oppressed
and become black with them. Christians must be black because God/Christ is black. By
describing God/Christ as black, Cone outlines racial identity as both literal and symbolic. In
a literal sense, Jesus was not a white man in the first century and because of who he was
cannot be one today. Since his presence and oneness with the oppressed and suffering cannot
be docetic, in a racist society Christ must be black to share in the bodily suffering of the
oppressed.15 But this racial identity is also symbolic for it is not just about skin color.
Christ’s blackness represents most importantly God’s solidarity with the poor, sharing in
their suffering today as he did in the first century on the cross, and giving hope for new life,
as he did in the resurrection.
As a Christian theologian, Cone professes that each person is created as and called to
live as the image of the liberator God. As a black man who has experienced and observed
racism in this country, Cone argues with confidence that we are not living as God’s image.
Cone contends that a proper understanding of who God/Christ was in the biblical stories and
therefore who God/Christ is today is crucial for our self-understanding since our search for
15

Cone, God of the Oppressed, 124. Docetism is the belief that Jesus only seemed to have a physical body but
in reality was incorporeal, a pure spirit. Since Jesus’ physical body was only an illusion, he only appeared to
physically die as a result of his crucifixion. This belief is regarded as heretical by Christian churches.
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identity is indeed our search for God.16 Professing Jesus Christ as the final and definitive
word for Christians regarding their humanity, including the meaning and significance of
bodily existence, means that Christians must convert to a new form of existence that radically
identifies with the poor and oppressed.17 This new way of being, enabled by the inbreaking
of the divine into social existence in the Incarnation, should transform our perceptions of
identity. For Cone, the meaning of Jesus Christ is an existential question; we must choose
where we will stand and what we stand for. A person is for or against oppression. Because
of Christ, people are now gifted with the freedom of self-determination about their being and
are no longer dependent on oppressive systems by which a person’s existence was formerly
defined.18 It is a freedom that allows the individual to choose God’s will, which calls us to
be for others and to recognize that one’s individual freedom cannot be achieved or have
meaning without the freedom of the other. According to Cone, this new form of existence
means that Christians today must be black by being fully present with the oppressed. Race
here is essential because it describes who we are and how we live based on the identity we
choose within the racialized context in which we find ourselves.
This theory of race as essence changes our current meanings of race in terms of
whiteness and blackness as well as challenges the significance we attribute to skin color.
Cone’s descriptions of white and black must be understood within the context of racism,
which in this country is the context of and for our “racial” identities. Cone writes that of
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Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, 14.
Cone, My Soul Looks Back, 97.
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Cone writes that the new value system of black theology brings to bear the spirit of self-determination upon
the consciousness of black people. They are no longer dependent on the white oppressor for their understanding
of truth, reality, or what ought to be done about the place of black sufferers in America. To be free means to be
free to create new possibilities for existence. See Cone Black Theology and Black Power, 129-30. Friday M.
Mbon argues that the image of freedom is the central image in Cone’s analysis of what it is to be really human.
For his analysis of all the aspects of Cone’s view of humanity, see his article, “James Cone and the Question of
What it Means to be Really Human,” Journal of Religious Studies 18 (1992): 34-49.
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course whiteness as such, meaning skin color, is no problem. However, in the black
experience whiteness almost always means racism and this is a very big problem. Therefore,
for Cone, whiteness in soul and mind, meaning in our way of being, is not identifying with
the oppressed. He argues that we cannot be white, culturally speaking, and think and act
biblically. In fact, he argues that the gospel denies whiteness as an acceptable form of human
existence. He further defines it as the symbol of humanity’s depravity and the expression of
what is wrong with humanity, which is not living as if Christ is at the center of our lives. If
our racial identity expresses who we are and is the determinate of how we live, then whites
must destroy their white identity, which represents racism and oppression, and forfeit
privilege based on whiteness.19 They are free only when they become new persons by
radically reorienting themselves to be on the side of the oppressed. When they do this their
white being passes away and they are created anew in black being. Black identity means
standing with that which society oppresses and denigrates, namely blackness, and taking a
stand for liberation.
Black persons must also embrace blackness. Blackness in Cone’s theology represents
the tension between oppression and the certainty of liberation. It is both the visible reality of
oppression in the U.S. and an ontological symbol of the ultimate liberation of the kingdom of

19

This same theme is at the heart of a movement called race traitors. In an interview, Noel Ignatiev of Race
Traitor magazine defines a race traitor as someone who is nominally classified as white, but who defies the
rules of whiteness so flagrantly as to jeopardize his or her ability to draw upon the privileges of the white skin.
Race traitors advocate the abolition of the white race. They contend that as long as the white race exists, all
movements against what is called “racism” will fail. They promote models of amalgamation. They argue that
although white supremacy seeks to repress the cultures of Afro-Americans and other peoples of color, American
culture is incontestably mulatto. Without race prejudice, Americans might discover that culturally they are all
Afro-American, as well as Native American, and so forth. See “Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity:
An Interview with Noel Ignatiev of Race Traitor Magazine,” in Critical White Studies, 607-12.
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God.20 Cone recognizes the suffering and humiliation of black people who are oppressed
because of their blackness but appreciates that this suffering and oppression is not the
definition of their humanity. He recognizes that people of color are often symbols of
oppression, but they are also signs of hope for the creation of a new humanity when they
reject racist living and make the black God/Christ the center of their being. U.S. society
describes black as bad and rejects it as a way of being.21 Cone argues that God has made this
blackness, this nonbeing in the world, God’s own condition. No one can know God without
knowing blackness. To be in relationship with and meet God, one must embrace what the
world hates; take it on as one’s own being. This is why Cone writes that blackness is holy,
because it is a symbol of God’s work and a mode of God’s presence.22 It is a special creation
of God offered to us as a gift by which each person can reorient their existence to be on the
side of the oppressed. Blackness is a symbol of liberation from whiteness. Cone writes that
blacks have been searching for an identity beyond the boundaries of black being set for them
by whites and white society. This is evidenced in the shifts in self-naming and identification
of this community from colored to Negro to black to African American.23 This search has
also been an experience of an identity crisis because of the destruction of their past by whites
and the attempt at assimilation as well as their own attempts to uncover their history and a
new meaning to blackness within the reality of white social and political power. Cone argues
that black persons must also accept blackness as a gift of the creator, as a special creation of
God.
20

Cone recognizes that not all those who are oppressed are black. If we understand with Cone that the kingdom
of God is ultimate liberation, any humiliation caused by oppression is inconsistent with this promised future and
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For My People, 5.
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Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 69.
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In Cone’s theology, in order for anyone to adopt this new way of being and living one
must be liberated from our white past and its ideology of racism. In opposition to a Christcentered way of being, racism is an outright denial of the Incarnation and Christianity. It
does not recognize that Jesus is with the oppressed in their blackness so it cannot recognize
that that is where Christians must be as well. Cone argues that the ultimate reality and
meaning of humanity is thwarted by the existence of racism and the exaltation of whiteness,
which sadly is the social ethos of the U.S. The liberation Cone believes we all need is
different for different people. Non-freedom is a sin in his theology but we all sin differently
depending on our social location. White sin is the folly of playing God. Whites are enslaved
and dehumanized by their own will to power. Therefore, they must be freed from their
racism. Black sin, on the other hand, is their loss of identity in a desire to be white. Blacks
must be freed from their self-hatred. Their freedom will involve new ways of looking at and
living reality. Cone argues that by repudiating the other’s status as master, the oppressed are
no longer slaves and can reorient their existence and achieve freedom even while still being
poor or oppressed. This new vision enables them to fight their oppression. Both versions of
liberation, white and black, are for Cone “not doing what I will but becoming what I should”
and this becoming is to realize in ourselves the image of God.24
For Cone race goes beyond mere skin color but is always connected to the meaning
and significance given to skin color since race is a social construct based on skin color in
U.S. society. Just as Christ’s blackness is both literal and symbolic so is our racial identity.
Humans obviously only live within the confines of their historical and cultural context, even
though these are not the final determinants of humanity. In this contemporary context,
people live with color as a defining characteristic and from its beginnings have ordered U.S.
24

Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 39.

102
society based on it. For Cone, however, racial identity is not just these constructions but also
one’s answer to the question of where is one’s being and on what do you ground it. Identity,
including racial identity, is not set once and for all but is defined by what one believes about
God/Christ and how one acts on this belief. If people understand their purpose as Christians
to be about the kingdom of God and their obligation to act as if Christ was at the center of
their lives, then they will renounce “whiteness” and follow the “black” Christ. If one
grounds their being in God then they must become black, no matter what their skin color,
because blackness is obedience to the gospel message to be in solidarity with the oppressed.
As a theologian aware and reflective of his context, Cone recognizes the significance
of race based on skin color in the United States. He challenges this significance when he
writes that race has little to do with skin color. For Cone, black is the color of the heart, soul
and mind when one is fully with the dispossessed. Blacks are those who say they are and act
as though they are black regardless of their skin color. The blackness of one’s skin color is
not enough to be living the image of God and does not exempt one from criticism.25 Only
with the destruction of whiteness, for racially defined whites and blacks alike, can the
wholeness of humanity, evidenced in the life of Jesus Christ, be realized. Because it
represents this wholeness, Cone can describe being black as our ultimate reality and
identity.26 He admits that although blackness now describes materially the condition of the
oppressed, it may not always be an appropriate symbol to describe the complete solidarity
between God/Christ and the suffering. But for now Cone uses racial identity to reflect on our
being as human persons.

25

Cone has often voiced disappointment and criticism of the black church. As an example, see “Black
Theology and the Black Church,” chap. 3 in My Soul Looks Back.
26
See Cone, Black Theology and Black Power, 32-33.
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Cone challenges Christians to expand the concept of material identity to consider how
it reflects beliefs and being based on these beliefs. Cone’s challenge of reversal,
understanding black as holy and white as evil, and his insistence on the need for all
Christians to become black, disrupts commonsense and accepted notions of the meaning of
skin color and race. One is black or white, with the oppressed or the oppressors, with God or
not. By challenging current concepts of race, new possibilities for being are created. The
goal for Cone is not to reify race but to embrace individuality. This individuality is not a
laissez faire individuality but part of a new humanity in which the special uniqueness of
every person is given and received, regardless of physical characteristics. 27 It is an
individuality that expresses one’s core beliefs through the construct of race.

Race as Historical Legacy
A second approach to race is race as historical legacy, which claims that race still
exists as the identities established to justify slavery and its aftermath of legalized
discrimination, namely, race constructed as black and white. This racial ideology created
stereotypes that led to a mythology deeming blacks inferior in nature and whites naturally
superior. This racial ideology was so strong and so widely accepted that it was then and still
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is at the heart of American culture. Those who investigate race from this angle claim that by
exploring and coming to grips with this racial legacy, we not only better understand our own
identities as black and white, but we make conscious how this racial ideology influences our
thoughts and actions. This approach views race as relational and dynamic and recognizes
that we continue to construct race in how we live together today. The goal of this approach
to race is to educate people about racial legacies so as to change the constructions of white
and black to a new way of living together that does not continue the injustices of the past.
Although all black theologians base their theology on the black experience, which in the
United States began and continues to be influenced by slavery and legalized discrimination, I
use the work of womanist theologians Delores Williams and Kelly Brown Douglas to outline
this theory of race.28
Both Williams and Brown Douglas argue that in order to understand race in this
country one must begin with an investigation of the American institution of slavery that gave
birth to it. Williams uses the term slavocracy to connote that slavery in the U.S. involved not
just the act of enslaving black people but a whole ideology—a way of being and thinking. At
the heart of this slavocracy was the construction of race in terms of white and black, which
assigned essential importance to skin color. Williams contends that although colonists also
deemed Native Americans as different and inferior, they based this assessment on English
national and religious biases; the same evaluation applied to Negro slaves had to do with
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English values regarding color, especially blackness.29 She argues that skin color or
blackness became “an independent rationale for enslavement.”30
Historian Winthrop Jordan in his book White Over Black gives a different answer to
the question of the relationship of slavery and the creation of race based on skin color.31
Jordan concludes that difference of color, which became the “mark” of race and really “race”
itself, was not the reason for enslaving Africans; it was the rationale for it, after the fact. At
first, the English believed the Africans had no religion or civilization and they thought the
African ways were lewd and libidinous. These impressions made the Africans heathen,
savage, and almost bestial in their eyes, but Jordan contends that even all of this did not add
up to a vision of innate, ineradicable inferiority rooted in the body. The need for such a
vision of race based on skin color arose with the spread of slavery, which became the better
means of meeting the material and economic interests of the English colonizers than
indentured servitude.32 As Luther Wright writes in “Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who
Cares,” “One problem with the existence of indentured servants and slaves in a free society
was the ease with which slaves or servants could escape if they were not distinguishable from
free citizens. By linking slavery to race, slave escape became much more difficult,
particularly once all blacks were presumed to be slaves.”33 This focus on skin color also
resulted from the slaveowners’ or slave supporters’ wrestling with the questions that arose
29
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concerning the place of free blacks or the status of children of “mixed” couples.34 These
questions demanded a more systematic approach to blacks and race. This approach drew on
two secular traditions of the time, the Great Chain of Being and the Linnaean system of
biological classifications, which led to “the naturalization of man” that used the human body
as a basis for distinguishing between different groups of people.35 The process of building
the American nation where equality was a national ideal involved “imagining” a community
in which some would be included while others excluded. Jordan argues that in the postRevolutionary period, based on the premise of black inherent inferiority, American
intellectuals, in effect, claimed America as a white man’s country.
Both Delores Williams and Kelly Brown Douglas recognize that any ideas and
theories about blackness also suggest ideas and theories about its opposite, namely whiteness.
These bodily distinctions were constructed in relation to each other. Both authors contend
that the debasement of blackness is always related to the overvaluation of whiteness. The
white and black “races” became polar opposites connoting, respectively, “purity and
filthiness, virginity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and beneficence and evil, God and
the devil.”36 Williams argues that by regarding blacks as “nasty and beastly” they could be
required to do any kind of work the slavocracy demanded.37 Whiteness according to the
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slavocracy meant you were not a slave and did not have to prove this status. Very
concretely, a person’s race based on the color of their skin determined their freedom. In
addition to indicating one’s place in society, a person’s skin color was also assumed to
indicate their innate value. Slavery demanded that black inferiority be grounded in nature.
This construction of race was supported by all manner of thought including that of science,
religion, and law.38
Williams and Brown Douglas argue that although most racist caricatures were
developed in order to justify the institution of slavery, their influence continues to prevail in
society today. Brown Douglas writes that growing up black in America means discovering
early in life the various stereotypes that surround blackness. Both Williams and Brown
Douglas examine these stereotypes and caricatures that were part of the mythology of slavery
and analyze how they have been translated into modern parlance. Brown Douglas writes that
the image of Jezebel defined the black female as “a person governed almost entirely by her
libido,” a temptress, and thereby justified white men’s sexual exploitation of black women.39
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Brown Douglas argues that the Jezebel image remains virtually intact in our culture and has
been carried forth in the image of black women as welfare mothers/queens who are portrayed
as promiscuous unmarried women.40 Connected to the Jezebel image is the caricature of the
black man as beastly and violent, the sexually perverse reprobate. This image justified
treating the enslaved black man as a powerful animal, a buck, who could produce work and
breed offspring. Through the years the supposed superpotency and virility of the black male
has meant he is a sexual predator whose common prey was and is white women.41 These
descriptions of slave mythology were used to justify the ill treatment of enslaved blacks, but
they did not meet all the needs of the slavocracy. White slaveholders could not entrust the
care of their children and their households to Jezebels and bucks. Therefore, the role and
stereotype of the Mammy emerged.42 Mammy was the strong asexual nurturer of the white
family. Mammy has become the strong, single mother with no needs, the domineering
matriarch. Connecting current racial stereotypes with those of the past is one way that these
authors support the claim that the racial system that justified slavery did not cease with
emancipation.43
40
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Williams and Brown Douglas maintain that the racial ideology that was developed
within the history of slavery and oppression and that has always valued whiteness over
blackness is still at the heart of American culture. Williams argues that skin color
consciousness and the value put upon color have birthed a pathological pattern in American
culture that continues to this day. She names this pattern “white racial narcissism” and
defines it as the overvaluation of one group’s skin color to the pathological point of using the
group’s power and authority to persecute others who are not of that skin color.44 She
contends that in this country and its society whiteness is valued as good and its opposite
blackness has been assigned a permanent negative value. The view that blackness is bad,
frightening, and dangerous, especially when it is the color of human bodies, has saturated the
American national consciousness and conscience. Brown Douglas also views American
society as one that is fixated on whiteness and has embraced and lives a white culture. 45
White culture is the very culture that harbors and nurtures white racism.
This racial ideology in the U.S. serves several purposes. One is economic. Williams
writes that the debasement of blackness and therefore black people was from the beginning
economically important to this country. The slave trade was the primary source of wealth
during the colonial period. Brown Douglas concurs that black people have been absolutely
critical to white economic power, initially as free labor and later as cheap labor. The ability
to freely exploit black bodies with relative impunity has been critical to the labor market.
She adds that another reason these stereotypes have been employed by white culture is that
44
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the very color and physiognomy of black persons has inspired both fear and fascination from
whites. Both reactions have served to heighten the sense that black people need to be
controlled.46
The mythology of whiteness and blackness serves not only the function of denigrating
and subsequently oppressing blacks but also of uniting whites. Williams writes that even
though after slavery, poor whites would have had more in common with the plight of blacks,
they nevertheless got their feelings of self-worth from membership in the white race since
society invested such great value in white skin. American culture employed whiteness as a
variable to unite various European immigrants together in a white group identity. Brown
Douglas maintains that European immigrants arrived as Irish, Italian, English, German, and
various other ethnic and cultural groups, yet somewhere on the shores of America they
became white. They subordinated their ethnic and cultural particularities in order to adopt a
common national identity as white Americans.47 This white group identity was the harbinger
of white culture, which exists primarily as it is contrasted with that which is non-white.
The theory of race as historical legacy respects the fact that our current attitudes
toward race and our own racist selves did not spring out of a vacuum, but have long cultural
antecedents. It approaches race as something formed by social distinctions, invented in time
and place, not nature. Race was not created by one person or even a group but by the needs
of a way of life, in this case the slavocracy of the United States. We cannot properly address
our bodily reality without recognizing the inheritance of race born in the system of
46
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oppression and privilege. We are heirs to notions of race based on skin color. People were
members of different races because they were assigned to them based on skin color. It was
important for this racial ideology, however, to connect skin color not only to supposedly
different biological groupings but to connect the color of race to innate characteristics that
were then classified hierarchically. Whites possessed a superior nature; blacks were closer to
animals. This theory of race lays out what our racial legacy works to keep unnoticed;
namely, that race is constructed for specific purposes. It is in no way natural or innate.
This approach to race challenges people to understand the progression, content and purpose
of the construction of race in the U.S. in order to better understand black and white identity.
Black theologians and theorists understand the importance of and have undertaken the task of
investigating the history of being one’s race in this country. They have also repeatedly called
upon white theologians and theorists to do their own work on the meaning of whiteness and
of white privilege or white supremacy. James Baldwin counseled white people to “do your
first works over.” He called them “to reexamine everything. Go back to where you started,
or as far back as you can, examine all of it, travel your road again and tell the truth about it.
Sing or shout or testify or keep it to yourself: but know whence you came.”48 White theorists
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and white theologians are beginning to answer this call. Thinkers in various fields are
beginning to interrogate whiteness and a field of critical studies of whiteness has emerged.
The purpose of these studies is to investigate the meaning of whiteness in a white
supremacist society. Racism is understood as a white problem and the goal is to dismantle
the structures that support and encourage it.49
This theory of race contends that the origin and staying power of white supremacy are
confronted only when we delve into the history of race and its ongoing legacy. White
supremacy should be understood as a system of individual, institutional, and societal
practices in which whiteness, meaning “white” bodies, and the cultural and societal practices
associated with those deemed “white,” are seen as normative and superior, and through
which white people are granted advantaged status of various kinds and their political, social,
and economic dominance is maintained as is the subjugation of peoples of color.50 Once we
recognize that human interaction is a source and continued basis for racial categorization, we
now put ourselves in a position to change the continuing racial ideology based on white
supremacy by expressing, embodying, and living race differently. This legacy results in
some bodies being more valued, which is contradictory to both the Christian revelation that
all are created in God’s image and the American proclamation that all are created equal.
With knowledge and understanding we can recreate race for the purpose of equality.
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Race as Culture
The approach to race as culture claims that defining race in terms of skin color is
insufficient and inaccurate. This theory shifts the focus from race as skin color to race as
communities with shared histories that provide their members with a common worldview and
culture. Black identity becomes African American identity which better reflects the selfunderstanding and culture of a specific community. This approach to race recognizes that
black bodies not only symbolize oppression in American society, but embody African
American culture that stretches back before this oppression and sustained people in the midst
of it. Theologians who posit this approach to race believe it provides new challenges and
insights to the Church in terms of individual and communal embodiment as well as breaking
down barriers between people while maintaining diversity and difference. This approach to
race is well represented in black Catholic theology. I use the work of Diana Hayes, Jamie
Phelps, M. Shawn Copeland, and Joseph Brown to explore it.
Race as culture recognizes that traditional racial classifications such as black and
white are too vague and do not reflect the diversity that exists within the very groups they are
trying to define. These racial classifications define racial groups as monochromatic and
monolithic in order to easily define who are to rule and who should be ruled. Diana Hayes
argues that these classifications mostly serve to maintain the “hegemonic dominance of
persons of European descent,” those deemed “white.”51 They were never meant to address
the diversity that exists in all racial groups. In fact, such nuance immediately breaks down
the categories of black and white. For example, the black community is extremely diverse
encompassing different languages, cultures, and skin colors. The either/or approach to race
51
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divides people into neat and specific boxes and alienates one from the other even if they
share interests and concerns. The approach to race as culture addresses both the problem of
unnecessary distinction of persons into absolute others and the problem of not recognizing
true diversity between persons. By shifting focus to culture, and therefore community, this
approach to race encourages true diversity in the richness of different cultures, yet allows
room to unite for common goals of justice.
The approach to race as culture shifts emphasis from race as skin color and the
history of racial categorization based on it to a focus on community. Proponents of this race
theory argue that how people define and name themselves depends more on the particular
communities and cultures into which they are born than any specific physical attributes.52
Therefore, they focus on the shared story of the community not simply the physical attributes
the community has in common. Personal identity is understood as coming from being part of
a community with a shared history that produces a shared culture. Communities nurture and
teach their members. They provide a worldview, a context for self-understanding, traditions,
heritages, art, music, and language. These communities with their specific cultures provide a
way to understand self and the world. These cultures are part of their members forever
because they form a person’s identity. Community identity is not just a historical legacy but
on ongoing and changing reality. To be authentically part of a community is to trace one’s
roots throughout the history of that community and also to be part of the ongoing reality of
the community. The community’s story is always unfolding. Therefore, racial identity is not
set once and for all because the story of it is still being told in the day-to-day existence of the
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community that produces it. It evolves as culture changes with the times and
circumstances.53
The theory of race as culture in its shift of focus from skin color to community treats
black heritage more specifically as African American heritage. Hayes contends that although
most black theologians use the terms African American and Black American
interchangeably, African American is the appropriate term for those who trace their ancestry
back to the time of slavery in the United States, while black American is a more inclusive
term covering not only African Americans but any person of African descent living within
the United States today regardless of intermediate places of origin.54 She argues that African
Americans’ ancestors may have been free or enslaved, but either way they were marked by
the experience of slavery and usually have a worldview somewhat different from that of
other persons of African descent. This kind of specificity in talking about “racial” groups is
at the heart of a race as culture approach.
This specificity also reflects the importance of self-naming for communities and
individuals. In the last section race was treated as a historical legacy and being raced was the
experience of being named rather than self-naming. This current approach to race holds up
culture as identity because it claims that culture is who and what we say we are.55 An
approach to race as culture understands that self-naming is not only important but liberating,
especially if people lift up a name formerly used to denigrate and dehumanize as is the case
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for African Americans. Of course, African American culture includes the reality of racial
classification and racial injustice, but it also embodies the agency of the community in selfdefinition. Self-naming as African and American better represents an identity informed by
the new community born in the United States as a result of the institution of slavery and by
the ancient people from whom they came and inherited ways of being in the world.
The African American community provides its members with an identity that
recognizes both its African roots and its American reality. It is a specific identity that
reflects a particular community’s experience. The roots of this experience stretch back to
Africa and help the community understands itself as heirs of African cultures. But the
African American identity also reflects their long and proud history in the United States
where they formed themselves into a new people.56 This African reality and American
experience collided in the African slave trade, which affected identity throughout the world.
Joseph Brown writes,
No mistake should ever be made regarding an assessment of the culpability and the
consequences of the transatlantic trade in human beings. Millions and millions of
lives were lost; millions more would wish for death, once they found out what the life
of enslavement would bring them. Centuries of systematic torture, manipulation,
abuse, and domination of human beings by other human beings have brought into the
world a pattern of psychosis and destructive behaviors that has infected cultures and
peoples everywhere.57
The impact of the slave trade is central to the previous theory of race as historical legacy; it is
here explored as part of the creation of African American culture and identity.
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The American part of the African American reality and identity began with the story
of African persons stolen from their communities and their land by slave traders. This was
just the beginning of a process by slavers to strip these people of all that made them who they
were, including their language, traditions, and culture. The goal was to make them a blank
slate upon which to draw a new and derogatory image of the enslaved person.58 The
enslaved resisted these efforts in whatever ways they could and countered with their own
efforts to create a new self-image for themselves. Enslaved Africans transformed themselves
into a new people by embracing each other as brothers and sisters no matter the differences
between them, and becoming an African American community. The members of this
community shared a history of oppression and suffered from the stigma associated with black
skin color in American society. Jamie Phelps writes that all the attempts to dehumanize
African Americans did impact their culture-making process, but did not dominate it.59
African Americans replaced slavery’s negative depictions of them with more positive selfimages. Their self-understanding comes from the stories of the community that have formed
and sustained it, especially those stories that tell and retell their history. In addition to
stories, Joseph Brown writes that enslaved Africans became a community through their song.
He contends that they sang themselves from small groups of individuals into a people. Their
singing brought them from the brink of collective psychic collapse to a place where systems
of psychological health could be generated and sustained.60
Theologians who investigate African American identity from a cultural perspective
recognize that this new people born in America through their stories and songs were in fact
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not new people. The approach to race as culture leads theologians back to Africa in an
attempt to trace African American heritage backward and find lines of influence forward.
When theologians advocate for a black theology that is truly black, they mean one that
reflects African American culture embracing American experience and African heritage. The
connection they seek is not so much an innate biological sense of being African but a way of
understanding the influences of African cultures on the culture and community that became
African American. Of course, the task of African Americans tracing their roots back to
Africa is not simple. Unlike immigrants from other countries, enslaved Africans were
systematically stripped of their history and heritage by the slavocracy of America. Finding
one’s specific heritage in Africa is difficult because it is a continent of many different
cultures and traditions. Even if the search is narrowed to the Western part of Africa where
most enslaved Africans were captured, one still finds there peoples of different cultures and
religions. Some scholars, therefore, try to map out and make connections among the
different cultures and religions of those Africans most likely enslaved in order to find
similarities and patterns. There are efforts to distinguish a distinctive African culture at the
base of all African cultures, whether on the continent or in the diaspora, and to describe an
Afrocentric worldview. Theologians have begun to outline a traditionally African religious
perspective that would have influenced African American Christianity.61
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Drawing from the blended identity of African and American, M. Shawn Copeland describes what she
considers the most essential characteristics of an African American Christian worldview: creative and tensive
holding of the sacred and secular, without separation or dilution; profound respect for all human life and
interpersonal relationships; individual identity formation from and in relation to community, along with regard
for the wisdom of elders; empathetic, symbolic, diunital, and associative understanding; unity of being and
doing; commitment to freedom and liberation due to centuries of oppression and communal and personal
anxiety; ambiguous toleration and transcendence of a notion of limited reward in the context of slavery and
stigmatized social history; indirection and discretion in speech and behavior; affirmation of styling: intentional
or unintentional improvisation in language, gestural, or symbolic mannerisms to favorably affect the receipt of a
message. See M. Shawn Copeland, “Body, Representation, and Black Religious Discourse,” in
Postcolonialism, Feminism, and Religious Discourse, eds. Laura E. Donaldson and Kwok Pui-lan (New York:

119
Employing an approach to race as culture, black theology teases out the black
experience, which is its main source for doing theology. It is the African American
community and its culture that black theology is referencing not racial classification in terms
of biology. Even though the African and American elements of this culture are always
wedded to the meaning given to certain aspects of physicality, it is the entire story of the
African American community to which black theology refers. It reflects the particular
experience of the divine this community has had within their culture.
M. Shawn Copeland writes that there is a synergy between identity and theology,
between black identity and black theology.62 Black theologians that embrace a race as
culture approach reflect on the African American community and its culture as a main source
for doing theology. They learn the cultures of West Africa in order to truly understand what
the slave trade meant to and did to captured Africans as well as what culture they brought
with them and how that was molded into African American life and culture. They attend to
the stories of these enslaved people to get a sense of how they were able to embrace a forced
and often hostile Christianity. They learn from slave theology that slaves understood God
speaking to them in their own medium. Diana Hayes explains this to mean that African
American slaves could not worship God truthfully unless they “talked” with God through

Routledge, 2002), 189. Joseph Brown claims that central to African culture and therefore religion are the drumand-dance-based religious expression, mystical forms of prayer, and the sense that all of creation contains the
power of the divine and that this power is to be used for healing that which has been wounded and for the
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their black culture.63 This culture continues to mediate God’s presence according to black
theology.
This approach to race as culture is central to the conversation about being black and
Catholic. The question has been raised to black Catholics whether it is possible to be both
authentically black and truly Catholic.64 Obviously this question is addressing more than
skin color. Here the question is whether one can be wholly part of the black community and
a full member of the Catholic Church at the same time. The question reflects the fact that the
Catholic Church has been beset by racism in the past and present. The Church, with its
Eurocentric identity, has encouraged African Americans to forsake their unique identities and
cultural practices in order to be seen as truly Catholic. Other members of the black
community understand this as a denial of black Catholics’ blackness. The question here is
whether these cultures, black and Catholic, are compatible and whether one can participate in
both without betraying the other.65
Diana Hayes proclaims the belief of Catholic theologians when she writes that to be
black and Catholic is not a paradox; it is not a conflict; it is not a contradiction. To be black
and Catholic is correct, it is authentic, it is who black Catholics are and have always been.66
Jamie Phelps argues that to address this identity question one must have a thorough
knowledge of the black and Catholic cultures in all their complexities. Most black Catholic
63
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theologians begin with tracing the black presence in the Catholic Church. This stems from a
conviction that to be authentically Catholic is to trace one’s or one’s people’s roots in the
Church, just as to be authentically black means to trace one’s roots throughout that history as
well. Sharing authentically in the history of these groups makes one part of them. Black
Catholic theologians attend to their historical presence in the Catholic Church and rightly
conclude that there have been African peoples in the Catholic Church as long as the Church
has existed.67 The Church needs to embody this reality at the altar, in the chancery, in the
seminaries, and other educational institutions in black bodies, which are black culture. The
Catholic Church has too long negated this culture, which hampers its ability to immerse itself
in the lives, traditions, and cultures of a people historically seen as “less than” human,
without cultures or traditions worthy of notice.68 Its ability to join with these cultures is a
critical contemporary challenge of the Catholic Church. These black Catholic theologians
are challenging the Church to recognize the cultures and heritages of the many peoples who
make up the Church and create true inculturation with respect to these life-giving and lifesustaining cultures. They also hope it will foster a new theology, open to the contributions of
67
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every race and ethnicity, expanding our understanding not only of each other but also of God
and Jesus Christ.
The goal of this approach to race is to shift focus and emphasis from race as physical,
meaning skin color, to race as community or culture. It argues that our racial identity is
constructed by the history of our communities as well as their ongoing stories. It emphasizes
the self-definition of the community and not just how it has been traditionally defined by
those in power for the purpose of oppression. This approach to race challenges people to
self-define in a more nuanced way than the usual black and white categories. It points out
that these groupings do not do justice to the diversity of those that make them up. Once we
define ourselves and allow others their own self-definition we can appreciate our differences
and meet on common ground.
This approach to race with its emphasis on culture treats black and white as quite
different categories. The black community, or more specifically the African American
community, developed a common culture based on the historical experiences of slavery and
oppression and resistance to this but also things like food, art, music, language, styles,
because they were robbed of their heritage and family and clan lineages. White is not a
culture in the same way. Whites may have become a new group of people in America, but
those that became “white” maintained the cultures of their immigrant forebears. Their
whiteness was opposed to being “colored,” it only had meaning based on the oppression of
blackness. There may be a worldview based on white supremacy, but this is not the same
kind of worldview as that created in the African American community. This approach to
race encourages whites to reclaim their cultural heritages and once again find and appreciate
the diversity of the “white” race. Changing our approach to race can change how we interact
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based on hierarchy and oppression to ways based on respect of differences. Diana Hayes
articulates the goal as the recognition that we are all people of mixed races, mestizaje people,
when it comes to culture, and still all of the same race, human persons.69

Race as Class
The next theory of race contends that the construction of race can never be addressed
as an independent variable. A full appreciation of the meaning and significance of race must
include an economic analysis as well. This approach to race connects racial discrimination
and economic exploitation as two sides of the same coin. I use the work of Dwight Hopkins
to give voice to this approach to race.70 Hopkins does not negate the continuing significance
of race and racism in American society. He maintains that race matters in the United States,
regardless of denomination, gender, class, sexual orientation, occupation, professional level,
and political orientation, and racial discrimination still permeates North American culture.71
But Hopkins understands racial discrimination as just one aspect of the disenfranchisement
suffered by African Americans. Another aspect is the restrictions they experience in
controlling wealth, resources, and indeed the space surrounding them. These attacks on
African American self-identity and self-determination have been an integral part of African
American life and history.72 Therefore, Hopkins argues that the liberation of the black poor
requires more than just a critique of race and an analysis of racism. A too narrow focus on
race is inadequate because the forces that keep the black poor poor are more complex. Black

69

Hayes, “To Be the Bridge,” 67.
I especially rely on Dwight N. Hopkins, Heart and Head: Black Theology—Past, Present, and Future (New
York: Palgrave, 2002).
71
Dwight N. Hopkins and Linda E. Thomas, “Womanist Theology and Black Theology: Conversational
Envisioning of an Unfinished Dream,” in A Dream Unfinished, 73.
72
Hopkins, Heart and Head, 17.
70

124
theology must understand the black poor’s place in our economic system as well as in our
national racial order. This complexity demands a more sophisticated theoretical framework
that addresses both our postmodern situation and our economic reality.73 Hopkins presents a
theological analysis of monopoly capitalism and its underlying racism and proposes an
alternative vision of a new common wealth. He advocates an understanding of the forces of
global monopoly capitalism in order to create a more equitable world.
Hopkins argues that black theology must focus on the situation of the black poor if it
is truly a Christian liberation theology. Black theology as Christian theology teaches us that
God is a liberator God who co-labors with the poor and oppressed for justice. If the
liberation of the least is God/Christ’s purpose then it must be our purpose as Christians.
Hopkins writes that the biblical stories call on humanity to oppose poverty, which is the
result of human sin. He further asserts that the stories and lessons of Jesus teach us to judge
life by the well-being of the most broken and vulnerable among our citizenry. Hopkins
argues that black theology has always attended to the experience of the poor in its
community. It arose from real life situations of African Americans struggling against racial
oppression and economic exploitation. Hopkins calls on black theologians to continue to
produce a theology concerned with the liberation of the poor, which involves dismantling the
dehumanizing structures that make and keep African Americans poor. To do this, black
theology must understand why the poor are and remain poor. This requires a class analysis.
He writes,
73
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The question of economically poor blacks living in the primary monopoly finance
capitalist country in human history is the decisive question for both womanist and
black male theologians. All else in God-talk and God-walk stands or falls on how
Jesus Christ calls us to measure our everyday living by whether or not poor black
people are getting better or worse. If black and womanist theologians are concerned
with liberation and not only with band-aid reforms, then class, poverty, ownership of
wealth, finance, and the means of production in the United States—indeed, in the
world—need to be top priorities.74
Hopkins advocates a wealth-class hermeneutic for black and womanist theologies in
order to understand the system of global capitalism and how its unjust power dynamics on
the national and international levels relate to and create the reality of the poor. It is wealth
that is crucial for economic analysis not simply income because it is wealth that determines
one’s power and privilege in American society and throughout the world. Class
differentiations in the U.S. are based on the control of wealth. Those with wealth own the
means and distribution of production, including land, the natural minerals in the land, the
commercial real estate on the land, the air over the land, communications networks,
industries, technologies, companies and corporations.75 Hopkins believes that monopolized
wealth is one of the primary targets of the gospel for social justice because it is a major
condition for the vast poverty and economic inequalities in North America and around the
globe.
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Hopkins contends that an economic analysis must be integral to black theology
because the monopolized ownership of wealth in the United States is directly related to skin
color. He argues that powerful white families, under the leadership of white men, crafted a
sinister racist asymmetry, known as white supremacy, in order to monopolize resources.76
Defining black as evil, powerful whites forced African Americans into servant and manual
labor roles while also denying them human and civil rights that the majority of the population
regularly expects as its God-given entitlement. Black human beings became just another
resource to be used and dominated for profit and the accumulation of more wealth. Hopkins
further contends that the state apparatus, also predominantly white, functions in collusion
with, if not at the behest of, the small minority of white families who monopolize the
majority of the wealth in the United States.77 The racism of U.S. capitalism also means that
the neighborhoods of poor black people can be the dumping grounds for deadly chemicals
and other lethal toxins that shorten lives.78
Hopkins’ own analysis of the finance and means of production of global capitalism is
uniquely theological, analyzing it as he would a religion, replete with a god, clergy,
institutions, a theology, revelation, a theological anthropology and core values. According to
Hopkins, the god or ultimate concern of the religion of globalization is the concentration of
monopoly finance capitalist wealth. It is a transcendent god beyond allegiances or
76
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boundaries reflected in the fact that wealth circulates wherever in the world the owner can
find the highest return. The religious leadership consists of a small group of U.S. families
who privately own, control, and distribute wealth and the means of production. Like priests,
they know the laws of the god and the requirements of its followers.
The institutions of the religion facilitate the flow of finance capital and aid the wealth
of the priests. These entities, he argues, maintain dependent financial relationships, an
unequal balance of trade, and unfair access to resources and wealth that allows the religion of
globalization to have free access to the developed world and the Third World.79 Hopkins
argues that these institutions are enabled and justified by the theology of neoliberalism whose
three prominent doctrines are an emphasis on free markets, privatization and deregulation.
The goal is to open up global markets for the god of globalization. Transnational
corporations enter developing countries, create unfavorable terms for the countries’ efforts of
exporting, and disrupt their economic planning for domestic prosperity. The governments of
these countries stop regulating the harmful effects of business practices on their people and
ecology. They are also forced to refocus resources to repaying debts on loans by monopoly
capitalists and away from health, education, welfare, jobs, and other safety nets for their
citizens. Devotees of the religion of globalization view the integration of all markets
throughout the world, the weakening of the sovereignty and decision-making powers of local
states and their shift of focus from their own people to the service of transnational
corporations, and the movement to a worldwide culture as revelation of the truth and
rightness of their god.
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Hopkins writes that like all religions, the religion of globalization advances a
theological anthropology, which defines what it means to be a human being in a religious
system. In this system a person’s worth is based on what they consume. A true human being
is one who actually possesses commodities or one whose goal in life is to do so. The ideal
person has the most concentrated financial wealth accumulation on a global scale, which they
use for their own individual benefit. Global capitalism rejects communalism and embraces a
utilitarian way of being. Only a few can become ideal persons for inequality and exclusion
are requisites of the religion.80 These values, Hopkins argues, are at the heart of U.S. society
and other developed capitalist countries. These Western countries want to establish their way
of life as the model for developing countries. The religion of globalization intends to create
one transcendent world culture that prescribes the tastes and sensibilities of the true human
being.81
Hopkins argues that the theological anthropology of global capitalism constructs the
wealthy white person as the ideal model of human personhood. Monopoly capitalism is
entwined with white supremacy. Hopkins writes that although its advocates present it as
intended and supported by God, true Christians should know that God did not originate or
advocate these oppressive systems. They are authored by humans and so can be dismantled
by human efforts as well. Hopkins claims that the goal of liberation theology must be to
liberate us all from an economic system that preys on the most vulnerable and rewards only
the wealthy few. Economic analysis should lead us to a concerted effort to bring about
systemic social justice and healing. These efforts should empower individuals and attack
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unjust systems created by the small group of monopoly owners of the world’s wealth. He
argues that black theology must unite its liberation theology with all the world’s oppressed
who struggle for God’s purpose of justice on earth.82 Monopoly capitalism has stolen
resources from blacks as well as other people of color and Third World nations and left them
poor and oppressed all over the world. The poor must unite against the global dynamics of
monopoly capitalism that destroys indigenous cultures, discriminates against darker-skinned
peoples, oppresses women, and attacks the earth’s ecology. Global monopoly capitalism
strangles the poor regardless of religion or nationality.
According to Hopkins, these dialogues and actions should work toward what he calls
a new common wealth. This new social order will include a new democracy and a new
economic reality. The new democracy will focus its energy on the vulnerable and
marginalized and will include true and equal representation of and from these populations.
The new economic reality will be based on humanity sharing equally in all available
resources and opportunities on earth. The equality established in both systems will be based
on all citizens having similar material possessions and possibilities. The new common
wealth will embrace communalism, not individualism. Members will recognize that no one
can be fully human if another has access blocked or is less than someone else in the
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community. Hopkins’ vision of the new social order is based on creative individuality where
the particularity of each person’s cultural identity is respected and affirmed.83
Hopkins maintains that for Christians this means adopting a preferential option for the
poor. Christians serve the poor by putting love of neighbor above the private accumulation
of things. Hopkins admits this is not easy for people in the U.S. as it goes against the grain
of the “American way of life” and its commodified, consumer economy, which purports a
me-firstism and instantaneous gratification. He contends that our economic and political
structures actually reward those who oppose the poor’s liberation. The commitment to
embody a preferential option for the poor and embrace the love of neighbor demands a
transformation of ourselves and our society. It means personally taking concrete action to
help people get out of poverty. It also means restructuring society so that the poor become
equal in all respects with those who currently hold privileges and wealth over them. Dwight
Hopkins contends that Christian theology can and must provide an alternative vision of
people and relating than that of the religion of globalization based on a preferential option for
the poor rather than support of the wealthy few.84
Hopkins theologizes that this vision of humanity is God’s vision for humanity. God
calls us to be healthy human beings as equal partners with each other and as equal and
responsible stewards of the earth’s resources. With concerted efforts we can dismantle
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monopoly capitalism and white supremacy and for the first time in U.S. history experience a
racial democracy. Hopkins maintains that no one in the new society would have private
ownership of wealth, for no one can own personally what does not belong to them. This new
communalism would foster a positive sense of self for each person since all would be
involved in the process of building common wealth for all. In fact, this way of being would
end all barriers to full humanity including not only class exploitation and racial oppression,
but also gender discrimination and sexual identity exclusion. The new common wealth
would embrace all.85

Race as Illusion
The main claim of understanding race as illusion is that race is not a biological or
“natural” category of human existence and should not be treated like one. This approach
does not negate the historical significance or impact of race on our society and its members;
but it does argue that times have changed and race is not what it was, nor should it be.
Proponents of this theory of race contend that race has been reified in black theology and has
indeed become an ontological category for black theologians. They claim that the black
identity discussed in black theology continues to be determined by whiteness and modern
white racial ideology. Advocates of understanding race as illusion propose a move away
from thinking about race as the central issue of a person’s being to a more complex approach
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to human identity. They contend that only in this way can black theology address the real
problems black people face and bring about true liberation. The work of Victor Anderson
and Alistair Kee to illustrate this approach to race.86 Both authors argue that black thinkers
must transcend racial discourse with its racial apologetics and present a new way for black
people to think about identity that allows for true fulfillment of the individual in community.
Both Alistair Kee and Victor Anderson agree that black is not an ontological
category, but Anderson contends that is has become one in black theology. Anderson uses
the term ontological blackness to describe this tendency in black theology to reify race.
Racial reification, according to Anderson, is to treat race as if it objectively exists
independent of historically contingent factors and the subjective intentions in the writings of
historical and contemporary writers.87 Treating race in this way makes membership in a
racial group the totality of a person’s existence. All other identifying characteristics become
secondary to race. Anderson argues that in black theology blackness has been reified into the
totality or unity of black experience.
Anderson contends that black theologians are heirs to a black intellectual tradition
that has led to the reification of blackness. He argues that the African American approach to
race he calls ontological blackness was determined by and reflective of white racial ideology,
the racial discourse of modernity and European imperialism. This racial ideology was
justified and supported by species logic applied to race as an organizing category. Species
logic contends that every individual member of a species shares essential traits that identify
the member within the species. White and black became species. Europeans articulated
“white” traits as the unity of experience and taste with history and culture. The racialized
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other of the “black” African was the opposite of the European and naturally inferior. This
inferiority was inherent in their race and therefore their very being and so justified the
contemporary politics of democratic exclusion that they experienced. Anderson writes that
white racial ideology has had at least three functions, all of which had the goal of justifying
inequality. It justified the supremacy of European consciousness on a comparative and hence
a scientific basis; it provided historical and moral rationalizations for the spread of European
imperialism throughout the world; and it justified the exclusion of blacks and other colonized
peoples from civic republican citizenship.88
Black thinkers responded to white racial ideology and defended black people by
extrapolating what they understood blackness to be. Anderson argues that African American
cultural philosophy became preoccupied with racial apologetics. It rejected categorical
racism and white racial ideology’s negative projections of blacks and worked to expound the
black cultural genius and civilization. The goal of black subjectivity became the disclosure
of this genius and the representation of the civilization of African Americans. Anderson
argues that this counter-discourse in African American cultural philosophy, including black
theology, has produced a cult of black heroic genius. It, like the white racial ideology it
repudiates, emphasizes racial categories and essentialized principles that determine identity.
Anderson contends that just as in categorical racism all persons who are classified as
members of the black race are included in qualities that distinguish this group from others.
He argues that African Americans continue to represent themselves as the mirror of
European genius.89
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Both Kee and Anderson argue that even the new self proposed and presented by black
theology is not really new but still determined by their oppositional stance to those who
previously defined them. They each contend that African American scholars are still
presenting themselves within the confines of the blackness that whiteness created. The new
black being continues to be defined within the binary dialectics of slavery and freedom,
Negro and citizen, insider and outsider, black and white, and struggle and survival. Black
consciousness is a revolutionary consciousness that requires oppression for its selfdisclosure. Black being is always in relationship with white racism. Anderson argues that if
black experience is defined as the experience of suffering and rebellion against whiteness,
which are ontologically created and provoked by whiteness as the necessary condition of
blackness, then whiteness appears to be the ground of black experience. This approach to
black identity is problematic for two reasons. First, it does not adequately address
contemporary black experience and identity; and second, it does not leave room for real
liberation of black persons today.
Both Anderson and Kee contend that black theology’s approach to racial identity is
modern discourse that does not adequately relate to contemporary postmodern life. Both
suggest that black theology needs to transcend modernity’s racial consciousness and develop
a real radical race critique. The first step in this move is to recognize that the culture that
created categorical black identity is not ultimate but a human artifact and therefore changed
and changeable. Another important tenet of this approach to race is the argument that black
persons are not bound by black culture but in fact inhabit widely differentiated social spaces
and communities. Anderson argues that African American life and experience are structured
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by dispersed and not always commensurable interests of class, gender, sexual differentials,
and race. Therefore identity formation is conditioned by all of these factors as well as race.
Black theologians must embrace the fact that raced identity is always present and effective,
but it is not total. Anderson calls for a new politics of identity that balances an emphasis on
community, unity, racial pride, and black interests, which mitigate claims for difference, with
an emphasis on personality which privileges self-realization at the levels of labor, family,
gender, sexual interests, and personal lifestyle choices, which can make it difficult to justify
claims for community.
Anderson argues in favor of new literary critiques of African American cultural
philosophy that address “race” as a dying category. Anderson proposes the grotesque
aesthetic, which focuses on ambiguity and difference, as an adequate foundation for a
contemporary rationality of difference. Anderson attributes his understanding of the
grotesque to Friedrich Nietzsche who he claims best crystallized a reversal of the heroic epic.
The grotesque contends with the seemingly diametrically opposed sensibilities in binary
dialectics, but seeks neither negation nor mediation between them. It leaves them in tension
and unresolved. It is a challenge to the mind’s instinctive endeavor to synthesize. It renders
objects we perceive and our apperception of them confused or ambiguous. The grotesque
aesthetic leaves open possibilities for creative ways for considering an object or subject,
because the object is other than how it appears when one contour or another is attenuated.90
Anderson argues that the grotesque in African American cultural analysis is able to see the
morally ambiguous African American presence in American life. The cultural critic is freed
up to play in the unresolved ambiguities of black life.
90

For Anderson’s understanding and use of the grotesque, see Beyond Ontological Blackness, 120-38.
Anderson relies on the following works by Friedrich Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy (Garden City: Doubleday,
1956); The Gay Science (Vintage Books, 1974); and Twilight of the Idols (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

136
Anderson argues that this new approach to black identity and experience addresses
the problems created by a focus on the heroic genius of black people in their struggles against
oppression. He claims that when black scholars make suffering, rebellion, and survival
essential marks of black experience, it leads to the absurd claim that anyone who is black is
also oppressed. He believes that such a claim trivializes the nature of oppression many
blacks genuinely experience. This oppression, of course, must be faced; but it must also be
accurately named and described. Anderson maintains that defining race in terms of
ontological blackness leads to another kind of limitation for black persons. He contends that
defining black consciousness within the binary polarities of white racial ideology and black
racial apologetics admits no possibility of transcendence or mediation from their dialectical
boundaries of being, or the blackness that depends on whiteness for it meaning.91 Liberation
then becomes the assumption of a revolutionary consciousness not real release from or
change of the categories that define and create the suffering and oppression in the first place.
Anderson is concerned for the individual seeking true personal thriving and fulfillment and
he wonders whether individual fulfillment is possible within the confines of ontological
blackness. Because of the over-emphasis on community and what it means to be really part
of the black community, ontological blackness represses individuality and does not allow
space for black persons to pursue goods outside of its dialectics even if they contribute to the
person’s fulfillment as an individual. Those who wander too far from authentic black
consciousness often find themselves ostracized.
Anderson maintains that ontological blackness does not and cannot recognize that
real black interests go beyond mere surviving to thriving and flourishing. He argues that
human flourishing involves cultural fulfillment, which he defines as the integration of human
91
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social activity with the satisfaction of categorical and reflexive human goods.92 Anderson
believes that a prerequisite for the cultural fulfillment of black people is cultural
transcendence from the binary determinants of racial apologetics. This does not mean
ignoring or neglecting the negative and difficult aspects of black life, but it calls on black
theologians to define the black experience as more than this. According to Anderson, black
theology must stop focusing on suffering as well as admit the internal differences among
blacks. Black theology must come to recognize the conditions of postmodern North
American life and develop “a new cultural politics of black identity” that meaningfully
relates to it.93 Anderson argues that “pressing beyond ontological blackness requires African
American religious critics to subvert every racial discourse, including their own that would
bind black subjectivity to the totality of racial identity.”94
Both Alistair Kee and Victor Anderson argue that black identity has become
synonymous with the blackness that whiteness created during modernity for the justification
of European imperialism and subsequent enslavement of captured Africans. At the heart of
this white racial ideology is race as a classifying category that discloses the qualities of each
individual in a specific race. Kee contends that black is a social and political construct
defined by the political interests of the powerful and as such should be dropped from black
discourse all together. He writes, “‘[B]lack’ does indeed seem a perverted category and the
use of the term by blacks would seem to be a form of perversion or self-abuse. It is difficult
to imagine how the interests of white oppressors could be better served than by blacks
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accepting this politically motivated and socially constructed term.”95 Anderson also
questions the usefulness of the modern disclosure of blackness, whether from the side of
white racial ideology or black racial apologetics. He argues that neither allows for an
adequate appreciation of the complexity of individual identity and neither allows for real
liberation from white racism. Both Kee and Anderson argue for an altogether new
expression of black identity.

III.

DISCUSSION
This chapter begins in the assumption that we must seriously engage race in order to

combat racism. It recognizes that in theory and theology race is treated as a social
construction, invented in time and place. It demonstrates how using construction as an
organizing principle can serve as a tool for theology to explore different theories of race
through reflection on the various meanings given to this construction. Differences exist
about what this construction is and how it should be approached. There are different answers
to the questions of who constructs, what meaning of race do they construct, why do they
construct, and how and should constructions be changed. An exploration of these answers
allows for a better appreciation of the complexity of race. This exploration of race helps
theologians navigate the diverse reality of race as well as their own theory of race. Since
race influences how we think and how we act, theologians must become conscious of their
own racial beliefs.
Thinking of race as a construction invites theologians to reflect on who constructs
race, how this is done, and for what purpose. Most agree that, historically, powerful whites
constructed race in terms of black and white to meet the needs of slavery. However,
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theologians must reflect on how this relates to current understandings and uses of race since
race is never constructed once and for all. Some argue that powerful whites are still
constructing race and that our state and economic structures support this construction.
Theology must also attend to how the black community and other communities have and do
construct race as well as how each person constructs race in their own life. These
constructions can be positive or negative depictions of human beings and result in racist and
nonracist ways of life. Race is constructed for specific purposes that include the oppression
and exploitation of people of color for the advantage and continued dominance of those
deemed white. Race has been used to meet the needs of our national economic system. It
has been used as a tool to support European imperialism and democratic exclusion. It has
been employed to make and counter claims of white racist ideology. Race also serves the
purpose of uniting people in shared worldviews and perspectives, which create group
identity. In the U.S., race has been a social construct based on skin color, which makes
sweeping generalizations about what it means to have this skin color. Race theorists and
black theologians claim that any racial construction is a conscious choice based on the core
beliefs of the constructing agent. This construction is accomplished through the
establishment of a narrative that situates specific traits within specific bodies and animates
and influences human interactions. Human relations both create and are created by narratives
of race.
In the U.S., race has been and continues to be an essential aspect of identity. The
theologians and theorists included in this chapter disagree about whether this is a positive or
negative aspect of our contemporary culture. James Cone contends that race has been a
negative aspect of American culture but because it is a choice based on our beliefs about
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human living we can change our racial identity to be a positive force. Those advocating an
approach to race as historical legacy also recognize the relational and dynamic character of
identity and challenge us to reconstruct our inherited racial understandings into relations of
equality. Black Catholic theologians underscore the idea that identity is about one’s
community and culture and that our ongoing participation in its story continues to form our
racial identities. Dwight Hopkins argues that we need to shift our understandings of identity
from where we fit into the current capitalist system to how we can all uniquely fit into a new
common wealth. Victor Anderson most notably argues that human identity is more complex
than just race and that identity shifts if we attend to different aspects of it. Because race has
always been a negative aspect of identity and continues to limit the individual, he advocates a
shift away from it in African American discourse.
Treating race as a construction attends to the fact that it has been invented in time and
space; it depends on its context and the history of its context. What race means in the U.S. is
not what it means in other societies, but this does not negate the importance of race for
theology done in the U.S. nor its influence on how the U.S. acts in the international arena.
James Cone focuses on the struggles of the black community throughout its history in the
U.S. with a special focus on the meaning and importance of the Civil Rights and Black
Power Movements for Christian theology. Those who understand race as historical legacy
call attention to the racial stereotypes that pervade U.S. culture. Dwight Hopkins challenges
theologians to understand how the U.S. participates in global monopoly capitalism and what
its views on race mean for people of color around the world. Alistair Kee and Victor
Anderson recognize that our racial discourse is changing in and for our postmodern context.
They argue that black life, like all life, is ambiguous and diverse. Advocates of approaching
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race as culture also call attention to the diversity of persons who live within the groups
defined as black and white.
Any understanding of the context in which theology is being done must appreciate
and understand the history of this context. Our past forms our bodies, our worldviews, which
are intimately connected to our bodies, and our ideas about each other. Race in terms of
black and white is the historical legacy of the United States. Theologians must appreciate the
American institution of slavery, the continued discrimination based on race that followed it,
and the efforts to combat both institutions. Our bodies have been marked by these
experiences. Our bodies also carry with them the history immigrants and enslaved Africans
brought with them. Racist ideology has been integral to America’s past and undermines
American claims to equality; it has also greatly affected American Christianity.
U.S. racist ideology, the stereotypes and caricatures it created, as well as the stories,
songs, and discourses formed to combat it all construct race. Theologians must investigate
the narratives that created and sustain racism as well as those that contest it. As Omi and
Winant warn, discussion of race reveals it to be much more complex than usually thought
and in it one must contend with many areas of human thinking. Not only do theologians
need to explore Christian narratives and theology that have been employed to support racist
constructions and institutions, but also those of science and law. The approach to race as
culture invites sociological and cultural investigations of the stories, songs, and life of
communities that construct race. Dwight Hopkins calls on theologians to examine the beliefs
and practices of capitalism and the discourse of neoliberalism. Remembering that race
continues to be constructed, contemporary as well as historical texts must be included in
discourse about race.
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Of course, Christian theologians are most concerned with the importance of race for
Christian theology. Theological anthropology is concerned with who we are and are called
to be in relation to our ideas about God. Christian theological anthropology addresses the
question of how the inbreaking of God into the world as a human being affects body-persons
as well as the community of bodies that is the Church. The work of theologians in this
chapter investigated how race is related to Christian identity and how we are and live it.
Theologians cannot ignore such an important bodily reality as race in a religion whose
central belief concerns the human body of God. All human bodies embrace categories of
physicality. James Cone argues that how we think about and live these categories should
reflect our central beliefs about God/Christ and how we are to live based on these beliefs.
Dwight Hopkins also contends that our purpose must be God’s purpose. This means we must
embody a preferential option for the poor and oppressed and stand with them with our whole
being, including our physical body. In terms of race, theologians suggest we become black,
change the meaning of whiteness, embrace the diversity of God’s people, and shift all of our
understandings of race for the purpose of combating racism.
Reflection on race is especially important for the Christian Church, which is called to
live as the body of Christ. The reality is that the Church has both embraced and fought
against racism; it has both included and excluded people based on race. The Church must
face its own culpability in the construction of race for racist purposes and live race as if
Christ was the center of its life. For Cone this means the Church will be a black Church
which stands with the poor and oppressed. Hopkins contends that the Church must begin the
formation of a new common wealth that equally shares the earth’s resources. Those who
understand race as historical legacy contend that all the Church’s priests and ministers must
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investigate how white supremacy has influenced their own identity and how they minister.
Race as culture advocates argue that the worship of the Church should embody the culturally
diverse bodies that are the Church. The Church can only be a moral voice in the world if it
recognizes its own racism and works to eradicate it. Black theologians call the Church to see
the sin of racism and liberation from it as integral to redemption. The purpose of changing
our attitudes about race is to work toward the establishment of God’s kingdom, which cannot
allow injustice or dominance between persons. Race is a major barrier to peaceful living and
the concern of those who wish God’s peace to be with us. To be the Body of Christ on earth,
Christians need a theology that addresses how categories of the body impinge upon this goal.
Liberation theologies are concerned to construct race in a positive way that allows for
all to live fully. James Cone advocates a new way of thinking about race, the renunciation of
whiteness and the blackness that whiteness created, and a commitment to becoming black in
imitation of Jesus Christ. Those who study race as historical legacy call for a cultural
transformation that reconstructs whiteness and blackness in order that all can live the equality
called for by Christianity and the United States’ founding documents. Advocates of the
approach to race as culture posit that people can come together for common goals of justice
while maintaining cultural diversity if we respect and appreciate our differences. Dwight
Hopkins argues that we can only overcome racism if we embrace people as more important
than the accumulation of things. This mindset will help establish racial democracy and instill
in all a positive sense of self. Victor Anderson and Alistair Kee contend that we need a new
racial discourse so that our identities can be different. This discourse must change the culture
that created blackness and embrace individual diversity. Specific expressions of race may
alter dominant theories of race. Understanding race as a construction implies that race
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changes and is changeable. Race is authored by humans and can be changed by human
efforts. We continue to construct race in how we live today. We can choose to continue to
live race as the historical legacy of slavery and racism or we can change these constructions
based on white supremacy. Challenging race involves new ways of looking at and living
reality and creates new possibilities for being. These may include dismantling our very
notions of race.

IV.

CONCLUSION
Just as in the previous chapter, reflecting on bodily construction leads to questions

about bodily expression. Racial identity expresses many things. The theologians in this
chapter argued that race expresses our beliefs about God and what it means to be a Christian,
our history, our culture and heritage, our beliefs about justice, our diversity as human beings,
oppression, dominance, exclusion, as well as our inability to get beyond race. White and
black are not obvious terms but have varying meanings depending on the interpreter.
Theology cannot assume any common understanding but must investigate their diverse
interpretations as well as their interrelationships. This interpretation must not only include
what history has said these identities mean but also how persons with these identities
describe them. This investigation is crucial to balance group identity with self-expression.
Black and white will mean different things to different people. Individuals express their race
differently. This expression may follow from group self-expression or challenge their
assumed communal identity.
Bringing together the ideas of the body as construction and the body as expression
starts the process of thinking about the body as symbol, a constructed and expressive reality,
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which can bring together theories of sex/gender and race for a more complete theological
anthropology. Investigating theories of sex/gender and race is an important first step to
appreciating how the human body in its specificity is an important theological theme. But
sex/gender and race are not independent variables. A fuller appreciation of the meaning and
significance of the body for human living must involve discourse that brings them together.
In the next chapter I will begin to explore how race and sex/gender interpenetrate and
influence the meaning of each other.
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And we know that what our minds forget our bodies remember. The body is central to our
being. The history of the African American ordeal of pain and pleasure is inscribed in our
bodies.
Linda E. Thomas, “Womanist Theology, Epistemology, and a New Anthropological
Paradigm”1

CHAPTER 4: WOMANIST THEOLOGY AND THE BODY

I.

INTRODUCTION
Part I of this dissertation addressed sex/gender and race separately in order to engage

different theories about these categorizations of bodily materiality. Part II brings race and
sex/gender together in its consideration of the materiality of the body. This shift brings to
light important considerations for theological reflection on the body in its specificity. By
shifting attention to the whole person rather than one variable of bodied identity, this chapter
recognizes that many intersections of identity make up human living. These combinations of
bodily categorizations create unique identities for those who are and live them. Construction
as a conceptual concept continues to be helpful to understand and trace the historical events
and language that create and affect unique identities. However, consideration must also be
given to the discourses of the groups that are these identities, often unnoticed outside of the
group. These group discourses may paint a very different picture of the self-understanding of
the group despite the affect of social constructions that wish to define them. Deliberation of
group discourses includes attention to individual voices within the group. These voices
reveal the various realities existing within the group itself, which again depend on ever more
specific identity or body markers. Womanist theology is a discourse that brings together
sex/gender and race and illustrates what attention to multiple bodily categorizations means
1
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for theological anthropology. Womanist theology continues to use construction as a helpful
conceptual tool to think about identity, but it also stresses the importance of attending to
group and individual expressions of identity. This balance of construction and expression is
the heart of my proposal of the body as symbol, which I will flesh out in the next chapter.
The balance of community and individuality, of the social construction and personal
expression of identity, is continually found in black feminist and womanist theory. I turn
here to the work of Patricia Hill Collins to give a brief introduction to this theory.2
Womanist scholars attend to black women as whole persons that navigate life within an
American society built on their exploitation and within the black female community that
provides a more positive self-image to help them face this challenge. The womanist project
starts with the exploration of the juncture of sex/gender and race, but recognizes the fact that
living the combination of black race and female sex/gender has historically intersected with
economic instability and sexual abuse. Womanist scholarship illustrates that any marker of
materiality that seeks to define group identity is a dependent variable because all aspects of
identity intersect and influence each other.3 Any combination of identity markers creates a
unique experience and perspective.

2

I rely mostly on Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of
Empowerment. I use the term womanist in this chapter even though Hill Collins uses the term black feminist,
since what I present would be accepted as foundational in womanist work as well, and womanist theology is the
focus of this chapter. See my discussion of the demarcations of black feminist and womanist in Chapter 1 of
this dissertation. Hill Collins is aware that she presents black feminist thought as overly coherent. She does
this purposefully in response to the challenges on political and intellectual fronts that question black feminist
theory’s right to exist. Recognizing that she has focused on the pieces of the mosaic, she writes that she hopes
to see other volumes emerge which will be more willing to present black feminist thought as a shifting mosaic
of competing ideas and interests, emphasizing the disjunctures distinguishing the pieces of the mosaic from one
another. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought, viii-ix. One such example of work that focuses on the diversity
of womanist thought is Stacy M. Floyd-Thomas, ed., Deeper Shades of Purple: Womanism in Religion and
Society.
3
Womanists are not the only scholars that recognize that sex/gender and race intersect with other identity
markers. The work of Judith Butler and John Paul II, included in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, analyze the role
of sexuality in the formation of bodies. In Chapter 3 I explored how Dwight Hopkins’ work considers
economic realities as intimately tied to questions of race. Womanists have begun to add to this list age and

148
Womanists argue that African American women did not and do not simply share in
the experiences of black men and white women, the simple addition of troublesome race and
sex/gender. Race and sex/gender intersect in the experience of black women and create a
unique identity. Collectively, African American women represent a unique perspective from
which to view life in the United States and theorize about it. Patricia Hill Collins points out
two aspects of this unique location. First, African American women have and often continue
to live in all-black communities, which carry on the traditions of African American culture
that traces its roots to African cosmologies and epistemology rather than those of Western
Europe. Second, African American women have often found themselves working within
white spaces and forced to learn and sometimes adopt the rules of the dominant society in
order to survive, but simultaneously marginalized in and by this society. Hill Collins
describes this as the black woman’s “outsider-within” position.4 Whether as domestic
workers or academics or any of a number of employment situations, the marginality black
women experience provides a distinct angle of vision on civil, political, and intellectual
situations.
Womanist scholarship focuses on the unique experiences of black women, both
individual stories and traditions within the group as a whole. Both analyses of identity lead
to a consideration of the power dynamics that affect these experiences and the social
constructions that want to define black women as a group. Womanists’ attention to the
intersecting oppressions black women experience moves them to a further examination of the
religious difference. See Audre Lorde, “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” in Sister
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matrix of domination within which these intersecting oppressions originate, develop, and are
contained. A central theme and critical aspect of womanist scholarship is engagement with
the images of black women society has created to control them. Womanists recognize that
controlling images such as Mammy, matriarch, welfare mother, and Jezebel reflect power
relations and justify the very existence of intersecting oppressions. To address these
controlling images, womanists must analyze the history and narratives of the social context
that have shaped black women’s identity.
Womanists point out that black female identity means one thing to society at large,
but quite another thing to black women themselves. Womanist theology and theory do not
stop by analyzing how intersecting oppressions construct black female identity in this
country. They also attend to the testimonies of African American women who are making a
“way out of no way.” This attention to African American women themselves witnesses to
the different reality and identity that these women create for themselves within the context of
oppression and negative constructions. This counter-discourse expresses something beyond
and in spite of these constructions. Attention to the counter-discourses of black women
themselves reveals that most black women do not define themselves with these controlling
images since they do not reflect how they know themselves or each other. Hill Collins writes
that black women must “jump outside the frames and systems authorities provide and create
their own frame” for stimulating positive self-definition.5 These new frames and systems are
created in the discourse between and among black women themselves. The tradition of
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sharing experiences and collecting and passing on wisdom about these experiences and acts
of resistance in response to them constitutes the long-standing African American women’s
intellectual tradition.6
The specifics of this tradition are not uniformly shared by all African American
women. Although African American women face common challenges, they do not all
respond to these challenges in the same way. Hill Collins writes, “There is no essential or
archetypal black woman whose experiences stand as normal, normative, and thereby
authentic.”7 Individual black women find their voices in their own unique way. They
connect to the larger black women’s community for support and to collectively work for
change, but they remain an individual within it. This individuality is based on how
intersecting oppressions have affected the individual. Attending to the various intersections
of identity categories reveals diverse and individual body-persons and recognizes the
diversity present in any group. By addressing many aspects of human identity, including
race, sex/gender, class, sexuality, and religious pluralism, womanism recognizes that
individual persons face different realities as these categories intersect specifically in their
lives. Womanists point out that just as white men, white women, black men and black
women all differ from each other, so too is there diversity within each group, including the
collectivity of black women. Contending with poverty or a denigrated sexuality creates
differences and fissures among those who identify as African American women.
Investigating African American women’s identity points to the reality that every person’s
identity is always more complex and unique the closer you attend to them as individuals.
6
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Black feminist and womanist work embraces the importance of individuality within
community and emphasizes self-expression in its treatment of identity and the body.
Womanist scholars contend that change happens in this self-expression that contests
traditional constructions of black female identity. This self-definition validates black
women’s power as human subjects. In their rearticulation of themselves is the power to
rearticulate their social realities. By resisting and challenging controlling images, black
women protest the power relations that underlie these images. Hill Collins writes that, “when
black women define ourselves, we clearly reject the assumption that those in positions
granting them the authority to interpret our reality are entitled to do so.”8 She contends that
this empowerment is the first step in resisting oppressive institutions. Black feminist thought
recognizes that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type and that oppressions
such as race and gender or sexuality and nation work together in producing injustice.
Womanist scholarship includes a thorough investigation of the social construction of black
female identity for the purpose of oppression and domination and a witness to the real black
women who know another image of self that is revealed in their individual life stories.

Structure of Chapter
This chapter explores bodily identity from womanist perspective. Womanist work
encourages an approach to the body that addresses the construction of bodily reality and
attends to the life stories and individual first-person expressions of identity. Womanists hold
in tension communal identity, which is often based in historical constructions, and individual
identity, which is the unique reality of the self. Womanists employ the idea of construction
in their investigation of the lives of African American women to tease out the various aspects
8
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of black female identity. Thinking of identity as a construction addresses how various
historical events and narratives have and continue to shape African American women’s lives.
Womanists give equal attention to the specific group’s expression of identity as well as
individual expressions within the group.
I use Delores Williams’ text Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist
God-Talk to provide the structure for this chapter.9 Williams’ work explores how black
female identity has been constructed through the forced and coerced use of their labor and
reproduction. Williams uses the theme of surrogacy to organize her analysis of African
American women’s historical experience. Surrogacy can be defined as functioning in the
place of someone else. In the history of African American women in this country, Williams
identifies two kinds of surrogacy experience. The first was the coerced surrogacy of
antebellum America when people and systems more powerful than black people forced black
women to function in roles that ordinarily would have been filled by someone else.10 These
surrogacy roles could not be refused. After the Civil War that brought freedom to enslaved
African Americans, black people tried to determine for whom or what black women would
not stand in place. However, even though black women could exercise choice in refusing
surrogate roles, social pressures and realities often influenced and limited their power to
choose full emancipation from all surrogacy roles. For this reason, Williams describes this
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surrogacy experience as voluntary though pressured. Her theology presents black female
identity as forged within intersecting systems of oppression. Her work outlines how black
women’s nurturance, physical labor, and sexuality have been exploited. Her initial
investigation of the intersection of sex/gender and race in black women’s lives leads to the
necessary consideration of class and sexuality. I follow Williams’ lead to consider how
approaching the many identity markers of human living lead to a consideration of the body
that incorporates the social construction of identity as well as unique communal and
individual expressions of identity.

II.

BODILY IDENTITY IN WOMANIST PERSPECTIVE

Surrogacy and Nurturance: Sex/Gender and Race
Womanist scholarship challenges any approach to the body that focuses exclusively
on race and/or sex/gender since the body is a complex combination of identity categories. A
focus on how race and sex/gender intersect is just a first step in appreciating the complexity
of bodily identity and the experiences that follow from this identity. The way that race and
sex/gender come together in the lives and experiences of African American women cannot be
understood as just being the experience of being female added to the experience of being
black. It is something different and unique and produces a unique perspective for African
American women that is sometimes in tension with white women and black men. African
American women and white women share both the challenge of facing sexism in their lives
and the belief in the full humanity of women, which makes them equal to men. However,
womanists would not affirm an historical solidarity or common experience among women in
this country. Womanists challenge white women to explore how they have benefitted from
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the subjugation of African American women and the social structures and standards by which
this was done and justified. White privilege creates a deep division between white feminists
and women of color.11
African American women share with African American men a common slave cultural
heritage and the ongoing experience of racism. They share the painful reality that in the
United States skin color makes a difference and has had a lot to do with their enslavement
and with the continuation of their oppression. Sharing this common heritage of the past and
experience in the present does not mean that all African-American people must or do think
alike. Black women challenge black men to see how sexism pervades the black world and to
recognize how they themselves add to the oppressive forces pressing on black women.12
Delores Williams argues that throughout the history of African American women in
the United States there have been forces bent on conquering black women’s power to resist
and rise above obstacles and trouble. She contends that both men and women of the ruling
class as well as some black men have worked to keep black women in the service of other
people’s needs and goals. These efforts included the production of negative and controlling
images of black women and a narrative that justified their exploitation. Williams points to
the mythology that surrounded the figure of Mammy both before and after emancipation.
Much of the antebellum stereotypes presented Mammy as the positive result of slavery; the
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conversion of some “heathen” black women into “civilized” models of womanhood. In fact,
Mammy was seen as an example of how black women could model the prevalent, Victorian
ideals of womanhood, by being maternal, virtuous, asexual, pious, tender, and understanding.
Mammies were thought to embrace and embody white cultural ideals and values.
In antebellum America, many African American women slaves were forced to
perform the role of Mammy. The job of these enslaved black women was to nurture white
families. Mammy was responsible for the care of the white slaveowners’ home and the
nurturance of their children. She managed the household, cared for the children, and often
advised about business matters. Even after freedom from bondage, many African American
women, forced by financial necessity, needed to continue performing the duties of Mammy
in the role of domestic worker. In both roles, Mammy and domestic worker, African
American women were thought of as subservient because of their sex/gender and subservient
because of their race. Patriarchy kept them locked to the proper work of women, which
included taking care of the owner’s or employer’s children and keeping his household
running smoothly. Williams argues that this role according to patriarchal norms belonged to
the white woman/mistress of the household and that the African American woman was
forced and coerced to be the white woman’s surrogate and do the work that she wished to
avoid. Whether as abused slaves or exploited domestic workers, African American women
have often been forced to put white women’s needs before their own and do the work white
women didn’t want to do or thought was beneath them. Williams contends that in white
women’s fight to get out of the house and be freed of domestic drudgery, the experience of
African American women, who have often been handed these tasks by white women to do
for them, has been ignored and disrespected. Mammies and later domestic workers were
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forced to support white male dominance with their work and to appear to agree and imitate
the ideals and values of white culture. The authority of Mammy or the domestic worker in
no way challenged that of the master and mistress; her race kept her subservient to both.
Williams argues that the surrogacy roles and images of Mammy and domestic worker
created a strain and tension for African American women in their own communities. She
contends that although Mammy’s forced surrogacy in the white household did not lessen her
dedication to her own family, it muddled her relationship with the black community.
Williams writes that Mammy’s tragedy was not that she abandoned her own people, but that
she was powerless to offer her gifts to black people “on terms they could accept without,
themselves, sliding farther into a system of paternalistic dependence.”13 Despite this tension
in the slave community, the nurturing skills of black women were valued by black men after
emancipation as long as her standing changed to support his male authority instead of that of
the white slaveowner.14 Williams writes that apparently the freedmen did not want to
perpetuate a model of authority subordinating black men to black women. It was the goal of
the black man to bring notions of black manhood into agreement with the manhood notions
of mainline American culture. Therefore, the black father must been seen as protector and
authority of the black family not the black woman. In adopting sexist role definitions, black
men have also been part of conquering black women’s power through violence as well as
13
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emotional and psychological pressure. Womanists argue that the inordinate demands men
make upon the nurturing capacities of black mothers are destructive for women.15
Williams argues that this forced and coerced form of surrogacy has contributed to the
formation of negative images of black women that prevail in America to this day. Mammy is
the image of black women as perpetual mother figures—religious, fat, a-sexual, loving
children better than themselves, self-sacrificing, and giving up self-concern for group
advancement. The mythology and stereotypes of Mammy and wage earner has morphed into
the negative depiction of African American women as matriarchs. These black women are
not respected and criticized for supporting their families and being heads of households. She
contends that in black religious institutions, black literature, and black culture, African
American mothers are often portrayed as an impediment to the black male’s struggle for
manhood in America. These women are seen as emasculating to black men and are often
blamed for many of the problems that plague the black community. Womanists counter by
calling attention to the fact that the continuous devaluation of black fatherhood and the plight
of black men is part of the cultural matrix of American society.16

15

This conclusion is part of Williams’ analysis of Alice Walker’s The Color Purple. Williams contends that
Walker’s work suggests that the exertion of male power to make sure women meet these demands constitutes
sexism in the black community. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness, 53.
16
In her work Sexuality and the Black Church, Kelly Brown Douglas cites “The Moynihan Report,” a 1965
report on the “Negro family” by Daniel P. Moynihan, who at the time was assistant secretary of labor and
director of the Office of Policy Planning and Research in the Johnson administration. The report implies that
black women are responsible for the failure of black children to achieve, especially black boys. The report
perpetuates the myth that “the crisis of black politics and social life [is] a crisis solely of black masculinity….It
is to be repaired by instituting appropriate forms of masculinity and male authority, intervening in the family to
rebuild the race.” It also identifies “Black women’s failure to conform to the cult of true womanhood…as one
fundamental source of Black cultural deficiency.” This report directed attention away from the social,
economic, and political structures – all of them racist and patriarchal – that actually deprived black men of work
and relegated black women to domestic labor. See Sexuality and the Black Church, 50-52. Williams’ work
concurs with this assessment. She writes that the Ku Klux Klan came to life to stamp out any manifestation of
black male power. This attack on black men trying to take their place in American society continues today. For
example, black working fathers cannot reside with their destitute families if the mother is to receive public
assistance for the children. Womanists insist that black women must not be blamed for the racism of American
society and that in fact suffer from it just as much as black men. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness, 80.

158
Womanists turn to their own tradition to explore how sexism and racism have
intersected in their history and its effect on their lives. They attend to the words of black
mothers to black daughters. For example, in Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were
Watching God, she articulates a black woman’s analysis of the historical intersection of
sex/gender and race in the lives of black women. She writes of a grandmother telling her
granddaughter about her perspective of the world. “Honey de white man is de ruler of
everything as fur as Ah been able tuh find out...So de white man throw down de load and tell
de nigger man tuh pick it up. He pick it up because he have to, but he don’t tote it. He hand
it to his womenfolks. De nigger woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see. Ah
been prayin’ fuh it tuh be different wid you. Lawd, Lawd, Lawd!”17 Through such
expressions, black women explain their experience in their own words. Womanists charge
both black and white theologians to attend to these expressions if they are to have an
adequate understanding of black female identity created in the intersection of sex/gender and
race.
Womanist analysis of the construction of black female identity challenges the
adequacy of the notion of patriarchy that many white feminists espouse to describe the cause
of female oppression. Williams contends that as a term to describe black women’s relation to
the white (male and female) dominated social and economic systems governing their lives, it
is lacking. It is silent about class-privileged women oppressing women without it. It is also
silent about white men and women working to maintain this white supremacy and privilege.
White feminist analysis is often silent about the positive boons that patriarchy has bestowed
upon many white women.18 Williams contends that overcoming the racist divide between
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womanist theologians and white feminist theologians will require an analysis of the racist
leanings of the secular and religious notions of womanhood in the country and in Christian
tradition. Williams argues that black women and other women of color have been oppressed
by the standards of white womanhood; and that often for women to be assumed to have
humanity at all, it must be white-woman humanity.19 African American women express
different notions of womanhood within the context of their lives.
Williams argues that just as a directed analysis of patriarchy is not enough, neither is
an exclusive analysis of racism enough. Such analyses are usually silent about black sexism
in all its forms. Williams suggests that African Americans need to continue to attend to how
they describe blackness. She contends that much of the language used to discuss the struggle
between blacks and whites assumes an androcentric black history so that blackness comes to
mean black maleness.20 As a theologian she challenges the black Church to reflect on its use
of the bible and to spurn patriarchal theology that prohibits women from asking questions
and keeps them in a secondary role to men in church and society. Womanists urge the black
Church and community to understand the unique suffering and struggle of African American
women and to not join the larger society in blaming her for what she had and has to do.
Womanist theologians recognize the unique identity of black women is situated
within the intersection of sex/gender and race. Their attention to the specific experiences of
African American women leads them to understand that black female identity is more than
just sex/gender and race. Black women know that their history includes struggles with not
only racism and sexism but also economic marginalization and sexual exploitation. These
experiences both unite and differentiate black women with and from each other. In the
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complex intersections of identity categories there are ever more unique experiences of being
a black woman.

Surrogacy and Physical Labor: Sex/Gender, Race, and Class
The persistent reality of poverty continues to be a common experience for African
American women. Therefore, to be true to the real-life situation of many African American
women, womanist analysis cannot stop with a critique of sexism and racism, but must also
make the connections between these and the structures that keep the majority of African
American women poor and/or economically disadvantaged. Womanists recognize that class
status is a crucial identity marker in U.S. society. Understanding class is not an independent
study in womanist discourse, but is understood through its interaction with sex/gender and
race. From the very beginning of black life in this country, race dictated one’s economic
status. Blackness made one a slave; it continues to make many poor. From their very first
moment on American soil, African American women found themselves exploited within the
U.S. economic system. The daily struggles of poor black women today witness to the
continued interaction of sexism, racism, and classism, so womanism employs a tridimensional analysis of this triple oppression. Womanist theologian M. Shawn Copeland
writes that the experiences of African American women are a pivot for focusing, defining,
and coding the interaction of sexism, racism and classism.21 She argues that theologians
interested in liberation cannot rank or order oppression but must see all its expressions and
their interaction both in the individual and societal realms.
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Through their experience of economic hardship, African American women know that
economic systems also construct how we are known and how we know ourselves. Delores
Williams argues that investigating the history of African American physical labor reveals
various ways that sex/gender, race, and class intersect. She begins with how the institution of
slavery originated this tri-dimensional oppression. The debasement of black women has
always been economically important for the U.S. Williams points out that the slave trade
was the primary source of wealth during the colonial period and the work of the slaves
helped build the economic foundation of this country. The debasement of all black people
was important for the success of the U.S. slavocracy. It was believed that the enslaved could
not be overworked and were “comparatively insensitive to sufferings that would be
unbearable to whites.”22 For enslaved black women, this justified the practice of forcing
them to do the same work as men in roles usually associated with men.
Not all female slaves were Mammies and forced to nurture white families. Most
female slaves were field hands and sex/gender and race intersected differently for them.
Williams describes the substitution of black female energy for black male energy as another
example of the forced surrogacy they experienced during slavery. The substitution of
enslaved women for enslaved men led to the “masculinization” of these slaves in their work,
meaning they lost the gender distinction society made between men and women. Williams
writes that in the consciousness of many slaves, the masculinization of the roles of female
slaves erased gender boundaries in relation to work. This is reflected most clearly in some
slaves’ lack of gender distinction in their use of pronouns. They would refer to both female
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and males slaves as “he.”23 The masculinization of their labor bred the idea that black
women were not feminine and did not desire to be so. When compared to white women,
black female slaves were considered to have not only far more physical strength but also
more capacity for pain than white women. But these women were not completely equated
with men. Williams writes that female field hands could not fill the highest role of field
slaves and become the slave driver. In addition, these masculinized female field hands were
thought to be of a lower social class than the female house slaves who usually did “women’s
work.” Williams argues that these female slaves were forced into the roles they had to
perform and then their suffering in them was justified based on the view of them the
performance of these roles created.
Even after emancipation, African American women often still filled the roles usually
associated with men at that time, including breadwinner and head of household. She entered
into these roles because of her economic circumstances. Poverty necessitated that black
women work either in the fields or as domestic workers. In the fields, they would continue to
do the same work as men. As domestic workers, they would do the work that white women
wished to avoid and had the resources to pass off to black women. Poverty and the search
for work often separated families and left black women to support their children without the
help of men.
Racism has historically undermined the efforts of black people to gain financial
security. Delores Williams gives an example from postbellum U.S. society. She writes that
even though white men and women had serious labor struggles with each other in Southern
factories after the Civil War, white women and white men together mobilized to keep
manufacturers from hiring black women and black men. Whites joined together, regardless
23
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of sex/gender or class, to keep African Americans economically and racially inferior. Some
of these tactics were violent. Employers came up with plans to “utilize black and white labor
in a reasonably efficient manner while still preserving white supremacy, especially for
disadvantaged whites.” 24
Focusing on the experience of black women, womanist scholars have always made
connections between racism, sexism, and economic exploitation. Frances Beale, in her early
black feminist article “Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female,” argues that the “system
of capitalism and its afterbirth racism” have always existed contemporaneously in the U.S.25
She contends that both narratives are imbued with sexism. Beale challenges capitalism’s
definitions of women and family. She contends that its sexist and racist model of family has
wreaked havoc in the black community because black people do not fit. The capitalist model
of woman is a bourgeois white model of womanhood and the model of man is the head of
household. Beale argues that the economic system of capitalism seeks to reduce women to a
state of enslavement and defines their labor as surplus and exploitable.26 For most of its
history, capitalist America has defined woman as full-time caregiver to the family who is
then a mere satellite of her mate. Beale argues that such an existence for women is sterile
and parasitic and offers her little opportunity to develop herself as an individual. In addition,
black men, even after slavery, have and continue to find it difficult to secure meaningful or
24
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productive employment. This reality attacks their sense of self given that the capitalist
evaluation of men depends on their status as breadwinner. Black women historically have
had to work and in fact are sometimes the breadwinner for the family. They are then accused
of emasculating black men. Beale contends that too often black men may have accepted the
sexist guidelines about women, but racism prevents them from taking their place beside
white men. She argues that the black community must renounce these ideas of manhood and
womanhood as counter-revolutionary.
Beale argues that capitalism and its class structure give birth to and perpetuate racism
and sexism, and calls on black female scholars to address this underlying problem.
Womanists have taken up Beale’s challenge. Womanist scholars recognize that fighting
classism is a different battle than taking on racism or sexism. First of all, it includes a
critique of capitalism, which is whole-heartedly embraced by most of the U.S. Second, in a
country that prides itself on equal rights and equal opportunity for all, it is difficult to even
make the argument for the existence of class structures. However, Katie Cannon, in her
articles, “Unearthing Ethical Treasures: The Intrusive Markers of Social Class” and “Racism
and Economics: The Perspective of Oliver C. Cox,” does both.27 In true womanist fashion,
she writes about both the realities of class and how to assess our place within it by balancing
“theoretical” approaches with personal reflection on individual history and the sense of self
that issues forth from that history.
Cannon’s analysis of class posits that before understanding our own personal place
within U.S. class structures, one must first recognize the reality of class itself. Cannon
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argues that knowledge of class is habitually suppressed in this country and the false idea of
classlessness is promoted. This illusion of classlessness promotes the idea that one’s social
standing is determined by individual merit and hard work, even though the class position of
one’s family is probably the single most significant determinant of future success.28 Success
according to capitalism is defined in terms of affluence and possessions. The way of life of
the privileged and affluent is established as the norm in U.S. capitalist ideology.29 For
capitalism and its resulting class structure to work and survive, it is important that the
majority of people buy into these values and ideology. Even those exploited by the system
are expected to embrace it and the justifications for their exploitation. Cannon writes that
most people opt to live this parcel of lies and either pose and pass as so-called members of
the muddled middle-class or exist in a state of we-are-all-the-same classlessness.
Cannon argues that this we-are-all-the-same attitude is dangerous for those who
possess little resources and limited opportunities, because class is not just about money but
our being and sense of self. When a person’s real life does not reflect the prosperity and
affluence of the ruling class, one can develop a sense of nobodiness. Those with higher
economic standing blame the poor for the problems in the U.S., an attack on the very being
of the poor.30 Cannon advocates honesty in assessing our place within the U.S. capitalist
order. She argues that each person must apply a fundamental inquiry of class indicators to all
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areas of their biotext in order to recognize class in one’s own individual life and how this
connects to the class structures of the U.S. capitalist political economy. This process invites
each person to claim who they are and where they come from as well as what roles they
adopt to survive and succeed in our society. It asks each person to assess their beliefs about
the internal worth of humanity and on what they base it.
This process of self-reflection in terms of class will highlight how each person relates
to capitalism. Some will be the powerbrokers who benefit from the system while others may
recognize that they are embracing a system that exploits them. Cannon argues that this selfreflection is especially important for the black community because racism is inherent in our
capitalist economic reality. She uses the work of Oliver C. Cox to uncover the
interconnections of racism and capitalism. Cox contends that the exploitation of black
people and people of color is an inherent dynamic of capitalism. Racism is about labor
relations. Black people and other people of color have and are intended to continue to
occupy the lowest rungs of the labor hierarchy both domestically and internationally.
Cannon writes that chattel slavery was an extreme institutional expression of capitalist
exploitation but demonstrates the frightful principle of capitalism that the greater the need for
black labor, the greater would be black subjugation.31 The suppression and mistreatment of
black people is maintained because it serves the needs of the system.
Cannon concludes from Cox’s analysis that since white supremacy has been
interstructured with our capitalist political economy only the elimination of a capitalist mode
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of production can open the way to making racism dysfunctional. She recognizes that this
fight against capitalism must be undertaken in the Church and theology as well. Cannon
writes that the form of Christianity shaped by obeisance to the economic interests of a
capitalist system is a new form of Christianity, one that legitimates exploitation. It is a form
of capitalist Christianity which combines defense of the sanctity of the economic system with
racial and theological conformity. Such Christianity, Cannon argues, separates the spiritual
person from the bodily person and calls on people to be spiritual and avoid politics. Such a
Christianity has no place in womanist theology.
The racism inherent in capitalism does not always preclude some African Americans
from achieving middle-class status. As African American life in this country diversifies in
this manner, womanists have become aware of the classism developing within the black
community. Bridgette Hector, in her article “Womanist Model: Crossing Class Barriers:
Middle-Class Black Women Relating with Inner-City Black Female Youth,” observes a
tension growing between black women of different economic class status.32 She contends
that class divisions are dividing the black community and leaving it diminished as a result.
Hector argues that African Americans of different classes do not know each other anymore,
and an important first step to unifying against oppression is to tell each other their stories so
they can learn about and from each other.33 In knowing each other outside of the dictates of
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Building on Katie Cannon’s observation that the real-lived texture of black life requires moral agency that
may run contrary to the ethical boundaries of mainline Protestantism, Hector argues that young urban black
women’s lives must be understood in their “particular” life dilemmas. Hector argues that although many
middle-class black women believe that intelligence and moral uprightness are developed in institutions of
higher learning, there is much to be learned from inner-city black youth. She first challenges middle-class black
women to understand the moral standards of their poorer sisters and respect their plight. She contends that in
fact the moral standard of the “hood” is communalism, which can stand as a powerful counterforce to the

168
capitalism, women of different classes can become “empowered cojourners” who dismantle
stereotypes and establish opportunities for ministry between each other.34 Womanist analysis
recognizes that economics both unites black women in their historical battle with poverty and
divides them in their present economically diverse realities. It is an important social marker
that groups and distinguishes bodies.

Surrogacy and Sexuality: Sex/Gender, Race, and Sexuality
In order to give a wholistic account of black female identity, womanist scholarship
attends to the sexuality of African American women. Kelly Brown Douglas addresses
sexuality and the black community and Church in her book Sexuality and the Black Church:
A Womanist Perspective, and concludes that the violation of black sexuality by white culture
is about nothing less than preserving white power in an interlocking system of racist, sexist,
classist, and heterosexist oppression. Brown Douglas approaches sexuality not as a term
synonymous with sex but rather implying a person’s very humanity. She contends that
sexuality is basic to personhood. It compels emotional, affective, sensual, and spiritual
relationships and involves self-understanding and ways of relating in the world as women
and men.35 Brown Douglas contends that the exploitation of black sexuality is part of the
overall effort to control black bodies in the support of white patriarchal hegemony. This is
especially true for black women who are held in lowest regard by white patriarchal culture
because they are black and female. In contrast to the myth of white womanhood, which
“leads men and children to God,” black women are blamed for the depravity of the entire
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black community. They are also held responsible for their past and present abuse at the
hands of white men. She claims that black sexuality and its attack and humiliation serve an
essential function in white culture’s myths, stereotypes, laws, and customs.
The attack on black sexuality began during and as part of the enslavement of African
people. Although according to the racist ideology of the time white men should have limited
their sexual relations to white women, they continually forced black women to endure their
advances and to provide for their sexual “pleasure.”36 This experience of surrogacy, which
entailed the continued rape of enslaved women, was a constant attack on their self-esteem
and self-worth. Delores Williams contends that the sexual surrogacy of enslaved women
contributed to a negative image of black women as “loose, over-sexed, erotic, and readily
responsive to the sexual advances of men, especially white men.”37 She argues that by
describing the black woman in this way, white society could put the responsibility for the
sexual liaisons of slavery upon the “immoral” slave woman, whose “passionate” nature was
supposed to have stemmed from her African heritage. These ideas laid the foundation for a
mythology of black sexuality that helped justify the institution and practices of slavery and
which continue to justify white patriarchal hegemony.
The racist caricatures and stereotypes surrounding blackness portray the belief in the
intrinsic depravity of black persons. The image of the wild and savage Jezebel was used to
justify the sexual exploitation of black women by white men. Brown Douglas argues that the
stereotypes and false images surrounding black womanhood provided a gateway and
36
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foundation for the dehumanization of black men. The stereotypes about the lasciviousness of
the black female required a matching mythology for the black male. Black people were
portrayed as governed by passion and therefore naturally violent. Black women were
described as seductresses of white men and black men as sexual predators of white women.38
The mythology created about black sexuality has and does support and justify white control
of black bodies. Brown Douglas contends that the myths employed to justify this control
painted black persons as potential threats to the peace and sanctity of the white world. For
the sake of the white world, these people needed to be controlled.39
Brown Douglas argues that Christian teaching has supported white culture’s control
of black bodies by giving sexuality authoritative prominence in the denigration of particular
human beings. Brown Douglas maintains that Western Christian tradition opened wide the
door for the possibility of utilizing sexual practices, or alleged sexual practices, as a means
for devaluing and demonizing human beings by associating sexual activity with passionate,
irrational, and even satanic behavior.40 White Christian society embraced and used this
tradition to place a sacred canopy over their acts of domination and oppression.
38
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how Brown Douglas understands the influence of Platonized Christianity in the sexualized condemnation of
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Brown Douglas utilizes Michel Foucault’s theory of power with insights from black
female and male social critics in order to address both the reality of the denigration of black
sexuality and reasons behind it.41 She reads Foucault’s relational view of power as
originating in and controlled by the hands of people not impersonal or elusive structures of
domination. Through the production of certain forms of knowledge and their deployment
through public discourse, power produces constraints over the bodies and consciences of
people and thereby compels them to behave in certain ways. Foucault argues that sexuality is
integral to power because it is central to the regulation of bodies. By questioning and
impugning another’s sexuality, one bolsters their own claim to superiority and suggests the
other group’s inferiority. Such distinctions establish justification for the control of one over
the other.42 By attacking black sexuality, white culture attacks black people’s being for the
purpose of controlling them. By painting black people as deviant and uncivilized, white
culture produces and deploys knowledge meant to define black people as inferior,
intrinsically depraved, and in need of control. Brown Douglas argues that the main purpose
of this mythology is to make white supremacy seem natural, normal, necessary, and
inevitable, and thereby deflect attention from the sinister nature of white power. White
culture has benefitted from the control of black bodies, both their reproductive and
productive capacities.

black humanity, see Kelly Brown Douglas, “The Black Church and Homosexuality: The Black and White of
It,” Union Seminary Quarterly 57, no. 1-2 (2003): 32-45; and Brown Douglas, What’s Faith Got To Do With It?
Black Bodies/Christian Souls.
41
Brown Douglas writes that since Foucault’s theory virtually ignores matters of race it must be complemented
by the work of black scholars. She contends that although Foucault’s analyses sometimes reflect a self-serving
androcentric perspective, they do provide an “insider’s” view of white patriarchal culture. Brown Douglas,
Sexuality and the Black Church, 12.
42
Brown Douglas, Sexuality and the Black Church, 22. She refers to Michel Foucault, The History of
Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. 1.

172
Brown Douglas argues that the assault on black sexuality by white culture has
impeded black people’s ability to love themselves, to love each other in all their diversity,
and to know God. The result of centuries of attack on all aspects of their person, including
their sexuality, is a lowered self-esteem of individual black persons. An inability to love self
is an obstacle to loving others. Brown Douglas writes that “the consequences of sexual
humiliation have left black men and women vulnerable to adopting perceptions of
masculinity and femininity that place them in dysfunctional relationships with each other and
oblige them to negate the humanity and worth of gay and lesbian persons whose ways of
being challenge their distorted views of sexuality.”43 Brown Douglas argues that black
people must face the degree to which their perceptions of femininity, masculinity, and family
have been shaped by and in fact support the ideology of a white, patriarchal, heterosexist
culture. She quotes Patricia Hill Collins who writes, “Much of the antagonism AfricanAmerican women and men feel may stem from an unstated resentment toward Eurocentric
gender ideology and against one another as enforcers of the dichotomous sex role inherent in
the ideology.”44
Brown Douglas argues that divesting themselves of this gender ideology will help the
black community better define black freedom as freedom for all black people. Like many
womanists, she contends that too often black freedom has meant gaining a certain standard of
“manhood” for black men. This manhood is too often reflective of patriarchal and sexist
norms that equate it with physical strength, independence, and dominance.45 This manhood
meant the subjugation of black women and the derision of homosexual persons. Male
homosexuality becomes equated with effeminate behavior and black mothers are blamed for
43
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causing it in their sons. Lesbians are often thought of as a betrayal of manhood by simple
virtue of who they are outside of sexual relationship with black men. In spite of this, these
notions of manhood and womanhood are often embraced by the black community. Brown
Douglas posits that one reason may be that in a society where privilege is accorded on the
basis of race (namely, whiteness), gender (maleness), and sexual preference
(heterosexuality), heterosexual privilege is virtually the only privilege that black people –
especially black women – can claim in order to move to the center.46
Brown Douglas contends that the worst response to the white cultural attack on black
sexuality is the silence in the black community concerning their sexuality. Brown Douglas
challenges the black Church to engage in a sexual discourse of resistance, which is a counter
discourse to the one white culture has created to describe and construct black sexuality. She
embraces the theory that discourse constructs us and it is through a disruptive discourse that
we can change.47 This counter discourse can change interpersonal interactions and
undermine oppressive institutions. Because Brown Douglas proposes this counter discourse
from a womanist perspective, she advocates dealing with sexuality within its intersections
with sex/gender, race, and class. She finds precedence for this counter-discourse in the
history of African Americans in this country. She points to the example of the enslaved
African people whose sexuality and persons were continually under assault, but who forged
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their own notions of their sexuality that affirmed their personhood and fostered well-being in
the community.48
Brown Douglas proposes that this sexual discourse of resistance should have two
main steps that could lead to many positive outcomes. First, it must deconstruct the sexual
politics of the black community in order to uncover and understand what forces have shaped
black sexuality. Most importantly, according to Brown Douglas, this discourse must name
and expose the impact of white culture on black sexuality. Second, the sexual discourse of
resistance must be constructive in that it should cultivate more life-enhancing approaches and
attitudes concerning black sexuality. Brown Douglas posits that by discussing sexuality the
black community could divest itself of its sexism and its homophobia. Both sexism and
homophobia destroy black life. Black feminists and womanists have long proposed to end
the silence about sexism in the black community because sexism is destructive to both black
men and women. Brown Douglas proposes that homophobia is similarly destructive to both
those who perpetuate it and those who suffer from its perpetuation.49
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Brown Douglas urges the black community to fully understand how the tools of
power have been used against black people, and recognize how they in turn are using them to
oppress gay and lesbian persons. Like white culture, the black Church invokes biblical
authority for its denouncement of homosexuality and thereby places a sacred canopy and
divine sanction over their views and thereby justifies its oppression of homosexuals. Brown
Douglas maintains that with such a history of the bible being used against them, it seems
abhorrent for black people to be so steadfast in their use of the bible against other black
persons. She challenges the black Church to remember how Christianity was used to support
their own oppression and therefore develop a hermeneutic that reflects the struggle for
freedom it says it embraces. She contends that the black Church needs to reexamine the
biblical texts it uses to denounce homosexuality and determine if homophobia is driving its
reading of these texts.50 She calls attention to the first chapter of Genesis that all of God’s
creation was good, including the human body. God is present through our very humanity and
the body is the instrument for divine presence, the means through which God is actualized in
our lives. The Incarnation reaffirms another Genesis claim that every human body-person is
created in the image of God. Brown Douglas emphasizes that God loves our bodies, all our
bodies. She urges the black community to remember that black bodies are not an affront to
God but the means by which black persons enter into loving relationship with each other and
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with God. She looks to the ministry of Jesus, which was partial to justice and the victims of
all oppressions, to justify her goals of tolerance and inclusion. Brown Douglas contends that
if the black Church really chooses Jesus as the center of its life and faith then it must also
choose a way of being in the world that includes an appreciation for the sanctity of human
sexuality and an acknowledgement and acceptance of the rich sexual diversity in the black
community.

III.

WOMANIST PARADIGM
This chapter has teased out examples of how womanist theologians analyze black

female identity from the perspective of black women themselves. This analysis recognizes a
unique identity for black women formed within the multilayered oppressions they have
collectively experienced. This identity is not monolithic as black women experience and
respond to these challenges differently. Markers of class and sexuality as well as others
create diversity within the African American female community. However, womanist
method embraces the claim that a unique theological perspective follows from the unique
experiences that result from black female identity. Womanists identify and learn the stories
of oppressed black women and witness to both their abuse and degradation as well as their
power and hope. Womanist theology explores the exploitation of black women in this
country, but sees how this difficult history has taught them to defy identity categories that
aim to define what a person can and cannot do. Black women are more than what our society
defines them as. Their own stories reveal a counter-discourse about their identity and the
power structures that affect this identity.
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Many womanists claim that what they offer is not just a unique perspective but a new
epistemology that creates a new paradigm for doing theology. Ideas have bodies and these
bodies affect ideas. Womanists claim that truth has been reified within ideological
formulations that keep white supremacist heteropatriarchy intact and continue the
marginalization of black women.51 Womanist theologians such as Delores Williams
challenge all theologians to consider how their bodily identity affects their theology.
Williams contends that a theology’s focus is often the result of whom the theologian
identifies with in biblical texts. She suggests that all theologians engage in a womanist
hermeneutic of identification-ascertainment in order to discover with whom and with what
events they personally identify.52 This will be the result of the theologian’s individual faith
journey and communal influences. She maintains that mainstream white male theologians
too often just identify with the patriarchs, that white feminist theologians are too often just
concerned with patriarchy, and that black male theologians identify too thoroughly with
Israel’s election. She suggests that because of their historical experience in this country,
African American woman see the oppressed of the oppressed in the biblical stories and
identify with them.
Williams posits that the unique identity and therefore perspective of the theologian
creates different ways of addressing theological themes. She challenges liberation theology
to expand its theological focus from a too narrow concentration on liberation themes to
include survival themes. Womanist theology’s identification with the oppressed of the
oppressed brings to light the reality that the oppressed do not always experience bodily
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liberation in the biblical stories or real life.53 It is still important theological work to reflect
on survival issues since oppressed communities must have tools to survive within the
oppression they fight to eliminate. Womanists consider what it means for the oppressed to
believe in a God that not only liberates but leaves some in bondage. The gift of revelation is
sometimes hope and survival tools. Williams claims that this recognition is a challenge to
black theology and its exclusive focus on liberation.54
Williams argues that the womanist method of identifying with the oppressed of the
oppressed in real life, in the form of black women and their experiences of surrogacy, also
raises serious questions about how Christians are taught to think about redemption through
the image of Jesus on the cross. As a surrogate for sinful humanity, Jesus on the cross seems
to redeem humans by enduring torture and death at the hands of cruel, imperialistic,
patriarchal power.55 God’s “love” is therefore manifested in the death of God’s innocent
child. Williams finds this problematic for two reasons. First, it bestows on surrogacy an
aura of the sacred and may encourage black women to also view their suffering as sacred, as
part of God’s divine plan. Williams contends that as Christians, black women cannot forget
53
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the cross, but neither can they glorify it for to do so is to glorify suffering, and to render their
exploitation sacred and to glorify the sin of defilement. For Williams, the image of Jesus on
the cross is the image of human sin in its most desecrated form. It should remind us of the
ongoing reality of oppressive systems that continue to attack, mock, and destroy human
bodies. The existence of this sin and its manifestation in systems of oppression such as
sexism, racism, classism, and heterosexism cannot bring about redemption.
Not all womanists agree with Williams’ theology of redemption, but many would
agree with her claim that redemption and the ushering in of the kingdom of God comes about
through the righting of relationships. William contends that if we focus on Jesus’ life we see
that righting relationships was core to his person and ministry. In this theology, the cross
becomes a reminder of how humans have tried throughout history to destroy visions of
righting relationships. Womanists claim that the wholeness that Jesus preached includes a
new vision for both individual identity and interpersonal relationships. This process often
involves the transformation of tradition and social relations sanctioned by the status quo and
its power dynamics. Williams interprets Jesus’ work as helping people exchange their old
identities based on inherited cultural meanings for new identities shaped by his gospel ethics
and worldview. Womanists call on Christians to embark on a similar personal and
communal transformation from identities based on patriarchal, racist, and heterosexist
meanings to those that embrace equality and inclusion.

IV.

CONSTRUCTION AND EXPRESSION
Womanist theology contributes important insights to theologizing about the body in

its sexed/gendered and raced reality. Womanists call attention to the fact that all bodies are
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always sexed/gendered and raced at the same time so both identity markers must be
considered in theological discourse. The intersection of these identity categories creates
different and unique identities and realities. Womanist theology also recognizes that identity
markers beyond sex/gender and race affect the lives of body-persons. It advocates movement
away from narrow or essentialized definitions of black and/or female subjectivity, including
black female subjectivity. Womanist consideration of black women’s historical experience
recognizes the influence of class and sexuality on black female identity that sets them apart
as a group as well as creates diversity within the group. These insights advocate an approach
to the body that recognizes that the identity of body-persons is greatly affected by how
sex/gender and race intersect in their lives as well as how these two intersect with a plethora
of other identity markers that create unique individual identities. Womanist theology urges
theological discourse about the body to balance consideration of the social construction of
identity with the unique expression of identity at both the communal and individual levels.
Womanist approaches to the body balance the fact that historical and societal
experiences and language construct our identity and the equally important fact that we are
always capable of both embracing and contesting these constructions. Our bodies include
both the construction of group identity as well as counter-discourses to this construction and
the life stories that individualize identity. Womanists recognize that white supremacy has
authored language that has defined black female identity for general consumption. But
female black bodies have a language of their own.56 Womanist theologians regard this
attention to the discourses of specific communities and individuals as integral to the
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theological enterprise. Rosemarie Harding writes, “Religion is not simply a doctrine of faith
or the methods and practices of church, rather it is all the ways we remind ourselves of who
we really are, in spite of who the temporal powers may say we are. Religion is how we
situate ourselves, how we understand ourselves, in a particular place and time vis-à-vis
ultimate reality, vis-à-vis God.”57
Just as in the previous explorations of sex/gender and race, womanist theologians use
construction as a useful though limited conceptual tool for exploring and understanding the
unique identity and reality of African American women by teasing out the various aspects of
identity that black women experience. Construction can be a limited tool because if often
does not attend to the counter-discourses of historically oppressed communities since these
discourses are rarely known outside of the community.58 Emilie Towns contends that the
images of black life from beyond black life usually keep black people as objects not as
subjects with complex identities and realities.59 Womanist consideration of history includes
both what those outside of the black female community have said about black female identity
and what they have said about themselves to each other. Central to the womanist approach
to black female identity is the fact that black women are and always have been more than the
constructs of white supremacy have portrayed them to be. Womanist discourse brings to
light the forces against black women and their own counter-discourse based on their culture,
language, and self-knowledge. Women of African descent have unique experiences and a
narrative about it that is uniquely their own. It is “a narrative of their persistent effort to rise
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above and beyond those persons and situations, which attempt to hold them down.”60 It is a
narrative that helps black women know themselves and how they came to be. It is a narrative
that is crafted within African American female culture. Womanists utilize this narrative with
the assumption that these women have intimate knowledge of the matrixes of power that
structure their lives.61
Womanists look to anecdotal evidence to speak the truth of the private lives of black
women and liberate and utilize the power of this knowledge. They look to ordinary people’s
reflection on their experiences of gender, race, class, and sexual oppression.62 Womanism is
based on the right of self-naming and a central tenet of its methodology. Black female
scholars of religion claimed the power of naming and called themselves womanists, knowing
that changing names can change minds. The power of self-naming reflects that each person
is a moral agent and a potential agent of change. Through the stories of the oppressed we
learn of their power and agency and our worldview changes. These stories are not just
communal stories but individual stories. By approaching the body in its totality, womanism
recognizes that each body-person is unique. They seek out and call forth the whole selfexpression of individual persons.63
Womanist scholarship claims a respect for individuality and the space each individual
needs to know the self. As individual creations with the stamp of the imago Dei, each person
60
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has their own expression of self and revelations of the divine to bring forth into the world.
Katie Cannon argues that womanists, and all theologians really, must bring the specificities
of their autobiographical context into play because our contextual lens affects our theology.
In other words, we must all tell our stories. These stories include our familiar narratives and
our communal practices. This self-reflection must include who we are and who we are
becoming. Life can only be accessed through individual persons. Womanists maintain that
only in knowing the person’s story can you know their understanding of black female
identity and therefore their rendering of womanist scholarship.
The community self-named as womanist is not a homogeneous group and its
narratives are not monolithic. Womanism recognizes that individuals make up communities
and they do not lose this individuality by being part of a group. Womanist scholarship
endeavors to negotiate and balance communal identity, which is both historical constructions
and their contestation, with individual identity, which is the unique reality of each black
woman. Although all black women live in the intersection of black race and female
sex/gender, the influences of class, sexuality, age, and religion on identity result in diverse
experiences and form unique persons. Womanism needs this diversity and expansiveness to
address the many challenges black women face both in the wider world and within the
community of womanists themselves. Womanists challenge each other to value the multiple
voices, cultures, and experiences of black women. It is not an easy challenge to embrace
diversity within community, but womanists believe it is true to their heritage and necessary
for their future to do so.64

64
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This attention to individuality does not lead womanists to embrace relativity and the
ultimate isolation of persons from each other. Womanist discourse reveals that attending to
individuality does not preclude community. Although different aspects of human identity
fragment communal identity into different experiences and realities, womanist scholarship
teaches that persons are always connected in their sharing of certain intersections of identity
categories. We are connected to others through the very uniqueness of our identity and the
aspects of it we share with them. Jacquelyn Grant argues that in all dynamics of oppression,
black women share in the reality of a broader community. They share race suffering with
black men; with white women and other Third World women they are victims of sexism; and
with poor blacks and whites, and other Third World peoples, especially women, they are
disproportionately poor. Therefore, in doing their theology, womanists in their concern for
the concrete lives of black women are also concerned with broader issues. Grant presents the
experience of a black woman as both unique and connected with others. She claims that “it
is in the context of black women’s experience where the particular connects up with the
universal.”65 Grant continues that this belief that the particular can and does connect up with
the universal is central to Christian belief. She writes that with Jesus Christ there was an
implied universality which made him identify with others—the poor, the woman, the
stranger. Emilie Townes echoes these sentiments when she writes, “It is in exploring these
spiritually based experience and to allow space for the problematizing of womanist theories so as to
acknowledge, differentiate, and reclaim the diverse faith journeys and spiritual influences in the lives of African
American women. In Deeper Shades of Purple, 43. In “Hospitality, Haints, and Healing,” Rosemarie Freeney
Harding writes that an openness to and acceptance of the diversity of God’s witness in the world is a legacy of
the wisdom brought from Africa. She writes, “Indigenous African religions are known for the inclusivity of
their worldview—most tend to find ways to absorb and adapt new traditions (even those of conquered and
conquering peoples) into a fundamentally accepting and essentially flexible whole.” In Deeper Shades of
Purple, 113.
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depths, in taking seriously my particularity—not as a form of essentialism, but as
epistemology—that I can meet and greet others because we are intricately and intimately
interwoven in our postmodern culture.”66 Womanism celebrates community that finds
common ground not sameness, and builds solidarity within diversity.

V.

CONCLUSION
Womanism attends to a “specific” community, namely black women, but offers its

work as a platform and starting point for the liberation of all to wholeness and right
relationships. Diana Hayes hopes that, in time, womanist would be adopted by all women as,
unlike feminism, from its beginnings it has been a theology that attempts to deal holistically
with issues of race, class, and gender (including sexual orientation).67 The womanist tenet of
critical engagement proclaims the inclusiveness of womanism for black women of different
religions and life situations. In addition, it proposes that womanist discourse is a thought
process “from which other critical discourses might glean directives for doing thoroughgoing
research and analysis ‘that seeks to discover and tell what is true.’”68 It is in this spirit that I
have explored womanist theology. Womanism advocates a method based on the belief that
to bring about a future inclusive and representative of all, theologians must attend to the
actual experiences of diverse persons. These experiences will help us redefine what it means
to be male and female or black and white or any other combination of identity markers
because they are the stories of how people live these identities. The following chapter on the
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body as symbol embraces an approach to the body that balances the social construction of
identity with the discourses of the oppressed and individual expressions of self.
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And the Word became flesh and lived among us…full of grace and truth.
Jn 1:14

CHAPTER 5: THE BODY AS SYMBOL

I.

INTRODUCTION
At the heart of this dissertation is the belief that the human person cannot be or be

known apart from their body. We are body-persons. Our coming to be is a materialization.
Theology needs to consider not only the process of materialization but our materiality as
well, including its sexed/gendered and raced aspects. What the previous investigations into
sex/gender and race and their interconnection in womanism reveal is that theology must
balance two aspects of materiality in any consideration of the body. Theologians must
explore what bodies mean in their specific context as well as investigate bodies as the reality
of specific body-persons. The purpose of this chapter is to propose a theological approach to
the body as symbol that builds on the discourses concerning sex/gender and race from the
previous chapters as well as applications of symbol to the body in theological and other
intellectual disciplines.
The first aspect of materiality that is important for theological analysis of the bodyperson is the impact of its context on the meaning of the body. I use construction as an
organizing concept to present different approaches to contemporary meanings of sex/gender
and race. Using construction as an organizing principle reveals how both discourses explore
the extent to which language and narratives establish norms and regulations by which we
know and are our bodies, how history defines and influences bodily identity, and how
changing times change bodies. Investigations of sex/gender and race that use construction as
an organizing principle are helpful for several reasons. They reveal the range of descriptions
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of sex/gender and race that exist simultaneously in theological and theoretical discourses as
well as their application to life and living. They present the diversity of opinion that exists
about these identity categories without deeming one correct and the others wrong. By
reviewing the multivalent reality of sex/gender and race, these investigations into sex/gender
and race invite theologians to chart their own theories of these identity categories.1
Specific investigations of theories of sex/gender and race are important for
theologians but they are not enough. Isolating sex/gender and race is a good first step to
seriously addressing them but theology must recognize and contend with the fact that all
people live both at the same time. Womanist theology is a theological discourse that
specifically explores this aspect of human living. Womanist theology utilizes the concept of
construction in its investigations of the experience of black women. Womanist theologians
explore how historical events and the narratives and mythology that followed from these
events construct black womanhood in this country. They explore how the intersection of
different bodily constructions influences each construction. In addition, womanist
theologians offer two other important insights for any theological analysis of bodily identity.
First, womanists point out that the constructions explored in most academic discourses are
those developed and known by those with power in our society. Womanists call upon
theologians to also attend to the counter-discourses developed by those who traditionally
have had no power in society or academia. Black womanhood means different things to
those who have traditionally oppressed black women as opposed to black women themselves.
Second, womanist theologians recognize that black womanhood is not a monolithic
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I recognize that it is difficult for some theologians to embrace the idea of construction as a reality. For them, a
constructed sex/gender or race is an illusion. It is my intention to propose construction not as the answer for
thinking about sex/gender or race but as an organizing concept around which to have discussion about these
identity categories.
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categorization. Womanist discourse addresses issues of class and sexuality that have affected
black female identity as well as differentiated black women from each other. Because it
begins with the complexity of human identity for any group as well as person, womanist
analysis moves out from race and sex/gender to consider other important identity markers.
As a result, womanist scholarship teaches theologians to attend to the individual as well as
the constructed group.
Womanist theology highlights a second aspect of materiality that is important for
theological analysis of the body-person, namely, that each body is the specific reality of a
unique individual body-person. Theology must recognize that persons choose how to
understand the constructs of sex/gender and race and their intersection, and speak and live
from this perspective. There are many different frameworks, discourses, and iterations of
identity, some of which have never been brought into mainstream discussion because of the
social location of those who embrace the standpoint. Theology must invite and explore
various communal narratives about identity, but it must also recognize that individuals may
be more diverse than the community identity by which they are known.2 The unique
individual at the heart of Christian theology must be included and recognized in theological
discourse about the body.
Approaching the body as symbol achieves the balance of the body as construction and
the body as individual expression that is needed for better consideration of sex/gender and
race in theological discourse. The body as symbol embraces both the body as a symbol of its
context, including the language and history of this context, and as a symbol of the individual
who is the body, including the person’s expression of their context and of their uniqueness.

2

These community identities would include the definition of a person as “woman,” “man,” “African
American,” “black woman,” “Caucasian,” etc.
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The body as symbol learns from and builds on ideas running through the previous chapters
on sex/gender, race, and womanism. First, it includes the idea that socio-cultural and sociohistorical contexts and their discourses are articulated and made visible in the materiality we
call race and sex/gender. Second, it allows for the reality that the meanings of bodies are
always shifting and changing. The constructions of bodies are not static. Because bodies
include individual articulations of identity constructions as well as the unique utterance of the
individuality of the body-person, race and sex/gender as such are continually being
reconstituted. Sex/gender and race have ambiguous meanings since there are so many people
articulating the materiality that is these identity categories. Third, the body as symbol
incorporates the tension and interconnection between individual identity and communal life,
which is central to human identity and theology, especially liberation discourses.
The concept of symbol embraces the insights revealed in the previous investigations
of theories of sex/gender and race, namely that material symbols reflect their context and
express mystery. The concept of symbol has a long history in theological discourse and has
been used by theologians to describe the body. There is also precedent in other intellectual
disciplines for thinking of the body in this way. An investigation of Karl Rahner’s
presentation of the body as symbol explores the body as expression, while analyses of the
body as symbol in philosophy, anthropology, and sociology promote understanding of the
construction of the body in and by social discourse. Each provides a corrective to the other
and in their balance is a good approach to the body as symbol. Balancing insights from
theology and other disciplines produces a good tool for a theological consideration of human
materiality that properly addresses sex/gender and race. This approach investigates the body
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as construction, reflecting its social location, and the body as expression, reflecting its unique
expression of its context and its self.

II.

SYMBOL
With the concept of symbol, theology already has a tool to reflect on the two aspects

of materiality highlighted by the previous investigations of sex/gender and race.3 The
concept of symbol applied to the body invites reflection on how its context impacts the
meaning of any body and how the body reveals the unique individual it is. The concept of
symbol addresses how materiality makes immaterial concepts and realities present. Although
the concept of symbol is prevalent in theological discourse, any attempt to give one universal
definition of symbol is almost impossible because of the many understandings of what
symbols are and how they function. This ambiguity is what makes symbol such a good tool,
because it invites discussion about bodily materiality and how and what it symbolizes. My
argument that human beings embody and live as symbols relies on certain aspects of the
word and concept of symbol, which are specifically helpful for thinking about the body in its
sexed/gendered and raced reality.
The word “symbol” itself can be traced to the Greek συµβάλλειν (symballein), which
means to throw together or place together. In its basic etymology, the word indicates one
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thing, usually material and visible, bringing to mind or representing something else, usually
immaterial and unseen. This idea of symbol has been used throughout Christian history to
think about the mystery that materiality makes accessible to us. The materiality of the body
makes present and accessible the very concepts of sex/gender and race and the person who is
the body. The body is the symbol of these identity concepts and the individual person. In its
visibility, the body triggers a huge vocabulary and diverse language about the meanings we
give to sex/gender and race. The body simultaneously symbolizes linguistically by evoking
historical meanings of sex/gender and race and nonlinguistically by its color, shape,
movement, gestures, clothing, and so on. The Greek root of symbol can also mean to
compare. Any body we encounter is compared with our preconceived ideas about sex/gender
and race. We want to determine if that body complies with or diverges from these
assumptive interpretations of sex/gender or race.
In its original Greek form (symballein), symbols were understood to indicate more
than one meaning, “thrown together” in such a way that one meaning implies or entails
others.4 Because of their open nature, symbols can be explained in many and sometimes
contradictory ways. A proper appreciation of symbols must embrace their overload in
meaning. They invite exploration and speculation. This multivalent character of symbol can
attend to both the complexity and diversity of persons and the complexity and diversity of the
very notions of sex/gender and race. Human persons are each unique, diverse, social,
oppressed and/or oppressing, agents of change, as well as a combination of many identity
markers. In addition, race and sex/gender also exist in multiple ways and are variously
interpreted in theology, theory, and specific societies. These explanations sometimes overlap
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and sometimes contradict each other but all are present in the broad concepts of sex/gender
and race and the bodies that symbolize them.
Symbols are contextual; in other words, the meaning and very existence of symbols
depend on their context.5 Symbols communicate to the members of particular cultural or
religious groups who have been taught their proper interpretation through the process of
socialization to the group. Symbols function as part of larger social systems and cannot be
fully understood in isolation. When it comes to the body, we are all socialized into certain
understandings of what particular bodies are and mean and what they can do. The identity of
any body-person is initially established by bringing together the individual body in question
with the concepts of sex/gender and race that are relevant to the context in which we
encounter them. To have a fuller appreciation of the body as a symbol of its social context,
interpreters must pay attention to and know the language and history of this context,
including its notions of sex/gender and race and how these have shifted over time. The body
as symbol is also communicating its own self-understanding. This meaning may align with
accepted rules of sex/gender and race or may be a counter-discourse to dominant theories. In
addition, an interpreter’s own perspective about sex/gender and race will influence the
meaning assigned to any body they encounter or investigate.
Catholic theology embraces the idea that materiality can and does reveal mystery
within the context of its time and space. The Incarnation and the Eucharist bring believers
into direct contact with God in specific places and times and do so through the thought and
language of these contexts. Just as theologians and Church leaders must reflect on how
different cultures embrace alternative liturgical and theological symbols, theological
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Some suggest that the similarities of certain symbols around the world have their origin in a common
psychological unconscious shared by all human beings.
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anthropology must also wrestle with various notions of sex/gender and race, as well as other
concepts of human identity. Christian revelation is historical and interpersonal as are the
symbols that make it present, including the body.
Another use of the original Greek term for symbol, symbolon, refers to the comparing
or setting together of two things for the purpose of identification. This harkens back to the
custom of bringing together the two halves of a broken object, called “symbols,” in order to
establish the identity of one or both of the persons possessing the matching halves.6 More
generally, the term symbolon could be applied to whatever signified a means of recognition
or identification. The Christian Church has employed this idea of symbol. In the Patristic
era, the liturgical creeds pronounced by candidates at the time of baptism were called
symbols.7 By professing their belief in formulas that began with “I believe” and inferred “we
believe,” the candidate was recognized as acceptable for baptism and incorporation into the
community. By uttering the Church’s profession of faith, the person was set aside once and
for all as a Christian and accepted into the community of faith. This personal expression of
the words that formed the community changed the identity of the individual.
The use of the idea of symbol as a token of identity is an important aspect of my
application of it to bodies. Bodies establish individual and communal identity. Each body
symbolizes the unique individual who it is as well as the meaning(s) assigned to bodily
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distinctive doctrinal characteristics of church bodies is called symbolics.
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categories such as sex/gender and race, which group bodies into distinct identity subsets.
Being able to identify persons, discerning how to feel about them, and thereby knowing how
to act toward them is an important part of everyday living. Recognition and identification are
crucial purposes of the body. Race and sex/gender serve important roles in this process of
identification and reaction. They can trigger feelings of belonging and acceptability or
rejection. These identifying categories may connect people cross-culturally as well as allow
people to live more specific cultural lives. In this way the body allows us to be open to
others while still forming communal loyalties.8
The concept of symbol itself allows for different opinions about how symbols
symbolize. The question is to what degree is a symbol the thing it is symbolizing and to
what degree is it not. This question also entails discussion about what it means that one thing
is or represents something else. The history of Christianity’s use of symbols has witnessed
periods of belief in a real affinity or correspondence between the visible sign and the
invisible truth and periods of iconoclasm when there was the need to distinguish reverence
for symbols and their worship.9 This “is” vs. “is not” debate can be translated as nature vs.
convention when it comes to bodies. Questions about nature and convention invite
8
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speculation about how materiality symbolizes and what it symbolizes. The body as symbol
asks the question of whether the body is uttering ahistorical and ontological realities and
materializing something natural and innate about human identity, or merely pointing to and
making present identity constructions based on how certain characteristics of the body have
been historically or conventionally associated with particular personality and capability traits
by specific social contexts.10 Today the “natural” status of sex/gender and race is being
challenged or has been eradicated. Theological discussion of the body must address what
happens if we change the register of a description from natural, ontological, or ahistorical to
one that is established by convention or power dynamics. The usefulness of the idea of
symbol in theological discourse about the body includes its invitation to conversation about
understandings of ontology, how being materializes, what it embodies, and the role of human
agency in changing any of these.
Thinking of the body as symbol invites critiques of the meanings assigned to the body
because all symbols must be investigated and questioned. While we are aware that symbols
shape our lives, at the same time, we question the meaning and intent of social, political, and
economic symbols, all of which are expressed by the body. We must investigate symbols not
only to more fully understand them, but also to judge whether those symbols lead us toward
the transformation of society for good or toward ill. Human history has witnessed the
expansive use and abuse of symbolic images. Within this conversation about the body as
symbol, interlocutors must remember that symbols elicit not only intellectual responses but
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Some argue that characteristics of specific sexes/genders and races have been tied to “natural” modes of being
and therefore explained as ontological descriptions. For example, there have been and are many theories and
explanations of women’s reproductive capacities. The female sex and its corresponding feminine gender have
been described as more nurturing and the roles assigned to them often in the capacity of caregiver because some
women can birth and nurse children. Africans were thought to be less human because they enacted different
modes of religion and living than the Europeans who described them in this way.
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emotional reactions as well, because symbols are deeply embedded in human living and the
meaning we attach to it. Debate about the materiality of the body is often difficult because of
the emotional connection people have to the meaning they gain from and give to bodies.
The fit of symbol for my approach to the body is evident in the fact that human
beings are body-persons; they are both at the same time physical matter and mysteriously
more than that. Bodies are powerful symbols because they can bear more than one meaning
and evoke a gamut of ideas and responses. Christian theology maintains that human persons
are the imago Dei and therefore the body symbolizes both human and divine mystery.
Neither is exhaustibly expressed in the body, yet neither can be revealed without the body. It
is through the body as symbol that we attain knowledge of the mystery of the human and the
divine that expresses itself in it. Yet at the same time that the body as symbol plunges us into
the mystery of being, it also reveals aspects of human history and determines everyday
actions and policy. The body-person achieves meaning in their context and expresses the
mystery of the individual who is more than just this context. The immaterial something that
is made material in the body is both the constructs of sex/gender and race and the expression
of the individuality of the body-person. The body is construction and expression at all times.

III.

THE BODY AS SYMBOL
The concept of symbol has been used in theology to reflect on the body. Karl

Rahner’s ideas about the body in particular are helpful for theological discourse about
sex/gender and race. Rahner demonstrates how discourse about the body flows from the
central questions of theology and is inherent in them. His theology of symbol argues that
expression is essential to being and the body as symbol is first and foremost the self-
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expression of the individual. Rahner’s emphasis on expression serves as a needed corrective
to discourse about the body that focuses almost exclusively on the group identity of the
person and loses sight of the unique individual that the body-person is. However, Rahner’s
theology also needs the corrective of discourses that understand the body as a symbol of its
context since his approach does not address the specificity of the body to which the
categories of sex/gender and race point. The juxtaposition of Rahner’s theology of symbol
with other theories of the body as symbol creates the balance of the body as expression and
the body as construction that is needed to have better theological discourse about sex/gender
and race as identity concepts and about the whole body in all its specificities. The body as
symbol expresses the mystery of the body-person that it reveals as well as the construction of
materiality that informs and is informed by this mystery.

The Body as Expression
Symbol is central to the theology of Karl Rahner. He wrote that “the concept of
symbol is an essential key concept in all theological treatises, without which it is impossible
to have a correct understanding of the subject-matter of the various treatises in themselves
and in relation to other treatises.”11 Rahner explains that a real theology of the symbol is
based on the fundamental truth of Christianity, namely that God enunciates God’s self to the
world through the incarnate Logos. He uses symbol to explain his theology of the Trinity
and the Incarnation as well as his theological anthropology that claims that the body is the
symbolic reality of the human person.
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Rahner admits that the word “symbol” has no clear and definite meaning in every
instance and that the very concept of symbol is much more obscure, difficult and ambiguous
than is usually thought. Symbol for Rahner is the highest and most primordial manner in
which one reality renders another present. Rahner argues that the symbol is not something
separate from the symbolized. The symbol contains the reality it represents and allows the
other to really be there. He writes, “the symbol is the reality, constituted by the thing
symbolized as an inner moment of itself, which reveals and proclaims the thing symbolized,
and is itself full of the thing symbolized, being its concrete form of existence.”12 For Rahner,
the symbol represents primarily for the thing symbolized itself and only secondarily for
others.
Rahner’s basic principle in his ontology of symbolism is that all beings are by their
nature symbolic, because they necessarily “express” themselves in order to attain their own
nature. He posits that all being must express itself. Being achieves its expression through
forming something distinct from itself yet one with itself. This expression is a symbol of the
being. Beings cannot fully express themselves all at one time so they are multiple in their
expression. These plural moments have an inner agreement among themselves on account of
the unity of the being.13 In its multiplicity, being sees “the other,” a derivative of its unity,
which expresses its unity. In the recognition of the whole in each part or expression, the
being is made present to itself and finds itself in knowledge and love. Therefore, Rahner
explains the expression or symbol of the being as its self-realization. The being needs this
“other,” this expression, to be present and to be known by itself and by others. Without the
symbol the being cannot be known at all.
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The Trinity is the constant background of Rahner’s ontological considerations of
symbol.14 Rahner argues that communication is intrinsic to God as God is in God’s self and
symbol is central to his explanation of this communication. God the Father, in order to attain
[his] proper nature, expresses self and possesses self in the other. The other is the Father’s
self-expression and therefore shares the Father’s be-ing. This other is the Logos, the second
person of the Trinity. The Logos is the perfect symbol of the Father. What is communicated
within the Godhead is the essence of God. This divine essence is communicated in three
manners, since expression of being is multiple. The Father as the unoriginate mediates self
to self. The Son is the one who is in truth uttered for self, and the Spirit is the one who is
received and accepted in love for self. This communication is the divine act of selfpossession in knowledge and love. Here is the perfection of unity in multiplicity that Rahner
understands as the ground of all being. This is Rahner’s first proposition about symbol; that
through symbols we express self and therefore possess self. We communicate first of all for
ourselves.
Secondarily, symbols allow beings to be known by others. This idea is also rooted in
Rahner’s Trinitarian theology. He argues that because God must express God’s self inwardly
in order to possess self in the other and therefore attain God’s own nature, there is potential
and capacity for God to be known outwardly and by others. God is known outwardly by the
same “other” by which God possesses God’s self, namely the Word. The content of God’s
communication is God’s self. God is the giver and gift of the communication itself. Rahner
maintains that how God is with us in and through this self-communication is how God is in
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God’s self because it is God’s self-communication.15 For Rahner, this self-communication of
God is a real ontological communication which gives real knowledge and therefore implies
real relation to what is known. That is why his basic Trinitarian axiom is that the
“economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic”
Trinity.16 The relationship that Jesus Christ revealed to us through the historic event of the
Incarnation reveals the real relation of the Father and Son as they are in God. Rahner
contends that God has made God’s self known as triune, a unity and multiplicity that is at the
heart of his understanding of symbol.
Rahner contends that in the same way as Trinitarian belief is best understood through
a theology of symbol so are Christological tenets. Because being expresses itself, the Word
must also express self in “the other.” This other is the humanity of Jesus Christ, which
shares the be-ing of the Logos. Jesus’ humanity is the symbol of the Logos, the second
person of the Trinity, and as the symbolic reality of the Logos, the self-disclosure of the
Logos. Rahner maintains that each person of the Trinity communicates self according to
their personal peculiarity, that is, according to and in virtue of their mutual relations.17 Since
only the Logos became human, we must believe that only the Son, in [his] peculiarity as Son,
could become incarnate.18 Only then could the mission of the Son tell us anything about the
Logos. In this human symbol, the concrete symbol of the Logos, God is expressed and is
known by the world. The fact that the second person of the Trinity expresses self in created
reality has consequences for all created reality. Rahner argues that we know human being in
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reference to divine self-communication because there is continuity between God and
humanity through grace.
Rahner’s theological reflection on being, both divine and human, is based on the
notion of the fundamental knowability of being because being is expressive. The central
symbol by which human beings are known is the body. The human being expresses self as
the body and through the body. Only through its self-expression in the body can the person
acquire self-knowledge and achieve self-fulfillment. In addition, it is only through the body
that the person can make themselves known to others. Therefore, Rahner defines the body as
the symbolic reality of the human being. In Rahner’s theology, to say that the body is the
symbol of the soul means that the soul renders itself present in the body. The soul
determines the body by expressing itself in it. The body becomes the actuality and reality of
the soul, its concrete form of existence. Therefore we can talk about corporeality as the
symbol of the unity of the person, which is self-communicated in the body. The person
speaks of self as one self-knowing whole which evokes the unity of one’s being. One only
knows the self in the body.
Rahner’s claim that “the body is the symbol of the soul, in as much as it is formed as
the self-realization of the soul,”19 reflects several important considerations for my own
project. First, the body is the person in that there is no separation between the soul and body.
Rahner writes that reality and its appearance in the flesh are for ever one in Christianity,
inconfused and inseparable.20 Therefore, Rahner argues that Christian theologians cannot
separate the reality of the person from their materiality in the body for the highest knowledge
of the spirit is corporeal. According to his theology, people come to be and know themselves
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only in their corporeality. This recognition of the importance of corporeality for human
living and being is at the heart of my project. There is no person without the body and
sex/gender and race are important aspects of the body and so must be seriously considered in
theological discourse.
Second, I agree with Rahner’s ontological assumption that being is expressive. By
understanding communication as intrinsic to being, we are able to think about the body as
self-expression. In fact, it is only through the body that persons can express themselves,
remembering always that this body is contextualized in time and space as well as through the
categories of sex/gender and race. These categories reflect the fact that human identity is not
simple. Like Rahner, I would argue that human self-expression is multiple even though the
human being is the unity of all these intersecting identity markers. Because human beings
cannot express themselves all at one time, theologians must attend to the many expressions
of the one person, including how sex/gender and race are part of these expressions.
Rahner is again helpful when he states that the body expresses the unity of the person
in different ways in its different parts. He contends that the person is known in each part of
the body, although some are more important than others.21 We certainly see this in how
critical identity aspects are based on specific body parts. For example, sex/gender is based
on genitalia and race is based on skin color. Other body parts do not matter as much, i.e., eye
color, hand size, or belly-button configuration. Rahner contends that differences clearly exist
in the various “parts” of the body with regard to their power of expression, their degree of
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belonging to the soul, their openness of the soul.22 For my purposes this can translate to the
whole person expressing self in their sex/gender or race at one time and then the other at
another time or a unique combination of the two at still other instances. This helps
understand the critique of womanists that feminists are not always in solidarity with other
women of color but sometimes more in community with white men based on their race. In
each case, the woman in question is expressing herself. Each aspect of the body contributes
its part to the whole of the symbol and all must be considered in theological reflection on
body-persons. 23
Another important contribution Rahner makes to thinking about the body as symbol is
his reflection on the uniqueness of the body-person. Each body is unique and particular
because it reflects and expresses the uniqueness of the person in and through it. The body is
not merely flesh that all humans share but the real symbol of the unique person. The
relationship of the person with their body is not arbitrary but true to them. Rahner writes,
“one cannot give another body to a spiritual soul; not only would it express itself differently,
but it would itself become other or else transform the body into which it was forced into its
body.”24 This body is symbolic of this soul. It is the person’s self-proclamation. What they
are saying in and through the symbol of their body is something real and true about
themselves.
Finally, I agree with Rahner that the body as symbol is the means by which the
person is known by self and by others. His theology of symbol posits that the being posses
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self in knowledge and love in the plurality they create in their symbol. For my project, this
means that how one expresses one’s body in terms of sex/gender and race is how one knows
one’s self. A person’s race and/or sex/gender may be a real symbol for them, the means by
which they realize themselves. This may be different for another person who may not know
or express self through the same particular categories. One must be attentive to how each
person is expressing their body in terms of their race and sex/gender to themselves in order to
know and understand how the body is communicating this individual to the outside world.
Rahner concludes that persons do not have a symbolic quality; they are symbols.
Rahner’s importance for theologizing about the body is his emphasis on the body as
an expressive symbol of the unique human person. The person known and knowing self
through the symbol of the body is a singular creation of God. Rahner’s ideas about symbol
allows for a pluralism of identity since each body as symbol reflects the unique individual it
is. This approach to the body as expression needs to be balanced with a strong historical
consciousness and social understanding of human existence in terms of the body. Rahner is
somewhat aware of determinants that affect the body and therefore the person known by it as
their self-expression. He posits that although the body does not have any positive content
prior to the reality of the soul, it may be influenced by prior determinations of matter. These
prior determinations of the body affect how the body-person can and does know themselves
and therefore how they are known by others through the symbol of their bodies. For my
proposal, the determinations of what certain aspects of the body such as race or sex/gender
mean would influence the body of the individual person and therefore the reality of the
person known in the sexed/gendered and raced body. These prior determinations may shift
but at this time in our society certain aspects of the body matter more than others and two of
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which matter most are one’s classification as male or female and white or person of color.
Rahner’s insight that the soul determines the body by expressing itself in it must be balanced
with the idea that the body also determines the soul by being the medium through which it
expresses itself. I posit that this balance can be achieved by incorporating into theological
reflection on the body an appreciation and consideration of social context and its construction
of bodies.

The Body as Construction
A corrective for the previous theological approach to the body as symbol in the work
of Karl Rahner and in much of traditional theology is to balance its insight that the body in
general as human materiality expresses the individual soul with an approach to the body as
symbol in other disciplines that considers the body specifically as a product and reflection of
its particular context. This section explores how other disciplines speak about the body as
symbol with an emphasis on its constructedness within its particular societal context. In this
section, I focus on how the body-person is a symbol of the society that forms it. I use Fiona
Bowie’s work The Anthropology of Religion as a guide to ideas about the body as symbol in
philosophy, sociology, and anthropology.25 As with theology, symbol in other social
sciences is a varied concept with diverse meanings. Bowie describes what she understands
as two poles of interpretation in the study of symbols. One pole maintains that there are
intrinsic genetic or psychological mechanisms that generate appropriate symbols. At the
other pole is the doctrine of conventionalism, which contends that symbols and what they
symbolize are arbitrary and based on social agreement. One can borrow from theology the
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insight that there are different emphases in the study of symbols on the “is” and “is not”
aspects of them.
Bowie maintains that when considering the body one must always remember that we
are not talking about biology per se, but rather we are speaking of symbolic classification.
Bodies are classified and regulated according to the markers, such as sex/gender and race,
that are deemed significant by the surrounding culture. The body is a symbol of its context
embodying and reflecting the beliefs of the culture in which one finds it. I focus here on
three ideas about the body as a construct of its social location. First, the body symbolizes its
society; the body and its surrounding culture reflect each other. Second, the body comes to
be and have meaning according to the regulations and control of a particular social context.
Third, the body’s personal expression is related to, influenced by, and an influence on
societal constructions of bodily reality. Throughout this section, I connect these theories of
bodily construction with my previous investigations of sex/gender and race in theology and
theory. I read liberation theologies concerned with sex/gender and race as part of this
corrective to traditional theological anthropology.
To suggest that the body is a symbol of its society in that the body and its surrounding
culture reflect each other has two aspects. First, societies, including religions, take cues from
the body and its functions and create meaning systems based on these. Second, the body
symbolizes society by reflecting its structure and beliefs. These two considerations of the
body create a constant back and forth between materiality and society. The conflation of
cultural rules with the body makes these rules and values appear natural. To explain this
aspect of the body as symbol, Bowie turns to the work of Robert Hertz and Mary Douglas. 26
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Hertz’s work on the concepts of right and left demonstrates how societies have taken the fact
that right-handedness is more dominant and married it to beliefs about religion and gender
role differentiation so that the right has meant good, sacred, creative, life, and male, while the
left has symbolized uncleanliness, profanity, death, weakness, and female.27 The defamation
of the left has limited the capacities of left-handed individuals who were forced to use their
right hand and has thereby been a loss to humanity collectively.
The continual interaction between the embodied individual and the social and natural
world of which the individual is a part is also prevalent in the work of Mary Douglas.28
Douglas contends that even the most lowly and intimate of bodily processes can be given the
most elaborate and metaphysical of interpretations. Douglas’ work stresses the importance
of the body as a symbol system in which social meanings are encoded and in this way how
body-persons are classified in any system. The body exists as a cipher for understanding
social structures because it symbolizes these structures. Douglas’ work on purity reflects
how religious/cultural beliefs are crucial for understanding bodies, classifying them, and
living them. She understands dirt not as a thing-in-itself but as a symbolic category that
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reveals the dualities of order/disorder, being/nonbeing, form/formlessness, and life/death.
Body-persons must be attentive to the purity of their bodies so as not to be classified on the
wrong side of these dualities, which has grave consequences for one’s place and potential in
society.29 These examples expound on the idea that the body-person is a symbol of the
society/culture in which it lives not only as a source of symbolic ideas for the meaning
making of society, but a reflection of this meaning making.
The links between the individual body and cultural forms that define this first aspect
of the body as a symbol of its context are found throughout the previous investigations of
sex/gender and race. Some theologians extrapolate from bodily realities such as
heterosexuality, birth, and infant nursing by the mother and present a “natural” and
ahistorical understanding of sex and/or gender. However, one could also argue that the body
is in fact constructed by these “ahistorical” meanings given to them by theology.
Theologians who treat race as a theological theme call attention to the fact that U.S. society
was built on beliefs that marry skin color to a mythology of color that understands black as
bad and white as good. Skin color is encoded by and reveals the social beliefs of our time as
well as our reactions to them. Our life and living is marked by skin color in black/white
relief.
A second supposition about the construction of bodily materiality is that the bodyperson comes to be and have meaning only according to the norms and regulations of its
social context. Control of how bodies can and should be is the means of regulating society as
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a whole. If bodies are and do what they should, then society will be as it should.30 The
regulation of bodies is the result of socialization and its process of imitation and the exercise
of power through the regulatory norms that define bodies as acceptable or unacceptable.
Michel Foucault’s work explores how societal power creates bodies and continually regulates
them by authoritative monitoring and the restriction of physical movement.31 This approach
to the construction of the body argues that in many ways the formation of the body-person
according to social norms is prior to any act, even imitation. The argument is that we can
only come to be as the embodiment of the regulatory norms of our society. Those not
adhering to this obligatory social conformity are left out of, removed from, or some would
argue do not materialize in the social order.32
This process of bodily construction is not a once and for all event but must continue
throughout life. Bowie investigates the work of anthropologist Judith Okely on boarding
schools to provide an example of this idea of the construction of the body-person by societal
norms and regulations enforced through the constant surveillance of power.33 Bowie
categorizes Okely’s description of her private girls’ boarding school as a “total institution,” a
notion of Erving Goffman for “a place of residence and work where a large number of likesituated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together
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lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life.”34 The goal of the boarding school is
to sculpt the minds and bodies of the students to reflect the understanding of the world
according to the custodians of the institutions. This understanding embraced the wider social
messages of class and gender. Okely describes the achievement of the school as the defeat of
the individual student. The comportment of the body was crucial in this process since bodies
reflect our inner attitudes. Its control was understood as integral to the control of the
person’s thoughts and emotions.35
The interconnection of the social, psychological, and biological is intrinsic to any
understanding of the construction of the body-person and is part of many of the liberation
discourses discussed in previous chapters. Many argue that history and the texts that tell its
tale are told by those with power and for the purpose of perpetuating the social structure that
keeps them in power. Bodies are understood as both a reflection of and the materialization of
society’s controlling discourses concerning sex/gender and race. These discourses are argued
to determine the meaning of bodies, the proper living of life based on these meanings, and
even the production and control of wealth. Victor Anderson addresses this notion of the
regulation of bodies from a different perspective altogether. He questions whether cultural
and racial communities themselves are guilty of regulating and defining bodies in a way that
limits their full potential for personal fulfillment. His argument contends that bodies must be
allowed to express themselves personally and not always collectively.
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This insight about the reality and need of personal expression is also explored in
Bowie’s article when she investigates the idea of personal symbols and the body. This
approach to the body as symbol contends that the body reflects not only the wider society but
also the individual within this society. In the body is located the back and forth between the
personal and the social. Bowie writes that we continually create patterns of meaning out of
both our individual and collective experience; even though individual classifications are less
powerful than those with the weight of collective authority, which in turn are more rigid than
private ones.36 Bowie includes the work of Gananath Obeyesekere as a consideration of the
personal symbolism of the body.37 He argues that personal bodily symbols are optional for
the individual and may fill a psychological need rather than reflect obligatory social
conformity. These symbols are nevertheless recognized by the culture in which the person
lives. Obeyesekere maintains that personal symbols may be missed or misunderstood if one
does not attend to the individual life history of the person who is expressing the symbol and
the meaning they attribute to the symbol. He concludes that the public meaning of a symbol
relates to, but may not be the same as, the genesis and personal meaning of the same symbol.
Here is what I call the personal expression of the social construction of the body.
Any approach to the body as a construction of society and therefore a symbol of it
needs to be balanced by not only the body as an expression of the unique individuality of the
person but also the body as a personal expression of the constructions of society. Expression
must include the idea that the body expresses the constructions that form it, sometimes
uniquely. The body’s personal expression of sex/gender and race is related to, influenced by,
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and an influence on the societal constructions of bodily reality. Therefore, personal symbols
constitute part of the symbolic language of the wider society. Obeyesekere claims that the
need to express personal symbols, or personal variations of culturally acceptable symbols,
may represent a psychological need so deep that the person would suffer if it were not
expressed. He claims that the personal expression is received by society as meaningful and
rational. We must also consider that personal expressions are often not accepted by society
as such. Some expressions are dismissed as silly, false, irrelevant, over reactive, or
unnecessary. The need to express the personal in the body may make the body-person an
anomaly or an outcast.38
This third point that there is always also a personal aspect to the constructedness of
bodies is quite evident in the work of womanist scholars. Womanism focuses on the unique
reality of black women with special attention to their expression of black womanhood.
Womanists emphasize the strong psychological need to express identity in one’s own words
and ways. They recognize that this expression does not erase the social construction of black
womanhood that has defined them and often limited their opportunities in their historical
context in the United States. But their expression of black womanhood serves as a counterdiscourse to this construction. Womanists recognize that black women must study the
history of the construction of black female identity in the United States as well as how that
same identity has been expressed by black women themselves. There is a constant
relationship between public and personal symbols. It is the hope of black women as well as
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other traditionally oppressed groups that as their members are more able to publically voice
their personal or communal expression of public constructions, their counter-discourses will
become part of the language of the wider society and the meaning assigned to their identity
by the wider community will shift.39 Womanists, much like Obeyesekere in his work,
recognize the need to attend to the individual who is making an expression of identity. Their
life story is important in order to properly understand how their body is symbolizing their
identity. This attention to the individual within community must allow for diversity of
expression and perhaps even contradictions of what it means to be a black woman.

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR THEOLOGY
My proposal of the body as symbol as a tool for theological anthropology emerges
from my investigations of theories of sex/gender and race in theology, of their intersection in
womanist work, and of relevant reflection on the body as symbol in theology and other
intellectual disciplines. It is a platform for deeper, more critical theological discussion of
sex/gender and race and through these of the overall complexity of identity for body-persons.
The body as symbol does not define race or sex/gender once and for all, but rather
acknowledges their diversity and multiple realities in our society. It also embraces the fact
that no identity markers are separate from the others that an individual embodies and is.
39
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Theology must attend to these identity markers without losing sight of the individual, unique
person.
The constructions of bodily identity may determine many aspects of one’s life but
one’s own narrative and individual expression in relation to them is just as important and
must be included in any theology that wants to be relevant for real people. Attending to
identity constructions guards against getting lost in the specificities of individual expression
and losing sight of the social constructions that always inform personal life. Attending to
individual circumstances and identities guards against a structuralist view of human identity
that leaves little room for uniqueness of expression and agency. The body as symbol reflects
on the person who lives and navigates social constructs and expresses individuality. This
approach to the body balances knowledge of various theories of sex/gender and race as well
as sensitivity to personal life stories. The concept of the body as symbol posits that the
person expresses and forms their body and that their body expresses and forms the person.
The body is both an expression and a construction.
The body as symbol invites theologians to consider the relationship between the
concept of construction and the body, including the idea of construction itself, the level of
bodily construction, and the agent(s) of construction. Fiona Bowie’s exploration of
philosophical, anthropological, and sociological work that treat the body as symbol provides
examples of how the body is a reflection and creation of its specific cultural context. These
approaches to the body as symbol argue that the body symbolizes, represents, and, some
argue, is the societal constructs of materiality in which it finds itself and comes to know
itself. There is much debate in theology and other disciplines about the “reality” of
constructions and some hesitation to think of bodies as construction since materiality is
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commonly considered the most real of realities.40 However, the term construction invites
reflection on how sex/gender and race influence and are our identities without depriving
them of their force in life. For example, most theorists and theologians understand race as a
social construction not a “real” biological distinction; yet saying it is a social construction is
not the same as relegating it to the status of illusion, which is just one theory of race.
Using construction as an organizing principle for discussion about sex/gender and
race invites dialogue about whether these bodily categories are transcendent, ontological,
ahistorical realities that tell us something ultimately true and timeless about ourselves or are
somehow constructed in time and place. One can understand the level of bodily construction
as total, as partial, or as none. If one accepts some level of construction in bodily life,
questions follow concerning who is doing the constructing and what kind of agency
individuals have within the matrix of construction. These initial questions about the
construction of material identity in terms of sex/gender and race disclose the existence of
various theories about sex/gender and race in both theology and theory. The meaning of
sex/gender and race varies according to the interpreter and even then no neat categorization
can capture any one thinker’s understanding of these identity markers. In a postmodern
context, theology must find methods to discuss race and sex/gender that recognize their
varied interpretation and simultaneously varied reality. Individuals understand and live
sex/gender and race differently and authentically.41 This variety includes multiple
explanations that may overlap and influence each other as well as exclude and contradict
each other. Approaching the body as symbol encourages and supports discourse about
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sex/gender and race that embraces the multiple realities and understandings of sex/gender
and race because the concept of symbol itself is open and allows for more than one meaning.
In addition, theology must be prepared to explore how race and sex/gender intersect and
influence each other. There is never just one construction of identity at work but several at
the same time.
The body as construction invites consideration of the language, history, and context
of the identity concepts by which it materializes and according to which it has meaning. My
investigation into theories of race and sex/gender includes three main ideas about the
relationship of the body and language. First, theologians must ask what language we use to
define bodies in their raced and sexed/gendered realities. Which language or narratives does
a theologian think important in furthering our understanding of bodies? Second, theologians
must interrogate how language forms bodies. Third, theologians must consider how the body
itself is language. Treating the body as symbol in theological discourse also invites
theologians to consider the history of bodily categories such as sex/gender and race. There
are many theories about how the body symbolizes the history of the context in which it finds
itself. The categories of the body may or may not be explained as historical and political
realities which have been constructed and reconstructed throughout history. Regardless of
whether one views the body’s meaning as historical or ahistorical, all must recognize the
influence of the body’s context on our understanding of it. Our understanding and
description of bodily categories such as race and sex/gender change in different historical
contexts and so the material identity markers that are important today, or were important
yesterday, may lose their importance in the future or may have already lost some of their
relevance for contemporary society. Thinking of the body as symbol embraces this
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changeability, whether it is explained in terms of the symbol’s birth, growth, change and
death, or in terms of our changing interpretation or growing understanding of the symbol.
Regardless of one’s approach to symbols, thinking of the body as symbol forces some level
of engagement with the historical shifts in the concepts of identity, such as sex/gender and
race.
Consideration of the body as construction, which includes reflection on the concept of
construction itself as well as the language, history, and context of the body’s identity
markers, is just one part of my proposal of the body as symbol. Bodies express more than
constructions and understanding constructions cannot tell us all we need to know about bodypersons. The other aspect of my proposal investigates the body as expression. If the body as
construction considers how the body informs the person, then the body as expression
addresses how the person informs the body. There are two important aspects of the
expression of the body. First, bodies express individual and communal interpretations of the
constructions of sex/gender and race. Second, the body is the expression of the unique
individual.
Personal interpretations of the constructions that give meaning to race and sex/gender
are expressed in the body. The same construct can take on different meanings for individuals
and groups. The philosophy, narratives, perspective, goals, and personal ambitions one
brings to this interpretation determine bodily expression. Differences in methodologies and
ontologies result in a multiplicity of meaning of sex/gender and race for bodily reality. The
expression of the body as symbol is each person’s expression of their self-knowledge, which
is their personal reality in relation to the constructions of race and sex/gender. This reality
might reflect an acceptance of the meaning of race and/or sex/gender received from their
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community or may involve contestations of these meanings. The body as expression
includes a person’s informed and lived sense of self which attends to the interconnection of
identity categories in one’s life that makes them aware that their identity fragments away
from sole categories of identity. Sex/gender and race may not only mean different things for
different people but have various levels of importance for their self-identity. Sex/gender and
race are interpreted differently because there are various experiences of them. As a result of
personal expressions of sex/gender and race, they exist as diverse realities. Communities
bring together persons with shared experience but even communities must recognize the
unique individuality of each of its members.
The body as symbol as a method for addressing materiality in theological
anthropology embraces the unique individuality of each body-person. The body expresses
this unique individuality and is always uniquely individual. Each body-person is a unique
utterance of the constructions that mark its identity as well as a unique occurrence of the
mystery of humanity. The unique expression that is the body-person may be shifting the very
constructions it is uttering in order for these to include the one time only utterance of any
individual person. Christians especially believe that the person is willed for their own sake
and represents a unique utterance of humanity by God. Therefore, there are and have been
untold numbers of expressions of the uniqueness of human living.42 The body as symbol
invites consideration of the individuality of the person in all the vastly different philosophical
and ontological approaches to sex/gender and race.
My investigation of the theology of Karl Rahner especially addresses the
individuality of each person and how this is reflected and expressed in their body. Starting
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with the belief that Christian revelation says something truthful about God and us, Rahner
concludes that beings, both human and divine, must be expressing something truthful in the
symbols they use to reveal themselves. God expresses self using the symbol of the
Incarnation and humans express their being using the symbol of the body. The materiality of
humanity becomes expressive of both human and divine life. It expresses uniqueness in both
ways. Human materiality expresses the unique being of the second person of the trinity that
has become incarnate and it expresses the unique being of each person who is a body. The
idea of being as expressive is important for thinking about human beings and what they may
be revealing through their body-selves.
In narrowing the analysis of human being from the general concepts of race and
sex/gender to individual persons, one becomes more and more aware of the varied and
complex instances of human identity. Womanist work especially teaches us this lesson. For
example, considering a black woman is different than just thinking about a black person or a
female person; and to be a black lesbian woman is different again. If class is added to the
analysis, one must recognize that a white middle class woman has a different identity and
reality than a poor white woman or still more different than a poor black woman whose
experience is different again from a middle class black woman. Black feminist and
womanist thought recognize that oppression cannot be reduced to one fundamental type and
that different oppressive forces work together to produce various instances of injustice. This
lack of attention to more than one identity factor that leads to oppression was and is a critique
womanist scholars level against both feminist scholars and black liberation theologians.
Their challenges charge theology to recognize that bodies are complex and unique if it hopes
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to address human reality. Neither sex/gender nor race can be approached as an independent
variable in the final analysis.
The very concept of symbol means that the body as materiality points to something
immaterial beyond it in which it participates and which it makes present. The body
participates in the societal constructs of its time and place and materializes them. The body
also participates in the individual identity of the human person and makes the person present
and known. The idea of symbol presents symbols as expressions which make something
intangible present, but which only can be understood in the context in which we find them.
The unique individuality of each body-person is always situated within the language, context,
and history in which they come to be. Addressing the body as construct and as individual
helps theologians better appreciate that identity markers both create community and fragment
it. The language, context, and history that form the constructs of identity will connect a
person to others that share some or all of these identity markers and form community for this
person based on shared language, belief, history, context, ability, religion, and so on. But
even within these seemingly bounded communities there will always be fragmentation
because they are made up of unique individuals. The boundaries of these communities and
the constructs which create them are always porous. This reality should not be problematic
for a Christian theology that confesses the uniqueness of each person as a never before
creation called into being individually by God and bound together in community through the
mystery of the Incarnation.
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V.

CONCLUSION
This balance of construction and expression in the idea of the body as symbol brings

together the goals of this dissertation. Thinking of the body-person as construct allows for
more adequate discourse about the specific identity markers of sex/gender and race. The
concept of construction is a good organizing tool and an instrument of education about
theories of sex/gender and race and how they are used in theology and theory. By deploying
this concept from contemporary theory, theologians can consider how the body is a reflection
and reality of its context. We come to learn that sex/gender and race are not concepts that are
outside of theological purview but intimately connected to its central themes. Understanding
the body as construct invites theologians to wrestle with the reality and complexity of
identity markers of the body such as race and sex/gender and our collective and individual
understandings of and relationships with them. But the concept of construction is not enough
for a full theological presentation of the body-person. Construction alone can focus on the
object of the body and lose sight of the subjective understanding and living of the body. It
also keeps race and sex/gender as separate concepts for consideration; but real human living
always knows their interrelationship. Theology must approach the individual and
communities not in terms of one category but a complex interaction of various discourses.
Therefore, theology needs to consider the body as expression in order to attend to individual
discourses about the body as well as communal counter-discourses that bring accepted and
commonsense understandings of sex/gender and race into question. This project is based on
the belief that race and sex/gender are important theological topics that are not being
adequately addressed in theological discourse. Approaching the body as symbol is a tool to
better develop theological conversation about these topics and address any oppressing and
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limiting aspects of them. More adequate and critical discourse about race and sex/gender
forms a crucial strategy in the overall battle against racism and sexism. The ultimate goal is
for each person to live to the fullest their unique instance of the imago Dei so that the Spirit
of God can more fully dwell among us all.
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EPILOGUE: AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

At the end of any project, one must ask oneself, “Where do I go from here?” This
dissertation has endeavored to develop a tool to better think about bodies in their specificity.
I narrowed my approach to a consideration of sex/gender and race in terms of white and
black, recognizing that any body and all bodies are more than these identities. This tool
should be expanded to include other identity markers. Any consideration of race in theology
must expand to include racial identities not included in the black-white paradigm, even if
influenced by it. In the United States Hispanic, Latino/a, and a variety of Asian American
identities represent other important racial distinctions. Considering the body as symbol
requires that any consideration of these identity markers must include how these
categorizations have been constructed in this country as well as the understanding of selfidentity that arises in each community. Recognizing that every racial group is diverse, it
would be necessary to map different understandings of each body categorization. In turn,
any consideration of sex/gender in theology must expand to include sexual identities that do
not fall neatly into the sexual dimorphism of male-female. Explorations of scholarly theories
and personal discourses about homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexual identity, and
transgendered identity must be considered in themselves as well as representing challenges to
our current understandings of sexual differentiation and gender. These further investigations
in the general topics of race and sex/gender are still just some of the identity categories that
mark bodies. Age, disability, and disease also affect how bodies are understood and treated
in our society and church as well as the body-persons who know these ways of being. The
endless expansion of a tool, however, is not the main purpose of creating it. Its
implementation is the reason for its creation. It is my intention to present the work of this
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dissertation as a tool for students, colleagues, church communities, and religious
communities to better consider the complexity of bodily identity. In its use and the
conversations that I hope it encourages, the tool will be refined.
Thinking of the body as symbol, as both a construction and an expression, has
implications for all areas of theological inquiry. It calls all theologians to be in dialogue with
theorists concerned with bodily identity. It also invites theologians to reflect on the literature
and stories of communities marked by different body categories. Both of these engagements
expose the theologian to the constructed and expressive aspects of bodily identity. No
theologian can be an expert on all identity formations, so theology must invite and welcome
diverse voices within its discipline. The presence of such diversity will not only present a
more nuanced theological study of the body, but diverse body-persons will bring new
questions, challenges, and propositions to central theological themes. This is already
beginning to happen, but mainstream theology and theological study must better incorporate
and appreciate the work of diverse body-persons. There is a reciprocal and interdependent
relationship between one’s theory and living of the body and one’s approach to the
theological enterprise. One only has to look to the Christology of James Cone, the theory of
atonement of Delores Williams, or the exegesis of Genesis of John Paul II to understand how
central one’s approach to the body is to theological study.
Let me present some ideas for the application of thinking of the body as symbol for
specific theological projects. Considering the body as symbol in biblical studies and
historical theology can lead to new insights on historical figures in the Christian tradition.
For example, the stories of Jesus with Martha and Mary in Lk 10:38-42 and Jn 11:1-44; 12:17 can be reread in light of this tool. An historical critical method helps us understand the
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constructions of sex/gender of the time. A narrative method helps us understand how the
expressions in word and deed of each of the characters is embracing or contesting these
constructions. In the stories from Luke and John, the characters sometimes acting according
to the sex/gender constructions of their time, and sometimes contesting them. It is interesting
to note that Jesus appears to be inviting the contestation. The balance of thinking of the body
as construction and expression continually reminds us that bodies did not all and always
mean one thing at any time in history. The unique individuals that are bodies express their
context and their individuality at all times. Approaching the stories in Luke and John by
keeping in mind the body as symbol presents the possibility for new understandings of early
Christian witness to bodies defined as male and female. In the same way, all historical
figures should be approached as both reflecting and embodying their context and expressing
their individuality through an acceptance or contestation of all or some of the aspects of this
context. In addition to biblical scholars and historical theologians, systematic theologians
must also be challenged to embrace a better appreciation of the body in its specificity.
Systematic theologians must be challenged to be systematic. Theologians should address
how their methods, theories of Christology, Trinitarian themes, and ecclesiologies influence
their theological anthropology and their understanding of body-persons who are specific in
time and in themselves. The study of any theologian’s work ought to question the
ramifications for our understanding of the body, including how we think about its race and
sex/gender. Studies of the theories of sex/gender and race of specific theologians can further
map the variety of approaches to the body in its specificity in theological discourse.
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